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Abstract 
In the context of oil price fluctuations inducing boom and bust cycles, this empirical study is a 
survival analysis of the Canadian oil and gas exploration and production (E&P) industry. The 
population includes 540 public Canadian E&P firms that have their headquarters and production 
activity in Canada, and the data covers the periods of Q1-2002 to Q1-2016 representing over 
15,850 firm-quarter observations. The method is an extended Cox model with repeating events, 
allowing for the use of time-varying predictor variables and the analysis is executed in R, a free 
statistical software. The study introduces a new definition of financial distress as two consecutive 
quarters of negative operating cash flow to total assets ratio, develops a baseline model with 
financial ratios and industry-specific covariates and tests three hypotheses. The first two 
hypotheses examine the extent to which hedging and company size respectively correlate to the 
state of financial distress, and the third hypothesis explores how being financially distressed 
contributes to being a target in a merger and acquisitions (M&A) transaction. The findings show 
that a hedging firm is 18.5 times less exposed to the hazard of financial distress than a non-
hedging firm; and with each unit size increase, a firm is 1.18 times less likely to experience 
financial distress, but financial distress is not a valid predictor of the hazard of being an M&A 
target. This study provides a new perspective supporting the use of hedging and size increase for 
increasing corporate resilience in Canadian oil and gas firms. 
Key words: Bankruptcy, Canadian oil and gas, Cox proportional hazards model, extended Cox 
model, financial distress, financial ratios, financial ratios history, firm size, 
hedging, M&A, survival analysis  
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Chapter 1: Overview 
Survival Analysis of Canadian Oil and Gas Firms 
Survival analysis is an advanced statistical technique of multi-linear regression analyses 
that serves for calculating the correlation of a predictor to an event, predict the likelihood over 
time of the hazard of the event and alternatively predict the probability of survival over time. The 
technique originated in medical sciences and has since been applied toward corporate failure and 
bankruptcy predictions using a specific survival analysis approach, the semi-parametric Cox 
proportional hazards (Cox PH) model (Deepa, n/a; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012; Laine & Reyes, 
2014; Yamazaki, 2013). Cox (1972) published the eponymous Cox PH model that uses only the 
value of the covariates – and thus does not require any indexing to prior distributions – for a 
regression analysis, provided the PH assumption is satisfied. The PH assumption requires that 
the values of the covariates remain constant over time. The specific outputs of a Cox PH model 
are the hazard function which gives the instantaneous potential per unit of time for failure to 
occur, given that the firm has survived up to that time, and the survival functions or cumulative 
hazards functions. When the covariates values change with time, the Cox PH model must be 
extended to satisfy the PH assumption. This research applies an extended Cox PH model that 
accommodates changes in the covariates’ values during the study period, and accepts the 
repetition of the hazard event (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). The method is 
an extended Cox model with repeating events that this research applies to a central concept of 
financial distress for a population of 540 Canadian oil and gas firms based on 15,850 firm-
quarters spanning the reporting period of Q1-2002 to Q1-2016. This overview chapter provides 
an economic context for the research with the problem statement, describes the purpose of the 
research and its significance, lays out a summary of the research design, stipulates the 
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hypotheses, frames the assumptions and limitations and lists the operational definitions of this 
study before concluding with a summary (Cox, 1972; Deepa, n/a; Fox, 2008; Klein & 
Kleinbaum, 2012; Laine & Reyes, 2014; Yamazaki, 2013). 
Problem Statement 
The problem is the dire financial distress situation Canadian oil and gas firms face during 
bust cycles (CAPP, 2016; Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; Millington, 2016; PSAC, 2016). Twenty 
Canadian oil and gas firms have filed for bankruptcy in the two years from September 2014 to 
August 2016 and several others are in financial distress (Haynes & Boone, 2016; Office of the 
Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, 2016). Canada has a commodity-driven economy that is 
highly sensitive to the health of its oil and gas industry. In Canada, the province of Alberta has, 
with 4.1 million barrels, the world’s third largest reserves of crude oil, following Saudi Arabia 
and Venezuela. Alberta counts for more than 80% of the country’s oil and gas production but the 
industry is active in 12 out of 13 Canadian provinces and territories (CAPP, 2016). The oil and 
gas industry in Canada follows boom and bust cycles and it is reactive to the volatility of the 
price of oil, booming when the price stays high and busting when it is low (Jakeman & 
Tertzakian, 2016; Millington, 2016). Alberta’s economy has been thriving with high levels of 
investment, sustained infrastructure development, full employment and even a shortage of skilled 
laborers since 2002; this long boom cycle has been synchronized with a steady rise in oil prices 
until June 2014 at USD 105.54 (Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; Macrotrends, 2016; Millington, 
2016). The economy was in crisis in 2001 when the oil price fell from USD 45.78 in November 
2000 to USD 26.02 in November 2001. The price of oil peaked in June 2008 at USD 151.72, 
then briefly dipped in January 2009 at USD 46.86 and remained high above USD 80.00 until it 
started going down after June 2014 reaching a floor of USD 28.50 in January 2016 
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(Macrotrends, 2016). Canada is a net exporter of oil and every annualized dollar increase in the 
price of oil barrel represents a CAD 1.7B GDP increase for the period of 2015-2021 per 
Millington (2016). Jakeman & Tertzakian, (2016) estimated that the industry sustains over 
440,000 direct and indirect jobs in September 2016 down from 500,000 in 2014 when the annual 
capital spending was CAD 81B and sustained low oil prices would risk eliminating 116,000 over 
the next five years. Natural Resources Canada (2017) estimated the oil and gas related jobs at 
191,415 direct jobs, 518,133 indirect jobs, and 203,065 oil and gas construction jobs. As of Q2 
2016 the industry’s nominal cash flow is the lowest since the 1990s, investment is reduced to 
legacy spending, production has declined, employment has fallen following systemic layoffs 
throughout the industry at large and the whole Albertan economy has considerably slowed down 
(Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016). Thus, the Canadian economy is largely driven by its oil and gas 
industry which follows boom and bust cycles. Millington (2016) estimated that the national GDP 
could be 23% lower if the price of oil remains low on average and grows slowly to reach only 
USD 51.00 by 2021 compared to a base case of USD 73.00. Canada exports 97% of its 
production to the USA where the oil and gas industry is also feeling the impact of low prices 
with a 379% spike in corporate bankruptcies in the oil and gas sector in 2015 (CAPP, 2016; 
Dionne, Plastino & Shaked, 2016). Many Canadian oil and gas firms are heavily indebted, 
illiquid, insolvent or outright bankrupt and the industry’s distress ripples through the entire 
economy. While intuitively understandable and their impact practically observable, the drivers of 
the economic survival of Canadian oil and gas firms are not dynamically analyzed and 
documented in the literature and this study aims at contributing to fill that gap (CAPP, 2016; 
Dionne, et al., 2016; Haynes & Boone, 2016; Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; Macrotrends, 2016; 
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Millington, 2016; Natural Resources Canada, 2017; Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy 
Canada, 2016; PSAC, 2016). 
Purpose of Research 
The purpose of this quantitative empirical study is to assess the relationship of 
explanatory variables to the survival time of Canadian oil and gas firms through an extended Cox 
model with repeating events (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012), that allows to 
estimate and interpret the cumulative hazard or the survivor function these predictor variables 
represent for the dependent variable. In survival analysis, the hazard function gives the 
instantaneous potential per unit of time for the event of financial distress to occur, given that the 
firm has survived up to that time. The survivor function gives the probability that a firm survives 
longer than some specified time (Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). This quantitative study 
uses a sample of 540 public Canadian exploration and production (E&P) firms having published 
quarterly financial reporting for the period covering the first quarter of 2002 (Q1-2002) until the 
first quarter of 2016 (Q1-2016), and representing over 15,850 firm-quarters of data collected. 
The methodology is quantitative and the method is an extended Cox model with repeating 
events, which allows for the use of time-dependent covariates and the reoccurrence of the state of 
financial distress for the same firm (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). For the 
first two hypotheses in this study, the dependent variable is financial distress, for which the 
researcher introduces a new definition in this study as two consecutive quarters of a negative 
ratio of operating cash flow divided by total assets (OCF/TA); and for the third hypothesis, it is 
the status of being an M&A target. As a preamble to the central hypotheses, this study includes 
the development of a baseline model for which the dependent variable is financial distress and 
the independent variables are covariates including financial ratios for liquidity, solvency, 
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profitability, valuation, efficiency, energy and size. The study aims to assess to what extent each 
covariate in the baseline model influences financial distress, and for the hypotheses, understand 
if hedging helps to prevent financial distress, if small size aggravates financial distress and if 
financially distressed firms are more prone to being merged or acquired (Cox, 1972; Fox; 2008; 
Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
Survival is the time until the event of financial distress happens, and in this study the 
event of financial distress can happen multiple times for the same firm (Fox, 2008; Klein & 
Kleinbaum, 2012). The researcher uses a survival analysis technique known as the extended Cox 
model, with repeating events, which allows for including time-dependent covariates in the 
independent variables (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). The independent 
variables are covariates predictors combining in a vector that is a function of proportional 
hazards characterizing the dependent variable of financial distress. As an alternative to a vector, 
the survival analysis can also use univariate predictors to individually test the independent 
variables. The literature on bankruptcy, corporate failure and financial distress is large and has 
evolved through successive research paradigms providing multiple analytical techniques (Aziz & 
Dar, 2006; Horrigan, 1968). Starting with financial ratios analysis, these methods include the 
univariate analysis by Beaver (1966), the multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) by Altman 
(1968), the conditional probability models by Ohlson (1980) or Zmijewski (1984) and many 
alternative intelligent techniques such as neural networks, decision trees, support vector 
machines or multidimensional scaling, and have in common to perform a binary pass/fail 
snapshot analysis and prediction. On the contrary, this study is a survival analysis, a statistical 
technique that is more dynamic, uses larger data and provides more analytical depth as well as 
predictive power in understanding the determinants of survival. Survival analysis is a regression 
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analysis technique widely used in epidemiology, biostatistics and to a lesser extent engineering, 
finance and social sciences (InfluentialPoints, 2016; Pereira, 2014). The methods to perform a 
survival analysis can be parametric with an assumption that the underlying distribution of the 
survival times follows a probability distribution such as exponential, Weibull and lognormal 
distributions; nonparametric like the Kaplan-Meier graphical representation of survival curves 
used for univariate analyses; and semi-parametric like the Cox PH model (Klein & Kleinbaum, 
2012). The Cox PH model is the approach that finance and social empirical studies commonly 
use (Chancharat, Davy, McCrae & Tian, 2007; Chen & Lee, 1993; Chong, He, Li & Zhang, 
2010; Pereira, 2014) . The preference for this method lies in its semi-parametric property that 
dispenses from  assuming and defining a probability distribution for the survival times; therefore 
unlike the more cumbersome parametric models, the baseline hazard in a semi-parametric 
survival analysis is an unspecified function. Additionally, the Cox PH model also derives its 
success from the fact that it is statistically robust and delivers results very close to the parametric 
models (Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). To be valid, the Cox PH model requires the satisfaction of 
the proportional hazard assumption: the hazard ratio (HR) is constant over time or more 
specifically the hazard for one firm is proportional to the hazard for any other firm and the 
proportionality remains constant, independent of time. The PH assumption verifies naturally for 
covariates that remain constant over the study period such as sex, geographic location or other 
stable attributes that social studies often use. However, when the values of the covariates change 
for each firm over the study period, that means that the covariates fluctuate with time, and the 
model no longer satisfies the PH assumption. Such predictor variables are time-dependent 
covariates and require extending the original Cox PH model with a unique time coefficient or a 
stratification of the data to mitigate the fluctuating impact of time on the predictors (Cox, 1972; 
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Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). The independent variables in this study are time-
dependent and the method is a Cox extended model (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 
2012). This research revolves around the key construct of financial distress with an ad hoc 
definition. The theoretical foundations include a review of the theory on financial distress and 
corporate failure starting from the origins of financial ratios until the current state of research, 
and a literature review of the specific constructs for the hypotheses: hedging, firm size, and 
merger and acquisitions (Altman, 1968; Aziz & Dar, 2006; Beaver, 1966; Chancharat, et al., 
2007; Chen & Lee, 1993; Chong, et al., 2010; Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Horrigan, 1968; 
InfluentialPoints, 2016; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012; Ohlson,1980; Pereira, 2014; Zmijewski, 
1984).  
This research includes a review of 26 studies on bankruptcy and financial distress which 
allow the researcher to confirm the conclusions of Outecheva (2007) that the literature agrees on 
recognizing that there is no universally and commonly agreed upon definition of financial 
distress, the main construct of interest of this study. Multiple definitions and measures exist in 
diverse empirical studies and each researcher designed their own construct to fit the purpose of 
their research (Outecheva; 2007). In this study, the researcher introduces a new  definition of 
financial distress as two consecutive quarters of negative OCF/TA. This definition is, to the best 
of the researcher’s knowledge, original in the literature and it stems from a rationale with 
multiple elements. The E&P sector in oil and gas is a cash-intensive and asset-heavy business 
with long lead times and a strong dependency on assets productivity and profitability to ensure a 
level profitability that grants endogenous long-term sustainability including assets renewal, 
covering the cost of capital, profit redistribution, strategic growth and potential share buy-backs 
(CAPP, 2016; Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; Harp Jr. & Howard, 2009; PSAC, 2016). That long 
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range sustainability and profitability relies on a backbone of sufficient, well maintained, 
upgraded, well run and reliable asset base. This requires a continuous significant level of capital 
investment and the return on that investment in turns demands to “sweat the assets” (Harrison, 
2005) to produce efficiently enough in order to generate the cash flow that maintains the 
profitability, sustainability and growth necessary in a competitive sector that is highly sensitive 
to the externality of low oil prices. OCF/TA is an asset efficiency ratio measuring the cash flow 
generated by the assets. With the consideration of survival, as opposed to investing in an E&P 
stock for a quick profit opportunity, the fundamental value of the E&P firms relies on their 
assets. Bankers and other refinancers know this and as long as the assets are productive enough, 
E&P firms can access refinancing in case of a temporary liquidity shortfall. Therefore in a 
context of oil price volatility, E&P firms can experience a low or even negative asset efficiency 
ratio during one reporting period without necessarily needing to take strategic action for 
correcting the impact on profitability and sustainability. They are expected as required, to be able 
to generally refinance and access cash in the period following the reporting of a negative asset 
efficiency ratio. But when the negative ratio repeats in a subsequent contiguous quarter, the 
firm’s ability to sustain its profitability on the sole strength of its assets weakens considerably.  
At that stage, the company may already be experiencing liquidity tension or close to it but it is 
not yet completely illiquid or insolvent or even bankrupt. The company is in financial distress, 
not yet in financial death. That state of financial distress includes liquidity tension and the firm is 
in what  Outecheva (2007) described as a “death struggle”. In that stage, in accordance with the 
definition of Hillier, Jaffe, Jordan, Ross and Westerfield (2012), the firm needs to take strategic 
corrective action and as Davydenko (2013) framed, potentially access external refinancing. The 
death struggle can ultimately result in a resurrection, a merger or a bankruptcy. The definition of 
SURVIVAL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN OIL AND GAS FIRMS 25 
  
financial distress using two consecutive quarters of negative asset efficiency ratio is distinct from 
alternative definitions in the literature, especially those that simply use the legal filing for 
bankruptcy as a threshold, illiquidity or insolvency. This definition ties into the asset-heavy and 
cash-intensive nature of the E&P business, includes access to refinancing during temporary 
operational hiccups or externalities, and intends to capture the structural failure endangering the 
self-sustaining profitability. This definition also includes the need for strategic action while the 
firm can still fight for its survival, provided its management possesses the financial and strategic 
acumen to recognize and acknowledge the severity of the distress at that moment. This study first 
analyzes the extent to which non-collinear ratios of liquidity, solvency, profitability and industry-
specific indicators contribute to financial distress. Then, as hedging is a practice more or less in 
use in the industry, the study aims at understanding whether hedging provides a protection 
against financial distress. The oil and gas industry in Canada is very diverse in terms of 
participants size, and large with several thousands of companies operating in E&P (CAPP, 2016; 
PSAC, 2016); and while not all firms are public, there is a large enough span of sizes to try to 
understand if size impacts financial distress and if smaller firms are more exposed to its hazard. 
For all these questions, the dependent variable is financial distress and the independent variables 
are the vectors of covariates that relate best to the specific question of interest. For the last 
question this study explores, the consideration shifts to the fact that in a still growing industry 
with several actors and where the fundamental value lies in the reserves, there is a concurrent 
level of mergers and acquisitions which reflects a natural evolution toward industry 
consolidation and which seems to be an integral part of the value chain for smaller players. In 
this context, the study seeks to observe whether being financially distressed influences merging 
or being acquired. For this last question, the dependent variable is the status of M&A in a 
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Heaviside function and the independent variable is primarily the financial distress status and 
secondarily a vector of covariates including liquidity, solvency, profitability and valuation ratios 
(CAPP, 2016; Davydenko 2013; Harp Jr. & Howard, 2009; Harrison, 2005; Hillier et al., 2012; 
Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; Outecheva, 2007; PSAC, 2016). 
This study contributes to the literature on multiple levels. The first includes the construct 
of interest and the method, the second is on the industry and the country, and the third level is 
about the questions this research analyzes. The paradigm of defining financial distress is neither 
established nor unified (Outecheva, 2007), and in the post-positivist approach governing this 
study, there is a clear attempt at proposing an original definition of financial distress that builds 
on an industry, a finance, and a strategic rationale while leveraging existing literature inputs from 
Davydenko (2013), Outecheva (2007), Hillier et al. (2012) and others before them. Although the 
E&P industry characteristics influence it, this definition of financial distress is eligible to fit 
several other industries or for a generic use. The method of an extended Cox model (Cox, 1972; 
Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012),  is to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, a first in 
survival analyses focusing on oil and gas, and the sample size is also unprecedentedly large; both 
of these originalities contribute to the existing empirical knowledge. Another level of 
contribution is the focus on Canada and the oil and gas E&P sector in Canada. This study is the 
first attempt since Chen and Lee (1993), to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, at running a 
survival analysis on oil and gas; their study used a Cox PH model, not an extended Cox model, 
thus did not include time-dependent covariates, and it did not focus on Canada. Their study used 
a smaller sample size of 175 firms observed over three years including 67 distressed firms, while 
this research has a larger sample of 540 firms observed over 14 years. While Chen and Lee 
(1993) used a Cox PH model with the assumption that the proportionality of covariates remains 
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constant over time, they did recommend for future research to use time-dependent covariates. 
Comparatively, the larger sample of this study over a longer time and the inclusion of time-
dependency should yield greater accuracy. Finally the questions relating to hedging and M&A 
this study explores, are original and should feed into the significance of the study (Chen & Lee, 
1993; Cox, 1972; Davydenko, 2013; Fox, 2008; Hillier et al., 2012; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012; 
Outecheva, 2007). 
Significance of the Study 
The significance of this research derives from its originality and its practical use for the 
business world. The originality of this research is about the country, the industry, the 
methodology and the hypotheses. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this study is the first 
survival analysis using time-dependent covariates focused on E&P firms in Canada. The 
practical use of this research will be of benefit to oil and gas managers, engineering, procurement 
and contracting managers (EPCM), other servicing suppliers to E&P companies, or creditors and 
analysts. Managers will better understand the state of financial distress this study proposes and 
still have an opportunity to act upon it with strategic action before the company becomes 
insolvent and is forced to file for bankruptcy. EPCM and servicing companies representing 
195,415 jobs in Canada (Natural Resources Canada, 2017) will have an interest in managing 
their prospective counterparty risk before engaging into material or long-term deals with E&P 
firms in financial distress. Creditors and analysts will benefit a better perspective in assessing the 
viability and distress level of firms while making refinancing decisions or recommendations on 
the stocks (CAPP, 2016; Davydenko, 2013; Natural Resources Canada, 2017; PSAC, 2016).  
The state of financial distress in this study follows what Outecheva (2007) calls a death 
struggle and includes the need for a strategic corrective action that Hillier et al. (2012) stressed in 
SURVIVAL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN OIL AND GAS FIRMS 28 
  
their definition of financial distress. In that state, firms are becoming illiquid or even insolvent 
but they are not yet in default or bankrupt. They need to take drastic action to reduce costs, 
restructure, divest, ally, merge, devise a new strategy or business plan and show strong 
management commitment and focus, to leverage their tangible assets and improve profitability. 
Firms in financial distress still have time to take such corrective action and secure refinancing 
along with sending the right confidence signals to the market to avoid entering receivership. 
Actual default occurs when the firm misses on a payment by its due date and Davydenko (2013) 
reported that 62% of defaults on bonds occur in the 30 days preceding one of the two semi-
annual scheduled payments of June and December, including 29% on the actual payment date. 
This study should therefore provide a new helpful perspective to the stakeholders directly 
involved in diagnosing financial distress and taking decisive action to save it with a prospective 
of improved profitability based on efficient assets and convincing managerial focus. There are 
more than 250 E&P firms trading in Canada that represent about 12% of the TSX, about 500,000 
jobs, CAD 72B in revenue, CAD 80B in capital investment and CAD 17B in royalty payments 
(Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; TMX, 2016). This survival analysis on their financial distress 
based on the efficiency of their assets, which drives their liquidity, solvency and long-term 
profitability will be directly beneficial to all of them, especially right before and during cycles 
busts (CAPP, 2016; Davydenko, 2013; Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; Hillier et al., 2012; 
Outecheva, 2007; TMX, 2016).   
The hedging literature reveals varied reasons for hedging and a wide span of hedging 
levels. Jin and Jorion (2006) and Lookman (2004) concluded that hedging does not increase firm 
value in oil and gas. This study will complement the analytical portfolio of oil and gas managers 
when they optimize their decision to hedge part or all their production, factoring in the varied 
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strategic objectives to hedge or not and the expertise and transaction costs it requires. They will 
now have an empirical reference shining light on whether hedging helps prevent a structural and 
serious but manageable state of financial distress. Practitioners intuitively expect firm size to 
influence resilience and while the literature does provide some insights, this study will provide a 
tangible reference specific to Canadian oil and gas firms as no other exists so far. Investment 
bankers and managers consider M&A at the deal and transaction level, focusing on the deal size, 
the premium, the synergies, the industry consolidation or redesign and the comparatives. 
Economists considering M&A may have a wider perspective and correlate the cycles of M&A 
activity to others such as boom and busts cycles in oil and gas. Financial economists and scholars 
have analyzed M&A as a bankruptcy avoidance strategy (Kyimaz, 2006) or found similar 
predictive keys between bankruptcy and M&A (Powell & Yawson, 2007). Any or all, of these 
inquisitive minds with an interest in M&A should find in this study empirical material that will 
help understand patterns, predictors, and plan action, timing, and valuation strategies in a volatile 
and competitive industry where the slightest information asymmetry can be a decisive 
competitive advantage (Jin & Jorion, 2006; Kyimaz, 2006; Lookman, 2004; Powell & Yawson, 
2007).  
This study is original in its method and its scope. The Canadian oil and Gas E&P industry 
is important to the national economy, with CAD $142B in 2015 nominal GDP representing 7.7% 
of Canadian GDP, and 709,548 direct and indirect jobs representing 3.9% of total employment 
(Natural Resources Canada, 2017). In a recent study, Millington (2016) estimated that every 
Canadian dollar gain in annualized WTI price represents approximately CAD 1.7B increase in 
GDP for the period of 2014-2021 (Millington, 2016). Additionally, CAPP (2016) estimated that  
for every two job additions in Canadian oil and gas, an equivalent new job appears in the US 
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(CAPP, 2016). Thus, oil and gas impacts several stakeholders in an intricate value chain that 
includes 518,133 directs jobs and 195,415 indirect jobs of oil and gas construction or EPCM, to 
which additional sectors such as railroad transportation or other services (e.g. hospitality in oil 
and gas driven centers like Calgary in Alberta) are also tributary (Natural Resources Canada, 
2017). This study will be of great and varied interest to all managers, practitioners, analysts, 
scholars and other stakeholders involved in Canadian Oil and Gas, and probably beyond. 
However, it remains that to validate its significance this research needs a strong, complete, 
defendable and replicable design (CAPP, 2016; Millington, 2016; Natural Resources Canada, 
2017). 
Research Design 
The description of the research design below situates the methodology in the literature 
and introduces the method of survival analysis, describes the population, defines the concept of 
financial distress and expands on the actual statistical analysis procedure at the core of this study. 
This quantitative research uses published financial data statements as independent variables that 
the researcher cannot control, alter or manipulate to change the dependent variable. Therefore, 
this research is a non-experimental study. This research inscribes in the field of analysis on 
corporate failure and bankruptcy prediction which has originated with financial ratios analysis in 
the early twentieth century and gradually evolved until maturing as a paradigm with Beaver’s 
univariate analysis (Beaver, 1966) and Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 1968) using a multi-
discriminant analysis. The paradigm shifted in the early 1980s with conditional probability 
models by Ohlson (1980) and Zmijewsky (1984), and opened to several alternatives methods 
since then, including intelligent techniques such as neural networks, decision trees, support 
vector machines or multidimensional scaling. All these predictive techniques have in common to 
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adopt a binary pass/fail approach which is a limit that motivated early pioneers in applying 
survival analysis to corporate failure, among them Chen and Lee (1993). Survival analysis is a 
statistical technique widely used in epidemiology, biostatistics and to a lesser extent engineering 
and finance that allows for a better understanding of the time-to-event and the impact of 
covariates on the survival time (InfluentialPoints, 2016; Pereira, 2014, Klein & Kleinbaum, 
2012). The literature abundantly documented the limits of MDA and other probabilistic models 
and Davydenko (2013) summarized a preference for survival analysis by many empiricists in 
asserting that “hazard analysis has become the instrument of choice in empirical studies 
predicting default and bankruptcy” (Davydenko, 2013, p.25). The methods to perform a survival 
analysis can be parametric, semi-parametric or non-parametric. Parametric methods require 
defining a baseline hazard as they carry an assumption that the underlying distribution of the 
survival times follows a probability distribution such as exponential, Weibull, lognormal, log-
logistic or gamma distributions. Semi-parametric models do not hold that assumption and do not 
require the use of a probability distribution for defining a baseline hazard, and the most popular 
method is the Cox proportional hazards model proposed by Cox (1972). They allow for only 
using the covariates. Nonparametric models like the Kaplan-Meier graphical representation of 
survival curves or the life-table method are mainly used for univariate analyses. The survival 
analysis method of choice in finance and social sciences is the Cox PH model. The preference 
for the method stems from it not requiring a baseline function as opposed to the more 
cumbersome parametric models and it being statistically robust in delivering results very close to 
the parametric models (Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). The Cox PH model requires the satisfaction 
of the proportional hazard assumption: the hazard ratio (HR) is constant over time or more 
specifically the hazard for one firm is proportional to the hazard for any other firm and the 
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proportionality remains constant, independent of time. This underlying assumption means that 
the covariates the study uses are time-independent. When the value of some covariates changes 
with time and makes the proportionality of covariates inconstant, those covariates are time-
dependent. Those do not generally satisfy the PH assumption and the Cox PH model is not 
appropriate for a survival analysis involving time-dependent or time-varying covariates. The 
appropriate semi-parametric method for time-dependent covariates is the extended Cox model. 
The extension of the Cox PH model for time-dependent covariates consists in either stratifying 
the data in homogenous time-independent blocks or adding a time coefficient to the Cox PH 
model (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). The theoretical foundations of 
survival analysis, the Cox PH model and the extended Cox model with a time coefficient lead the 
way below to the specific research technique for this study (Altman, 1968; Beaver, 1966; Chen 
and Lee, 1933; Cox, 1972; Davydenko, 2013; Fox, 2008; InfluentialPoints, 2016; Klein & 
Kleinbaum, 2012; Ohlson 1980; Pereira, 2014; Zmijewsky, 1984). 
This study is a quantitative analysis using a sample of 540 Canadian E&P firms publicly 
traded on the TSX anytime between Q1-2002 and Q1-2016. The sample includes only firms that 
meet the following criteria: they are in the upstream oil and gas business of exploration and 
production (E&P); they are headquartered in Canada; their production takes place in Canada; and 
they are publicly traded in Canada, on the TSX or the TSXV. The quarterly financial reporting of 
these public 540 firms represents 14 years of data and 15,850 firm-quarters. While Canadian oil 
and gas firms have not benefitted from being the focus of any other survival analysis, to the best 
of the researcher’s knowledge, authors have worked on Canadian business failure prediction 
models and reported that “a major obstacle in Canadian business failure prediction research is the 
scarcity and poor organization of available data” (Boritz, Kennedy & Sun, 2007, p. 147). 
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Davydenko (2013) used the databases of Moody’s, Merrill Lynch, LSTA/LPC Mark-to-Market 
Pricing Database, Mergent’s Fixed Income Securities Database, Thomson Reuters and 
Compustat to perform a survival analysis using Cox PH, focused on bond default and insolvency 
of 306 public Canadian firms. The study in this research has a different focus than Davydenko’s 
(2013) credit analysis and requires financial statement data for all firms in the sample. The 
primary data source for this research is Canoils, a privately-owned database started in 1985 and 
focused exclusively on Canadian Oil and Gas companies. Canoils belongs to the JuneWarren-
Nickle’s Energy Group (JWN) a publishing firm that provides paying access to Canoils to 
professional subscribers such as oil and gas corporations, credit analysts and banks, media or 
educational institutions. JWN graciously granted the researcher a free access to the data for this 
study (Boritz et al., 2007; Davydenko, 2013).  
The financial literature does not provide a universally accepted standard definition of the 
notion or status of financial distress. This post-positivist research focuses on this notion and 
defines it as two consecutive quarters of negative ratios of operating cash flows to total assets, a 
definition that builds on the work of Outecheva (2007) and Hillier et al. (2012) with the intent to 
capture the quintessential state of short and long-term risk to the resilience, growth and 
profitability of E&P firms. This definition of financial distress is the central construct of interest 
of this study for which the researcher selects predictor variables including a Heaviside function 
for hedging, a proxy in the form of the natural logarithm of total assets for firm size, another 
Heaviside function for M&A, and liquidity ratios, profitability ratios, solvency ratios, valuation 
ratios, energy ratios and efficiency proxies for the baseline model (Outecheva, 2007; Hillier et 
al., 2012).  
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The core statistical analysis of this study consists in collecting the data (see appendix B), 
building the relevant financial ratios for each firm-quarter (see appendix C), laying out the data 
for use in R, the statistical software running the survival analysis (see appendix D), coding R (see 
appendix E), running an extended Cox model and interpreting the results (see appendix F). The 
study explores three hypotheses and precedes them with a baseline model. Prior to running the 
survival analyses this study focuses on, the study includes a descriptive statistics section that 
analyses the data through standard statistical values such as the mean, the median or the standard 
deviation. The baseline foundational model includes a vector of covariates that allows 
determining the correlation to financial distress of liquidity, solvency and profitability ratios. For 
each analysis in the baseline model and the three hypotheses, the result interpretation starts with 
appraising the model validity through the following goodness of fit tests: likelihood ratio test, 
Wald test, score (logrank) test, concordance and R-square. If the model goodness of fit is 
satisfactory, the next phase in interpreting the results consists in verifying whether the rejection 
or lack thereof of the null hypothesis by reading the p-value which must be lower than 0.05, 
reading the HR which must be different from one, and ensuring that the confidence interval (CI) 
is also different from one, for concluding to the rejection of the null hypothesis. Provided the null 
hypothesis is rejected, the analysis then progresses to interpret the regression, typically by 
reading the point estimate hazard ratio (HR) in a survival analysis along with its CI, or by 
reading directly the regression coefficient with its CI for continuous predictor variables. The 
hazard ratio describes the relationship between the covariate and financial distress and gives the 
instantaneous potential per unit of time (quarter in this study) for failure (financial distress) to 
occur, given that the firm has survived up to that quarter. The HR tells how strong is the 
relationship of the predictor variable to the dependent variable by showing how many times the 
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independent variable for firms exposed to the event (e.g. financially distressed firms) correlates 
to the event more (or less) than it does for the whole population including censored firms. The 
analysis may also include a visual representation of the survival curve or its alternative 
cumulative hazard curve which is a curve of the regression analysis for all the data in the model. 
This curve is the hazard function which gives a conditional failure rate with a scale from zero to 
infinity and the survivor function gives the probability that a firm survives longer than some 
specified time. Chapter 3 of this study contains a detailed mathematical description of the Cox 
PH and the extended Cox models this study uses (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 
2012).  
In summary, the research objective is to: 
• Collect the financial reporting data, verify it and build the financial ratios for each 
firm and each quarter in Excel. 
• Analyze in Excel the descriptive statistics of the data. 
• Layout the data in Excel for use in R, the statistical software this study uses to 
perform the survival analysis, as a CSV file. 
• Code and run the survival analyses in R for each predictor variable or vector of 
covariates as required. 
• Assess the model’s goodness of fit and proceed further only if the model is valid. 
• Check if the model rejects the null hypothesis and proceed further only if it does. 
• Interpret the HR or the regression coefficient. 
• Run and interpret the cumulative hazard curve.  
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The research design establishes the key constructs of survival analysis, financial distress, 
population and analytical procedure, and this analytical framework serves to test the substantial 
research hypotheses of this study. 
Research Hypotheses  
The baseline model serves to construct in Excel the observations of financial ratios and 
other proxies for each firm and each period. This represents over 15,850 observations and for 
each predictor variable, the baseline model tests a null hypothesis of no correlation and no 
predictive ability to the dependent variable of financial distress. The preparation work of the 
baseline model helps for the data analysis and data layout of the hypotheses this study 
researches.  
The first question R1 is: does the presence of an active hedging policy influences 
financial distress? The hypotheses formulating question R1 are: 
- Null hypothesis H10: Hedging has no influence on preventing financial distress. 
- Alternative hypothesis H1a: Hedging does influence the prevention of financial distress. 
For research question R1, the dependent variable is financial distress and the independent 
variable is a Heaviside function identifying the presence of hedging in percentage of BOE 
hedged with “1” and the absence of hedging with “0”. The sample size for this research question 
differs from the baseline models as it includes a shorter time frame starting in Q1-2007 and 
ending in Q1-2016. The Q1-2007 starting period reflects the beginning of a compulsory 
reporting of hedging activity for Canadian oil and as firms as required by the National 
Instrument 51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities (NI 51-101). The sample 
size for this hypothesis is 515 firms and 11,005 observations. The null hypothesis is rejected if 
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HR and CI are different from one and the p-value is smaller than 0.05 (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; 
Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012; Ontario Securities Commission, 2016). 
The second research question R2 is whether firm size influences financial distress? The 
hypotheses for this question are:  
- Null hypothesis H20: Smaller size does not influence financial distress. 
- Alternative hypothesis H2a: Smaller size influences financial distress. 
The dependent variable remains financial distress and the independent variable is 
company size measured as the natural log of total assets. The sample size is the same as the 
baseline model’s. For R2 too, the null hypothesis is rejected if HR and CI are different from one 
and the p-value is smaller than 0.05 (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
The third research question R3 is: does being financially distressed influences being an 
M&A target? The hypotheses are:  
- Null hypothesis H30: Financial distress does not influence the propensity to be an M&A 
target. 
- Alternative hypothesis H3a: Financial distress is a catalyst to being an M&A target. 
The dependent variable is a proxy for M&A activity in the form of a Heaviside function 
of “1” for M&A activity and “0” for the lack of M&A activity. The sample size is 166 firms and 
175 events, some firms having more than one transaction during the period of study of Q1-2002 
to Q1-2016. An event is a status of being a target in an M&A completed transaction. Consistent 
with the first two hypotheses, the null hypothesis is rejected if HR and CI are different from one 
and the p-value is smaller than 0.05 (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
The baseline model of this study intends to capture the specifics structural factors that 
contribute to a distressed state that may endanger the going concern of Canadian oil and gas 
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firms and thus require a transformational strategic action. This foundational analysis is important 
to enabling a focus on the three research hypotheses that shed light on precise external and 
managerial factors relevant to the oil and gas industry. The constructs of interest and the method 
of this study are open to interpretation and therefore require a context of assumptions and 
limitations for grounding this research. 
Assumptions and Limitations 
This study takes place in a post-positivist paradigm where the methodology is a non-
experimental quantitative design using a precise statistical analysis and the axiology includes the 
researcher’s worldview in selecting and defining the key constructs of interest. The assumptions 
and limitations framing this research are methodological, theoretical, specific to the research 
topic, and relate to the method of the extended Cox model. They include the sampling, the 
definition of financial distress and the selection of the predictor variables, the method of survival 
analysis, the interpretation metrics and the specific assumptions around the proxies for the 
hypotheses and oil and gas metrics. 
The scope of this study restricts the sample to Canadian oil and gas E&P firms that have 
their headquarters and production in Canada and that are publicly listed on the Canadian stock 
exchange, the TSX. As companies report their financial statements quarterly, the metric in use 
for the frequency and the volume of data is the firm-quarter. In the literature, the firm-month is a 
metric that appears in empirical studies (Chen & Lee, 1993; Davydenko, 2013), but this study 
uses firm-quarter since it corresponds to the frequency of reporting and the size of the sample of 
540 firms over 14 years yields a statistically significant sample of more than 15,850 firm-
quarters. The sample size for the baseline model is 15,836 firm-quarters, the sample size for the 
first hypothesis on hedging is 11,005 firm-quarters; it is 15,854 firm-quarters for the second 
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hypothesis on firm size, and 3,698 firm-quarters for the third hypothesis on M&A. To simplify 
the language in this study, the researcher uses a generic 15,850 firm-quarters when referring to 
an overall sample size (Chen & Lee, 1993; Davydenko, 2013). 
Theoretically, the researcher’s view and choices characterize the central constructs of 
financial distress definition and selection of covariates. A review of the literature shows that 
there is no consensus on the definition of financial distress. Over the past century, the notion 
appeared under various phrases and the variety of criteria authors have used include asset value, 
bankruptcy, default, liquidity, insolvency, dividend reduction, restructuring, profitability, stock 
market value, lay-offs, sales growth reduction or distressed exchange offers. Noting this 
heterogeneity, Outecheva (2007) posited that “the state of the art in the theory of financial 
distress is rather to interpret it as dependent on the purpose of research under a particular point 
[sic] of view” (Outecheva, 2007, p.18). In this study, the researcher defines financial distress as 
two consecutive quarters of negative operating cash flow to total assets ratio. The intent of this 
definition is to fit a cash-intensive industry with long lead times where companies must “sweat 
the assets” (Harrison, 2005) to make them generate the cash flow that can sustain their renewal 
and the overall profitability of the firm. Financial health depends on assets efficiency and a 
negative ratio of OCF/TA in any quarter should alarm company management while still leaving 
time for refinancing, which is possible and normally accessible in an integrated economic value 
chain where banks recognize the value of collaterals in oil and gas firms, typically heavy and 
valuable production equipment or reserves. This access to refinancing is consistent with 
Davydenko’s approach to financial distress (Davydenko, 2013).  However, when a firm suffers a 
second consecutive quarter of asset inefficiency, it falls into financial distress, a stage where 
liquidity is a potential problem that may worsen, where the firm is not yet systematically in 
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technical default or even insolvent, but where management needs to take material and strategic 
action such as restructuring, strategic partnerships, lay-offs, reorganization accompanied with a 
sound and credible project and financial strategy. Following Turetsky and McEwen (2001) and 
Whitaker (1999), Outecheva (2007) called this phase death struggle, where the fate of the 
company could either go towards a renewed positive momentum or a filing for bankruptcy; and 
Hillier et al. (2012) defined that a firm in financial distress needs to take strategic action, 
consistent with Platt and Platt (2002), Andrade and Kaplan (1998) and Brown, James and 
Mooradian (1992). The definition of financial distress as two consecutive quarters of negative 
OCF/TA ratio fits asset heavy industries such as exploration and production (E&P) in oil and 
gas, and leverages the contributions of Davydenko (2013), Outecheva (2007), Hillier et al. 
(2012) and their predecessors. With similarity to the variety existing in defining financial 
distress, the choice of predictor variables is also very diverse in the literature and in this study the 
researcher’s own selection is ontologically personal. Seeking completeness, mutual exclusivity 
and relevance, the researcher identifies liquidity, solvency, profitability, valuation, energy, size, 
and operational efficiency ratios that best combine into vectors of covariates for the baseline 
model and each research question in this study. Additionally, the researcher assumes the 
directional effect, as positive or negative, of each financial distress predictor on the hazard ratio. 
This study has an axiological assumption of being value laden with the researcher’s worldview in 
defining financial distress, selecting the financial distress predictors and assuming their 
directional contribution to the hazard rate. This axiological assumption also extends to more 
specific topics at the core of the hypotheses being tested (Andrade and Kaplan, 1998; Brown, 
James and Mooradian, 1992; Davydenko, 2013; Harrison, 2005; Hillier et al., 2012; Outecheva, 
2007; Platt and Platt, 2002; Turetsky and McEwen, 2001; Whitaker, 1999). 
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The methodology of this empirical study is quantitative with a survival analysis statistical 
method (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). The techniques of survival analysis 
can be parametric, semi-parametric or non-parametric. The survival analysis method of this study 
is a semi-parametric approach that is consistent with existing empirical analyses using survival 
analysis in finance and social sciences. Being semi-parametric, the method does not require any 
assumption about the distribution of survival times that would depend on previous periods’ 
observations. Therefore, the semi-parametric technique does not have any baseline hazard; 
rather, it depends exclusively on the vector of covariates, and where those covariates fluctuate 
over time, the model is extended to include a time coefficient. The method is the Cox extended 
model, an extension of the Cox PH model that includes time-varying covariates (Cox, 1972; Fox, 
2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012).  
Additionally, the confidence intervals set for use in this study are at 95%, a rate that 
could be higher for more precise appreciations or on the contrary lower as required, but a rate 
that is standard in survival analyses and in financial empirical analyses. The p-value is small 
when inferior or equal to 0.05 and large when superior to 0.05. The hazard ratio interpretation is 
that a HR of 1 means that there is no relationship between the covariate and the event, a HR 
superior to 1 means that the hazard for the exposed firms is as many times as that of unexposed 
firms (for example a HR of 5 for a covariate means that for exposed firms it contributes to the 
event 5 times as much as the censored firms), and a HR of less than 1 also carries the same 
proportionality of exposure between exposed and unexposed firms. For hedging and for M&A, 
the analysis in this study relies on a Heaviside function with a value of 1 when the event 
occurred and zero when it did not (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012).  
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The oil and gas industry metrics this study uses are 2P for reserves, BOE for production, 
WTI for oil price index and USD for oil price currency. In oil and gas, reserves are classified in 
three categories. The first is 1P or proved reserves, the second is 2P or proved reserves plus 
probable reserves, and the third is 3P or proved reserves plus probable reserves plus possible 
reserves. A common practice in the financing industry or managerial analyses and forecasting is 
to use 2P, a measure that is not as conservative as 1P and not as generous as 3P (Arthur, Levine, 
Taylor & Tolleth, 2014; Harp, Jr. & Howard, 2009; Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2007). 
Thus, to remain consistent with industry practice, this research uses 2P as the metric for oil and 
gas reserves. Oil and gas firms produce either oil only, gas only or both, in various proportions, 
and tend to have very diverse approaches to hedging their production. The frequency, continuity 
and proportion of the production hedged vary greatly from one firm to another. In this study, the 
proxy for hedging is the percentage of barrels of oil equivalent (BOE) hedged, a unit of energy 
consistent with practitioners’ preference in banking and oil and gas, and that captures the total 
production of a company, whether in gas or in oil. When providing this perspective to situate the 
context, the price of oil and gas is in US dollars and for the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 
index. Oil price reports come in three main benchmark indices representing several dozens of oil 
types and assays: WTI, Brent crude and Dubai & Oman crude or Fateh. The indices represent the 
gravity of the oil as light or heavy, its sulfur level, as sweet or sour, and its production site that 
determines its transportation, as off shore or in-land. A Canadian index exists since 2014. The 
Canadian Crude Index (CCI) represents the heavy sour crude produced in Canada, especially in 
the oil sands, but this index is too recent for providing the trend and historical data this study 
needs, and WTI is one of the most commonly used oil price benchmarks globally and certainly in 
North America. Therefore, this study refers to the WTI in USD for the boom and bust 
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perspective of oil prices fluctuations impacting Canadian oil and gas E&P producers (Arthur et 
al. 2014; Harp, Jr. & Howard, 2009; Natural Resources Canada, 2017; Society of Petroleum 
Engineers, 2007). 
Several types of measures and approximations exist in the literature for company size. 
The most common in empirical studies and survival analyses is the natural logarithm of total 
assets, a metric that fits the objective of this study for an asset heavy industry; that remains 
consistent with the conceptual approach of financial distress definition in this study; and that is 
practical for use in a vector of covariates. The proxy for company size is thus, consistently with 
the literature, the natural logarithm of total assets (Log Assets) (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006; Aziz 
& Dar, 2006; Chancharat et al., 2007; Charalambous et al.; Chen & Lee, 1993; Chong et al., 
2010; Dang & Li, 2015; Fitzpatrick & Ogden, 2011; Gentry, Newbold & Whitford, 1985; 
Nikitin, 2003; Ohlson, 1980; Peat, 2007; Prantl, 2003; Raj & Rinastiti, 2002; Rommer, 2004; 
Shumway, 2001).  
Mergers and acquisitions in this study come through the lens of financial distress and the 
approach of interest to understanding whether financial distress influences the M&A activity, 
requires viewing it from the perspective of the target. M&A is eligible for measurement and 
scoping only for target companies, public firms, for the period of observation going from Q1-
2002 to Q1-2016, and excludes companies with foreign production, headquartered outside of 
Canada, cancelled deals and companies with incomplete data.  
This study is laden with the choices of the researcher and includes an ad hoc definition of 
financial distress, ad hoc selections of predictor variables, hedging and M&A proxy variables, 
and literature-aligned standards and assumptions for the use of a semi-parametric survival 
analysis model, a 95% confidence interval, the interpretation of the p-value, the proxy for firm 
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size, reserves, oil price index and Heaviside function (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & 
Kleinbaum, 2012). Throughout the study as required, the researcher provides rationales and 
explanations for the use of any such assumption and definition to help clarify their sense, use and 
context as would the provision of operational definitions that follows (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; 
Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012).  
Operational Definitions 
Several concepts and notions appear throughout this study. They pertain to the industry, 
the research key construct of financial distress and the method of survival analysis. Some have a 
straightforward definition and others need to be more explicitly laid out in the context of this 
study. Table 1 provides in alphabetical order an overview of the operational definitions further 
explained below and attaches each concept to a primary category and a secondary category to 
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Table 1. Overview of the operational definitions 
Overview of the operational definitions 
 
A detailed explanation of each concept in the list of notions in the first column of table 1 
follows below in the same alphabetical order. 
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• 2P: Proved reserves plus probable reserves. There are three levels of reserves estimation 
in oil and gas: 1P or proved reserves, 2P or the sum of proved reserves and probable 
reserves, and 3P or the sum of proved, probable and possible reserves. The most common 
reserve estimate in the industry and in finance is 2P as it represents the most acceptable 
balance between the too conservative1P and the too optimistic 3P (Harp, Jr. & Howard, 
2009; Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2007). 
• Bankruptcy: legal insolvency that can ultimately result in a liquidation and foreclosure or 
in a restructuring.  Most of the North American academic literature on business failure 
refers to the American bankruptcy chapters when mentioning bankruptcy, making it a 
benchmark for most readers. The Code of Laws governs bankruptcy laws in the U.S.A. 
and includes titles which in turn include chapters. Three chapters deal with bankruptcy. 
Chapter 7 is for liquidation, the most common filing used for personal bankruptcy, 
although also accessible and sometimes used by businesses as well. Chapter 11 is for 
restructuring businesses and corporations, allowing them to be rehabilitated and continue 
as a going concern while their debt load becomes a separate legal estate for which a plan 
will be negotiated and implemented with creditors; companies benefit a “bankruptcy 
protection” under Chapter 11 thanks to the creation of this separate legal estate. Chapter 
13 or the Wage Earner Plan allows individuals to develop a plan to repay their debt 
partially or completely while they can keep their assets, as opposed to Chapter 7’s 
liquidation. In Canada, there are no chapters to refer to bankruptcy laws and instead of 
one Code of Laws there are several Acts governing bankruptcies. The Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act (BIA) governs bankruptcies for most the businesses and the Office of the 
Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB), a federal office. The Companies Creditors’ 
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Arrangement Act (CCAA) governs the restructuration or liquidation of businesses with 
more than CAD 5M in liabilities that commit an act of bankruptcy including defaulting 
on a creditor’s payment when due. The Winding Up and Restructuring Act applies to 
financial institutions. The Wage Earner Protection Act applies to individuals. The Farmer 
Debt Mediation Act applies to farmers. The Canada Transportation Act regulates 
railroads bankruptcies. The Act of interest for this study with its scope of public oil and 
gas companies is the CCAA which is the closest equivalent to Chapter 11 in the U.S. 
However, the CCAA bears the following notable differences: the filing can be voluntary 
but requires the commitment of a bankruptcy act, unlike in Chapter 11; a CCAA filing 
does not create a separate legal estate; under CCAA, the debtor cannot disclaim a 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) unlike in Chapter 11 where this provision is a 
considerable help for restructuring and renegotiate labour contracts; a CCAA filing does 
not grant the debtor any exclusivity period to file a plan (120 days after the petition date 
in Chapter 11, that the court may extend for up to 18 months) or to solicit acceptances 
(180 days after the petition date in Chapter 11, that the court may extend for up to 20 
months). Overall, where Chapter 11 has specific statutory requirements and seems more 
designed for the continuity of the business which can save jobs and be more beneficial to 
the economy as a going concern, the CCAA is more general and open to the Canadian 
judge’s will, and seems more concerned with fairness to creditors and all stakeholders 
rather than privileging a going concern compromise. This bankruptcy paradigm in 
Canada contributes to the definition of financial distress in this study in situating the firm 
into a death struggle before it files for bankruptcy, as the intent of restructuring and 
taking strategic action is economic and managerial rather than legal with the safety net of 
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a Chapter 11 protection as can be the case in the U.S. (Blakes Canadian Lawyers, 2016; 
Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, 2016; United States Courts, 2017).  
• Baseline model: In this study, the baseline model is an extended Cox model with 
repeating events that explores the existing relationship of selected covariates including 
liquidity, solvency, profitability and activity-specific ratios to the state of financial 
distress, regardless of any hypothesis and research question. The baseline model builds 
the financial ratios observations and the structure of the collected data layout for the 
survival analysis in R, the statistical software that computes the survival analysis 
regression for the large amount of observations. As such, the baseline model serves to 
prepare the data for the specific hypotheses of this study (Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
• BOE: Barrel of oil equivalent. One barrel of 42 U.S. gallons or approximately 159 litres 
of crude oil contains 5.8 million British thermal units (MBtus) or 1,700 kilowatt-hours 
(kWh) of energy, and 6,000 cubic feet of natural gas (6 mcf) have the energy equivalent 
of one barrel of crude oil. BOE (also referred to as COE for Crude Oil Equivalent) is a 
standard unit for measuring, reporting and analyzing the energy a production and 
exploration firm can access or produce (BP, 2016; US Energy Information 
Administration, 2017). 
• Censoring: Censoring is a key concept in survival analysis data observation, consisting in 
identifying and removing from the sample tested the observations for which the event did 
not occur during the observation period (i.e. the firm did not go into financial distress 
since it started reporting its financial information, until the end of the study period in Q1-
2016), the subjects lost to observation during the observation period or withdrawn from 
the study (i.e. the firm stopped reporting). This censoring is a right-censoring, which is 
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the most common in statistical analysis. Left-censoring occurs when the true survival 
time is less than or equal to the observed survival time, which happens when the event 
occurs for other reasons than the dependent variable event being observed. All censoring 
in this study is a right-censoring (Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
• Conditional probability models: Conditional probability is the probability of an event 
based on the occurrence of another event. The conditional probability models this study 
mentions are logit and probit, both binary classification models. The probit model (from 
the combination of probability and unit) is a regression analysis that uses the maximum 
likelihood procedure and can result in only two values such as pass or fail; hence it is 
binary. Like probit, the logit model is a logistic regression with a categorical dependent 
variable and a cumulative logistic function used for the independent variables. That 
function takes the form of a S curve and captures growth with an exponential initial stage 
that slows down and eventually stops at maturity. In this study, the references to these 
models are mainly in the literature review about the O-score model by Ohlson (1980), a 
logit model, and the Zmijewski’s probit model (Zmijewski, 1984). Incidentally, it is 
interesting to note in the context of this study that it was also Cox (1958) who developed 
the logit model, 14 years before his other seminal contribution of proportional hazard 
survival analysis that is the generic method of quantitative analysis in this study (Balcaen 
& Ooghe, 2006; Ohlson, 1980: Zmijewski, 1984). 
• Corporate failure: in the context of this study, the phrase is a synonym to bankruptcy, 
economic, or financial failure. The researcher employs it in a generic sense to situate, 
introduce or illustrate predictive analysis from its origin in the early 20th century up to 
now. The phrase “corporate failure” in this study does not pretend to any specific and 
SURVIVAL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN OIL AND GAS FIRMS 50 
  
rigorous measurable or attributive definition, as several authors and schools of thought 
may have used it with various meaning based on the needs of their specific researches 
(Outecheva, 2007). 
• Covariates: a covariate is an independent variable that may have a predictive impact on 
the result being observed. In regression analysis and thus survival analysis, synonyms for 
covariates include predictors or explanatory variables (Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012).  
• Cox PH model: Cox (1972) developed a semi-parametric survival analysis that now bears 
his name. The model is a proportional hazards regression analysis that does not require to 
be indexed like a parametric model. As such, the analysis depends entirely on the vector 
of covariates deemed to influence the event. The Cox PH model requires the satisfaction 
of the proportional hazard or PH assumption that the value of the covariates remains 
constant over time. The tests for verifying the PH assumption are graphical (log-log 
survivor curves: if the curves are parallel the PH assumption is satisfied; or a comparison 
of observed and predicted survivor curves: if the curves are close the PH assumption is 
satisfied); goodness-of-fit (GOF): if the p-value is large the PH assumption is satisfied; or 
Schoenfeld residuals: if they are flat or nil the PH assumption is satisfied. If the PH 
assumption is not satisfied, then the value of the covariates varies with time and is time-
dependent or time-varying. One solution for that is to stratify the model by splitting the 
dataset into sub-samples, each with their own baseline hazards, and then estimate the 
partial likelihood of each stratum before summing them all for the total model output. 
Another solution consists in adding a time coefficient to the model and turn it into an 
extended Cox model. This study uses an extended Cox model. The key outputs of a Cox 
PH model are the hazard ratios (HR) and the survivor functions or cumulative hazard 
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functions. Chapter 3 of this study provides a detailed mathematical description of the Cox 
model and the extended Cox model (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
• Crude oil: In this study, the reference to crude oil is from a standardized and generic 
benchmark perspective to discuss oil prices and cycles. The reference benchmark is the 
WTI index. Technically, several dozens of oil types exist based on their location, 
transportability, viscosity as low or high density and sulphur content as sweet for less 
sulphur or sour for more sulphur. The measurement of oil is in barrels and one barrel is 
42 U.S. gallons or approximately 159 litres. Crude oil is fluid and easier to extract than 
the bitumen from the oil sands that constitutes the bulk of Canada’s oil reserves. Oil 
sands are a mixture of sand, clay, water and bitumen and the bitumen is so viscous that it 
requires heating for extraction and the addition of diluent for transportation.  The 
province of Alberta in Western Canada has the world’s largest reserves of oil sands 
before Venezuela, the USA or Russia, and the total area actively mined in Alberta is 
904km2, about the size of Berlin in Germany. Another alternative to conventional crude 
oil extraction is hydraulic fracturing also known as fracking, a very recent method less 
than ten years in development (Arthur et al. 2014; Harp, Jr. & Howard, 2009; CAPP, 
2016; PSAC, 2016; Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2007). 
• Death struggle: A stage of corporate financial distress that Outecheva (2007) introduced 
in her doctoral dissertation. Whitaker (1999) and McEwen and Turestsky (2001) 
originally posited that financial distress is not a single event and Outecheva (2007) built 
on it to propose subsequent phases in the process of being financially distressed. 
Following an early impairment, a deterioration of performance, failure and then 
insolvency, the firm enters the death struggle when it defaults and faces the risk of 
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bankruptcy; the firm is insolvent and its existence is at risk. The death struggle phase 
precedes a debt restructuring and then recovery or on the contrary a bankruptcy 
(Outecheva, 2007). This study borrows from that interpretation for its definition of 
financial distress (McEwen and Turestsky, 2001; Outecheva, 2007; Whitaker, 1999). 
• Decision trees: A classification method that uses a visual graph of alternative possibilities 
which incorporate probabilities of outcomes. Decision trees are a tool that several 
disciplines use including operations research, decision learning, and binomial option 
pricing in finance, which can lead to the Black-Scholes formula, real options analysis or 
investment decisions and competing projects. The method is also one of the bankruptcy 
prediction techniques and as such it relies on algorithms for data mining (Altman et al.; 
Bhattacharya, Gepp & Kumar, 2010; Chen, 2011; Hosseini & Rashidi, 2013).  
• Default: A firm is in default when it misses a due payment on a specific date. The firm 
can be illiquid before that date but it defaults only when it misses the payment. 
Davydenko (2013) analyzed that defaults on bond coupon payments occur mostly in the 
30 days or less before the semi-annual payment dates in June and December (Davydenko, 
2013).  Default can also happen with suppliers, contractors, employees or on preferred 
stocks dividends. Default is one of many criteria present in the literature to define 
corporate failure or financial distress, including Beaver (1966) or Andrade and Kaplan 
(1998) (Andrade and Kaplan, 1998; Beaver, 1966; Davydenko, 2013).  
• DuPont Analysis: The DuPont analysis or DuPont identity is a breakdown of a firm’s 
return on equity into net margin, asset turnover ratio and leverage, allowing for a better 
understanding of the drivers of the return on equity. The formula was developed in the 
DuPont Corporation a century ago and contributed to the development of financial ratios 
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which later became foundational to bankruptcy and corporate failure predictive analysis 
(Castellano, 2015; Horrigan, 1968). 
• E&P: Exploration and Production is the upstream industry of the oil and gas sector that 
also includes the midstream companies focusing on transportation such as pipeline 
companies, the downstream companies focusing on distribution with refineries and gas 
stations networks, and integrated oil and gas companies which activities span across 
those distinctions. More than 1,000 E&P companies exist in Canada, including about 250 
publicly traded, where the oil and gas activity is mainly upstream and midstream as over 
half of the production is exported to the US refineries on the Gulf coast and the rest is 
exported to Asia or Europe. The scope of this study is Canadian E&P companies that 
have their production and headquarters in Canada, and that are listed on the TSX (PSAC, 
2016; TMX, 2016).  
• Economic Distress: Davydenko (2013) defined economic distress as insolvency which is 
a low market asset values relative to debt, and distinguished it from financial distress that 
he defined as illiquidity or low cash reserves relative to current liabilities (Davydenko, 
2013). Like the concepts of financial distress or corporate failure, economic distress does 
not benefit in the literature a standard and commonly accepted definition. The concept 
may be interpreted by the researcher as they wish, often indistinctly from or 
amalgamating with financial distress. However, it carries a longer term and more 
structural impact on the firm resilience than does the narrower definition of financial 
distress tied to illiquidity or default only, that the literature often proposes. In this study, 
economic distress is close enough to the definition of financial distress based on the 
structural ability to generate enough cash from the operations to ensure the going concern 
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sustainability and the long-term profitability of the firm, to be indistinct. The phrase is 
however rarely employed, as opposed to its synonym financial distress (Davydenko, 
2013). 
• Extended Cox model: An extension of the Cox PH model that includes a time coefficient 
for time-varying covariates. When the proportional hazards assumption of proportionality 
constancy over time does not hold for some covariates, those change value with time. To 
run the model with time-sensitive covariates, the researcher can stratify the data in 
homogenous blocks satisfying the PH assumption before summing them all or add a time 
coefficient to the time-varying covariates. The latter is the extended Cox model (Cox, 
1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012).  
• Failure in survival analysis: The event of interest, which in this study is the occurrence of 
the state of financial distress, or the event of being an M&A target for the third 
hypothesis. The key indicator of failure in survival analysis is the hazard function (Klein 
& Kleinbaum, 2012). 
• Financial Distress: Two consecutive quarters of negative operating cash flow to total 
assets ratio (OCF/TA). The literature provides several definitions for financial distress 
but there is no universal standard and each researcher selects the most pertinent definition 
to their study. This definition is original and designed to fit a capital-intensive and asset 
heavy industry such as oil and gas E&P with long lead times and assets life cycles. The 
resilience of the business depends on its self-sustainability which fuels the capacity of the 
assets to generate enough cash to insure short term funding liquidity as well as cash for 
reinvestment, growth and competition, or even profitability. The metric of OCF/TA is an 
asset efficiency ratio that should be a low positive percentage. In an industry as exposed 
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to the externality of crude oil prices as E&P, this definition captures the structural 
reliance on self-funding through a profitable use of the assets representing the core value 
enabler of the business, while allowing management to take corrective action if the first 
quarter presents a negative asset efficiency ratio. When a second consecutive quarter 
confirms the alarming trend, the company is in financial distress. As such, it can still fight 
this death struggle by taking strategic corrective action in the form of restructuring, 
reorganization, strategic partnerships, strategic portfolio management, focus, and 
refinancing by leveraging its reserves as a precious collateral and presenting a well 
crafted new management vision. This definition evolves from contributions to the 
literature by Outecheva (2007) for the death struggle, Davydenko (2013) for the 
possibility to access refinancing, which thus discounts illiquidity as an exclusive measure 
of financial distress, and Hillier et al. (2012) for the requirement to take strategic action 
as a gauge of severity (Davydenko, 2013; Hillier et al, 2012; Outecheva, 2007). 
• Hazard function: The instantaneous potential per unit time for the event to occur, if the 
firm has survived up to that time. The hazard function gives a conditional failure rate and 
focuses on the odds of failing. The hazard function is a key output of survival analysis 
(Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
• Hazard ratio: The hazard for one firm divided by the hazard for a different firm, which 
corresponds to the vector of covariates for one firm relative to the same vector for 
another firm. The hazard ratio is the measure of effect in survival analysis, expressed as 
the exponential of the regression coefficient for each covariate and used to measure the 
relationship between the dependent variable and the covariates (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; 
Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012).   
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• Heaviside function: A discontinuous step function adapted from differential equations in 
calculus to represent binary choices in the form of 0 and 1 representing the absence or 
presence of an event. In this study, the hypotheses on hedging and M&A use a Heaviside 
function (Dobrushkin & Gourley, 2014; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
• Hedging: a risk management investment designed to mitigate potential adverse price 
movements of an asset. Oil and gas prices are volatile and producers may use derivative 
contracts to offset those price fluctuations on part or all their production. The main 
derivatives in use in oil and gas include futures, which lock in the price of the future 
production and both sellers and buyers are obligated to honor the future price; swaps of 
floating price for a fixed price for a defined period of time with periodic cash flows 
exchanges or swaps;  put options that fix a price floor and give the buyer the right but not 
the obligation to buy; and costless collars that combine two options such as being long 
(buying) on a put, and short (selling) on a call therefore creating a floor and a ceiling. The 
hedging focus in this study is on the existence of hedging and not on the specific 
strategies and derivatives of Canadian oil and gas producers (Haushalter, 2000, 2001; 
Iqbal, 2015; Jin & Jorion, 2006; Mercatus Energy Advisors, 2016). 
• Intelligent techniques: artificial intelligent techniques relying on algorithms and computer 
processing power to generate, emulate or apply logic. In corporate failure and bankruptcy 
prediction, intelligent techniques are distinct from statistical techniques such as univariate 
or multivariate discriminant analyses, conditional probabilities or survival analysis. 
Finance is only one of many applications and research fields where intelligent techniques 
are experimented. The techniques are constantly evolving and expanding but in corporate 
failure the main techniques are machine learning techniques including decision trees, 
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neural networks and support vector machines among others (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; 
Blocher, Ko & Lin, 2001; Charalambous, Charitou and Neophytou, 2004: Chong & 
Wilson, 1995; Ravi & Ravi, 2007).   
• Multicollinearity: in statistical analysis multicollinearity refers to two or more predictors 
in a regression analysis that are strongly correlated, and thus one can be predicted from 
the others quite accurately. The Cox PH model and the extended Cox model rely on an 
assumption of non-multicollinearity and each analysis should test this assumption or 
alternatively use univariate analyses, rather than vectors, to eliminate the risk of 
multicollinearity (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; InfluentialPoints, 2016; Klein & Kleinbaum, 
2012). 
• PH assumption: Proportional hazard assumption central to the Cox PH model. The 
validity of the model relies on the assumption that the covariates remain constant over 
time and therefore the proportionality of hazards or hazard ratios among the firms in the 
sample also remain constant. Graphic methods such as the parallelism of log-log survival 
curves or the closeness of predicted and observed survival curves, goodness-of-fit test 
using p-values, or Schoenfeld residuals are the tests for verifying the PH assumption. If 
the assumption does not hold, the covariate varies with time and the model must be 
stratified in homogenous blocks for which the PH assumption is verified, or extended 
with a time factor for the time-dependent covariates (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & 
Kleinbaum, 2012).  
• Predictor: a predictor is a synonym for a covariate in survival analysis (Klein & 
Kleinbaum, 2012). 
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• Semi-parametric: a regression model that combines parametric and non-parametric 
components. The Cox PH model is a semi-parametric model because its baseline function 
does not need to be specified. A survival model uses a baseline function and a vector of 
covariates. The baseline hazard function in the Cox PH model is a time component that 
does not involve the explanatory variables, while those are time-independent and 
normally satisfy the Cox PH assumption. The Cox PH formula is the product of the time-
dependent baseline hazard function and the exponential expression of the vector of 
covariates. When the vector is equal to zero, its exponential is 1 and therefore the 
remaining time-dependent factor is the baseline hazard function. In the Cox PH model, 
that baseline hazard function is unspecified and the regression applies only to the 
exponentials of the covariates. That property of keeping the baseline hazard function 
unspecified is what makes the Cox PH model a semi-parametric model, and why the PH 
assumption must be satisfied. In parametric models, the baseline hazard function is the 
assumption that an underlying distribution of the survival times follows a probability 
distribution such as exponential, increasing or decreasing Weibull and lognormal 
distributions. Non-parametric models provide graphical representations of the distribution 
such as the Kaplan-Meier model (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
• Survival analysis: or time-to-event analysis, survival analysis is a statistical technique for 
analyzing prospectively the duration until an event of interest occurs. The technique is a 
regression analysis that relies on the key notions of hazard function, hazard ratio, 
survivor function, censoring, proportional hazard (PH), PH assumption and vector of 
covariates or predictors. Klein and Kleinbaum (2012) listed three goals to survival 
analysis: a) estimate and interpret survivor functions and hazard functions, b) compare 
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survivor and hazard functions, and c) assess the relationship of explanatory variables to 
survival time. The technique is mainly used in epidemiology and biostatistics, but also in 
engineering, social studies and finance (InfluentialPoints, 2016; Pereira, 2014). The 
specific methods to do a survival analysis can be parametric, semi-parametric or 
graphical. This study, consistent with existing research in survival analysis applied to 
finance, uses a semi-parametric method extended from the generic Cox Proportional 
Hazard model to allow for the use of time-varying covariates and for the repetition of the 
dependent variable during the study period. The method for this study is an extended Cox 
model with repeating events (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; InfluentialPoints, 2016; Klein & 
Kleinbaum, 2012; Pereira, 2014). 
• Survivor function: In survival analysis, this key construct of interest is a function that 
gives the probability that a subject (a firm in this study) survives longer than a specified 
time. The function focuses on surviving or not failing as opposed to the hazard function 
that focuses on the failure time. The survival function is a decreasing curve or step 
function when using real data that also serves for testing the PH assumption (Cox, 1972; 
Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
• Time-dependent: or time-varying covariates define the nature of explanatory variables or 
predictors or covariates for which the values fluctuate during the study. The Cox PH 
model is based on the PH assumption and the constancy of the proportions among the 
individuals in the sample. This is the case for example for individuals’ sex or firms’ 
headquarters location in some studies, both of which are time-independent or time-
invariant covariates. When the values fluctuate, such as for financial ratios for example, 
the covariates’ value vary along different periods during the study and they are thus time-
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dependent or time-varying predictors. A Cox PH model with time-dependent covariates 
does not initially satisfy the PH assumption and requires a stratification into homogenous 
blocks of time-invariant covariates to be later consolidated, or to be extended with a time 
coefficient for the time-varying explanatory variables (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & 
Kleinbaum, 2012).  
• Time-varying: synonym to time-dependent (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 
2012). 
• TSX and TSXV: Toronto Stock Exchange and TSX Venture Exchange. Both are 
Canadian stock exchanges providing a primary and a secondary market for Canadian oil 
and gas firms. They are part of the TMX Group Limited based in Toronto, Canada. The 
TSX serves the senior equity market and the TSXV for more junior firms, is in Calgary, 
Alberta (TXM, 2016).  
• Vector of covariates: a vector is a matrix with only one column or one row, and a vector 
of covariates is thus a linear matrix including all the ordered explanatory variables used 
in a survival analysis or a Cox PH model (Anonymous, 2003; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
• WTI: West Texas Intermediate. Oil price reports come in three main benchmark indices 
representing several dozens of oil types and assays: WTI, Brent crude and Dubai & 
Oman crude or Fateh. The indices represent the gravity of the oil as light or heavy, its 
sulfur level, as sweet or sour, and its production site that determines its transportation, as 
off shore or in-land. The WTI is the benchmark reference for oil and gas prices in North 
America. This study refers to WTI prices (Arthur et al., 2014; Harp, Jr. & Howard, 2009; 
Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2007). 
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Summary 
In a context of boom and bust cycles driven by the fluctuations in the price of oil and gas, 
Canadian oil and gas producers leading the Albertan economy are in severe financial distress 
during bust phases. Since mid-2014, oil prices are low and the province has suffered dozens of 
bankruptcies, massive layoffs, a halt in major capital projects investments, a drastic reduction in 
production and a harsh economic recession (Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; Macrotrends, 2016; 
Millington, 2016). Over the past century, the analytical methods to study and predict corporate 
failure, bankruptcy and financial distress have evolved and matured, going through a few 
different paradigms until the current use of a variety of artificial intelligence techniques and the 
application of survival analysis methods borrowed from epidemiology and biostatistics (Aziz & 
Dar, 2006; Horrigan, 1968; InfluentialPoints, 2016). This research is a survival analysis with the 
intent to study the relationship of explanatory variables to the state of financial distress in a 
population of publicly traded Canadian oil and gas exploration and production firms 
headquartered and producing in Canada. The method for this quantitative study is a semi-
parametric extended Cox model with repeating events. This technique uses a multi linear 
regression analysis of proportional hazards within the sample population with the exclusive use 
of predictors, and no baseline hazard, while accounting for the time factor of varying predictor 
values and accepting the repetition of the event of financial distress (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; 
Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). The research uses a sample of 540 firms with quarterly public 
reporting of financial statements from Q1-2002 until Q1-2016, representing 15,850 firm-
quarters. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this sample size is unprecedented in similar 
studies, specifically for Canadian oil and gas firms for which this is the first survival analysis, the 
first Cox PH model extended to include time-varying covariates and to allow for the repetition of 
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the event. This originality contributes to the significance of this study as do its practical 
applications in opening the way to further analyses of the impact of different predictors alone or 
combined, the specific definition of financial distress unique to this study and the pragmatic 
understanding it allows stakeholders in the E&P sector, such as suppliers, partners, investors, 
regulators or customers, at capturing the resilience, solidity, economic fragility or strength, 
growth, profitability and overall survival and potential of Canadian E&P firms. In the absence of 
a universally established definition, the researcher defines the central notion of financial distress 
in this study as two consecutive quarters of a negative ratio of operating cash flows to total 
assets. This definition intends to capture the state where a firm in this capital-intensive industry 
characterized by long lead times is not generating sufficient cash flows from its operations to 
sustain its liquidity requirements, which endangers its solvency and profitability by impeding the 
ability to reinvest healthily in its essential asset base. In that state, firms need to consider 
significant strategic actions to survive, or face complete failure in the form of bankruptcy or 
insolvency. The design of the study uses the foundation of a baseline model and explores three 
hypotheses as research questions. The baseline model explores the causal relationship of 
liquidity, solvency, profitability and operational predictors to financial distress and has a sample 
size of 15,836 quarter-firms. The first hypothesis studies whether the presence of hedging 
influences financial distress and uses a sample of 515 firms, with 11,005 quarter-firm 
observations for the period of Q1-2007 to Q1-2016. The second hypothesis is on the impact of 
size on financial distress and has the same sample size as the baseline model with 15,854 
quarter-firms. The third hypothesis focuses on whether being financially distressed is a factor in 
being the target of a merger and acquisition transaction and uses a sample of 166 firms involved 
in such transactions between Q1-2002 and Q1-2016, with 175 M&A transactions and 3,698 
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quarter-firm events of financial distress. The analysis consists in collecting the data, building the 
observations in Excel, laying out the data for the statistical software, coding the software, 
running the survival analysis, verifying the models’ validity, testing the null hypothesis, 
interpreting the regression results and interpreting the cumulative hazards function curves. This 
research exists within a post-positivist paradigm where the axiological assumption includes the 
values and interpretations of the researcher in framing the key constructs of interest. Therefore, 
this study is laden with several assumptions and limitations stemming from the choice of the 
method, the definition of financial distress, the units and metrics, and the scope. An explanation 
of all assumptions and limitations enables to better contextually situate the research and facilitate 
its replicability. As this study bears multiple specificities related to the oil and gas industry, 
corporate failure and the statistics of survival analysis, it includes definitions or explanations for 
several key notions, some of which have evolved with the science of financial distress itself. 
With such a strong contextual framework and potential significance due to its originality, this 
study requires a solid rooting in the academic literature on the central construct of financial 
distress and the satellite concepts explored in the research questions (Aziz & Dar, 2006; Cox, 
1972; Fox, 2008; Horrigan, 1968; InfluentialPoints, 2016; Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; Klein & 
Kleinbaum, 2012; Macrotrends, 2016; Millington, 2016; Outecheva, 2007).  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 Oil price shocks create financial distress on Canadian oil and gas firms and there is a 
need to analyze and understand the determinants of such distress (Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; 
Millington, 2016, CAPP, 2016; PSAC, 2016). However, the specific questions of interest for this 
study evolve around the pertinence of hedging and size as determinant of financial distress and 
the impact of financial distress as a driver of merger and acquisition activity. Research on 
corporate failure is rich and varied but empirical studies do not unanimously converge in 
adopting one reference approach for studying financial distress and predicting it (Outecheva, 
2007). There is room for subjective selection and interpretation of the inputs, yet the analysis 
must abide by the rigor of the scientific approach. This reality defines the post-positivist 
paradigm of this analysis. The current state of knowledge and research in corporate failure has 
gradually evolved from the apparition of financial ratios over a century ago to their use for 
predicting bankruptcy until the first paradigm of linear multiple discriminant analysis started in 
1968, followed by a second paradigm of conditional probabilities models in the early 1980s 
(Altman, 1968; Horrigan, 1968; Ohlson, 1980; Zmijewski; 1984). Both have become references 
still in use today and both present limitations and restrictions. Several alternative techniques, 
mainly leveraging artificial intelligence also attempt to accurately predict financial distress but 
only proportional hazards as used in survival analysis and as enabled for business analysis by 
Cox (1972) offer more than a binary answer (Chen & Lee, 1993). This literature review targets 
completeness in setting the historical and broad stage of the evolution of financial distress 
analysis starting as far as 1892 (Castellano, 2015; Marshall, 1892) and leveraging over 180 
references. The rest of this chapter comes in three sections. The first establishes the research 
paradigm and its assumptions. The second roots the theoretical orientation of the study 
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comprised of eight subsections encompassing the buildup of the analytical paradigms, their 
descriptions and limitations, the alternatives techniques, survival analysis, hedging, size and 
merger and acquisitions. The third section proposes a critique of the existing research using the 
necessary understanding of the framework set in section two to arrive at the adoption of the 
survival analysis methodology for this study (Altman, 1968; Beaver, 1966; Castellano, 2015; 
Cox, 1972; Chen & Lee, 1993; Horrigan, 1968; Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; Marshall, 1892; 
Millington, 2016, CAPP, 2016; Outecheva, 2007; PSAC, 2016). 
Research Paradigm Assumptions 
A post-positivist paradigm governs this dissertation, with the following ontological, 
epistemological, axiological, rhetorical and methodological assumptions. The ontology of this 
research is that financial distress is a tangible reality, observable and measurable. Yet, that reality 
can fluctuate and change depending on the definition used to determine financial distress. 
Bisman (2010) determined that “accounting is a human artefact, and decision-making is 
inextricably bound to facets of human cognition” (Bisman, 2010, p.14) and as financial ratios 
variables are constructs of accounting, they are inherently reflective of the valuation and 
recognition choices made for the reporting of financial statements, albeit in full compliance of 
the required accounting principles and standards. Therefore, data is fallible but it is possible to 
capture the reality of financial distress. Epistemologically, this research is etic, dualist and 
objective. The researcher performs this study on historical data and is completely independent 
from the oil and gas companies analyzed, individually or as a group, in the past or the present. 
To gain knowledge about the hazard of financial distress and survival of Canadian oil and gas 
companies, this study applies an extended Cox model with repeating events that is nomothetic, 
objective and uses a quantifiable statistical analysis. Axiologically, this study is value laden with 
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the researcher’s worldview of defining financing distress and selecting how many and what 
variables to use. This influence stems from (a) an absence of a universally accepted set of 
financial ratios or definitions required as a paradigm for a survival analysis of financially 
distressed companies, (b) the liberty to select and include market data and firm characteristics, 
and (c) a lack of formal and irrevocable generally accepted definition of the state of financial 
distress. The rhetorical assumption of this study is that the researcher uses an impersonal, formal 
and strict language based on the rules of statistical and financial recognition, measurement and 
disclosure. The researcher is writing from the perspective of a disinterested scientist. The last 
assumption governing this research is methodological: the researcher performs this empirical 
research through a quantitative technique using a specific statistical analysis selected based on 
the research question. The perspective of understanding the time to failure and the probabilities 
of survival based on time-varying covariates guide the choice of using a semi-parametric 
extended Cox model. The statement of the research objective is clear and the study uses 
verifiable hypotheses to formulate it. Internal and external validity is central as the researcher 
explores causal relationships within a macro-economic context and for an entire industrial sector 
(Abawi, 2008; Bisman, 2010; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Miller, 
2002; Trochim, 2006). 
These assumptions are meant to establish a paradigm for this quantitative research where 
scientific rigor and agnosticism guide data collection, statistical analysis, argumentation and 
reporting while acknowledging the influence of the researcher’s values in choosing definitions 
and selecting variables. This paradigm inscribes in continuity with the literature on corporate 
failure that grounds this research and helps frame its theoretical foundations. 
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Theoretical Orientation 
Originally, the development of financial ratios occurred gradually. The business objective 
behind their apparition was to analyze and compare performance and then the need to monitor 
credit and corporate risk turned them into the preferred tool for financial distress analysis and 
prediction. Beaver (1966) initiated a new paradigm for bankruptcy prediction that included 
Altman’s MDA (Altman, 1968) and the conditional probability models pioneered by Ohlson 
(1980) and Zmijewski (1984) but those classical models had several restrictive assumptions and 
alternative techniques have since been proposed including neural networks, non-computing 
techniques and intelligent techniques such as support vector machines or decisions trees. Among 
them, one technique proved superior in allowing for a dynamic time-to-event analysis of 
corporate survival as opposed to the traditional pass/fail binary prediction alternative methods 
offer. This analytical method is a semi-parametric survival analysis Cox (1972) developed that is 
mainly used in biostatistics, epidemiology and to a lesser extent engineering, finance and social 
studies (InfluentialPoints, 2016; Pereira, 2014). The technique is a proportional hazards 
regression analysis one can extend for time-varying covariates. Survival analysis assumes that 
there is no multicollinearity and that the hazards remain proportional among covariates and the 
extended Cox model of this study allows to estimate the relevance of covariates, the hazard they 
represent for financial distress and predict survival on a time-continuum. Using vectors of 
relevant predictors, the extended Cox model can analyze the questions of interest for this study 
around the determinants of financial distress, the impact of hedging and size on financial distress 
and the causality of financial distress on mergers and acquisitions. This section presents the 
theoretical foundations of this research by reviewing the literature with eight subsections. The 
first three pose the framework with a historical review of the origin of financial ratios and their 
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use in bankruptcy prediction, a review of the classical paradigms of corporate failure analysis, 
and the alternative techniques used. The fourth and fifth focus on survival analysis with its 
superiority over classical models and its empirical use in oil and gas and in Canadian literature, 
and an overview of the diversity characterizing the definition of financial distress. The last three 
are a literature review of hedging, firm size and M&A as they relate to the research problem of 
financial distress and survival of Canadian Oil and Gas firms (Altman, 1968; Beaver, 1966; Cox, 
1972; InfluentialPoints, 2016; Ohlson, 1980; Pereira, 2014; Zmijewski, 1984). 
Financial Ratios: Origins and First Use in Bankruptcy Prediction 
A review of the academic literature in bankruptcy and corporate failure performed for 
this research reveals that Beaver (1966) is the most systematically and frequently cited reference 
for anchoring the origins of bankruptcy predictability, but long before him several authors had 
already built the foundations he used to publish his seminal article. Initial works focused on the 
use of financial ratios, then more empirical studies analyzed ratios’ predicting power confirming 
the emergence of a few specific ratios while evolving towards cash flow analysis in the last 
decade before Beaver (1966) (Beaver, 1966; Castellano, 2015; Horrigan, 1968). 
The roots of corporate financial health analysis through financial ratios trace back as far 
as the late nineteenth century and it took them about three decades until 1920 to take hold. 
Foulke (1961) situated the first appearance of financial ratios no later than 1891 and Horrigan 
(1968) analyzed that credit analysis that developed with the emergence of the American financial 
sector, was the real catalyst for the use of financial ratios, especially in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century. Two studies marked the development of financial ratios, both in the 1910’s. 
The first is the DuPont Analysis. In 1914, Donaldson Brown developed a ratio “triangle” system 
to analyze operating results and return on investment. Brown was an electrical engineer without 
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any formal training in finance who had previously gained exposure to and reported on business 
challenges at the DuPont Corporation. Brown built his inspiration for the “triangle” on a similar 
approach published by Marshall (1892) (Castellano, 2015; Horrigan, 1968; Marshall, 1892). The 
second was a compilation of seven ratios for 981 firms by Wall (1919) that raised the following 
comment from Horrigan (1968): 
His results would be vulnerable to criticism by today’s standards; but his study was 
historically significant because it was a widely-read [sic], overt departure from the 
customary usage of a single ratio with an absolute criterion. Wall had, in effect, 
popularized [sic] the ideas of using many ratios and using empirically determined 
relative ratio criteria (Horrigan, 1968, p.286). 
Financial distress analysis and predictability originates from the need to monitor credit 
worthiness and corporate risk. That monitoring expanded in breadth and sophistication thanks to 
financial ratios and by the 1920s, there were both enough public data for empirical studies and 
shared financial knowledge of financial ratios to give rise to bankruptcy prediction studies. The 
specific use of financial ratios for understanding and predicting corporate failure started during 
the great depression and established the first empirical bases of bankruptcy analysis. Following 
Wall’s study (1919), the use of financial ratio gained in popularity and innovation as it widely 
proliferated in the 1920s (Horrigan, 1968). Bliss (1923) was the first to explore the predictive 
power of ratios by attempting to capture the complete business activity of any corporation 
through a system of ratios, based on the assumptions that they were good indicators of the 
structural relationships within a company. Duning and Wall (1928) pioneered the formalization 
of financial analysis by using ratios (Beaver, Correia & McNichols, 2010; Bliss, 1923; Duning & 
Wall, 1928; Horrigan, 1968). Foster and Ramser (1931) studied 173 firms and 11 ratios to 
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formalize financial analysis. Fitzpatrick (1932) randomly selected 20 firms that had failed during 
the period of 1920 to 1929 and pair matched them using fiscal year, sales volume, asset size, 
product line and financial soundness as criteria. He analyzed each pair three to five years prior to 
the failure and concluded on the importance of each of the 13 ratios used for his analysis while 
specifically singling out net worth to debt and net profits to net worth as the best indicators of 
failure. In 1934, Dodd and Graham (1934) published “Security Analysis” and contributed to 
formalizing financial analysis using ratios. Smith and Winakor (1935) used 10 years of data to 
analyze 183 firms with 21 ratios and were the first to praise the ratio of working capital to total 
assets’ accuracy, steadiness and predictive power of failure. Merwin (1942) analyzed a larger 
sample of 900 small corporations using six years of data. He identified three ratios useful to 
predict failure for up to five years prior to discontinuance: a) net working capital to total assets, 
b) net worth to total debt, and c) the current ratio. For Horrigan (1968), “Merwin’s study was the 
first sophisticated analysis of ratio predictive power, and the findings of the study still appear to 
be credible” (Horrigan, 1968, p.289). Hickman (1958) used data from 1900 to 1943 and 
identified the net profits to sales ratio and times-interest-earned as useful predictors of default on 
corporate bonds issues. Halcrow, Jacoby and Saulnier (1958) used credit information from RFC 
for the years 1934 to 1951 to determine the predictive power of current ratio and net worth to 
debt ratios for loan defaults. Walter (1957) and Donaldson (1962) shifted the analysis of failure 
on technical cash insolvency and pioneered the use of cash flow analysis towards bankruptcy 
prediction based on the fundamental principle that the value of an economic concern is the net 
present value of its expected future cash flows. Thus, from Wall (1919) to Merwin (1942) the 
following series of five observations follows.  First, financial ratios gained in popularity and 
sophistication. Second, the advent of ratios contributed to the formalization of financial analysis. 
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Third, there was the publication of the first empirical studies attempting to predict failure by 
using ratios. Fourth, the ratio of working capital to total assets started to emerge as a reliable 
predictor of failure. Fifth, Merwin (1942) produced the first solid predictive analysis of corporate 
failure, twenty-four years before Beaver (1966). All this preamble to Beaver (1966) constituted 
necessary stepping stones to his ground-breaking article, about which it is interesting to note the 
following prescient comment from Horrigan (1968) “this study will undoubtedly become a 
landmark for future research in ratio analysis” (Horrigan, 1968, p.291). Indeed, the landmark 
turned out a major paradigm shift in corporate failure prediction (Beaver et al.; Bliss, 1923; 
Duning & Wall, 1928; Dodd & Graham, 1934; Donaldson, 1962; Fitzpatrick, 1932; Foster & 
Ramser, 1931; Foulke; 1961; Halcrow et al., 1958; Hickman, 1958; Horrigan, 1968; Merwin, 
1942; Smith & Winakor, 1935; Wall, 1919; Walter, 1957). 
Classical Paradigms of Corporate Failure Analysis 
From Beaver (1966) to Zmijewski (1984), the classical paradigms of multiple 
discriminant analysis (MDA) and conditional probability models have dominated corporate 
failure predictive analysis. Beaver (1966) wrote a seminal article that stands as a milestone in 
corporate failure literature. He used a stronger statistical technique than Merwin (1942), the 
naive Bayes approach, on 79 matched pair companies using data from 1954 to 1964 (Pereira, 
2014; Horrigan, 1968). Beaver (1966) used a univariate analysis, taking each ratio one at a time 
with its own cut-off point to make a predictive classification of failure or success. He used 30 
ratios and a cash flow approach, and considered the firm as a reservoir of liquid assets, drained 
by cash outflows and supplied by cash inflows. The reservoir serves to balance cash flow 
variations and failure is a consequence of its exhaustion when the firm can no longer honor its 
financial obligations. For Beaver (1966), failure meant the incapacity to honor financial 
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obligations as they come due, and the operational application of this principle translated into the 
occurrence of any of the following events “bankruptcy, bond default, an overdrawn bank 
account, or non-payment of a preferred stock dividend” (Beaver, 1966, p.71). He identified 
working capital to debt as the best predictive ratio, followed by net income to total assets. The 
univariate analysis from Beaver (1966) opened the way to what would become one of the base 
reference techniques in bankruptcy prediction, Altman’s Z-score (Beaver, 1966; Horrigan, 1968; 
Merwin, 1942; Pereira, 2014; Zmijewski, 1984). 
Altman (1968) used the linear discriminant analysis that Fisher (1936) had originally 
introduced to combine five ratios into a single function called the Z-score that required only one 
cut-off point but depended on restrictive assumptions. With 33 matched pairs of bankrupt and 
non-bankrupt firms and data from 1946 to 1965, Altman (1968) calculated discriminant factors 
for each ratio. The technique called MDA relies on the main assumption of dichotomy meaning 
that data groups are discrete, identifiable and non-overlapping. Additionally, MDA has three 
restrictive assumptions: multivariate normality, equal dispersion matrices, and inclusion of prior 
probability of failure and misclassification costs (Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006). The first assumption 
of normality tends to be subject to violation in MDA as financial ratios have the propensity to be 
asymmetric and skewed to the right. However, within a specific industry group, Deakin (1976) 
observed a more normal distribution (Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006; Deakin, 1976; McLeay & Omar, 
2000). Authors using MDA have forced the normalization by using several transformation 
techniques including reciprocal or logarithmic transformations, log-transformation, square root 
and lognormal transformation, or windsorizing, which consists in trimming the outliers (Balcaen 
& Ooghe, 2006). The second restrictive assumption requires the variance-covariance matrices to 
be equal between the failing and non-failing group otherwise the mean variables between both 
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groups fail the significance tests. A violation of this assumption can be mitigated by using a 
variant of MDA, the quadratic MDA but Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) observed that quadratic 
MDA is a complex procedure only relevant for large data samples with relatively small numbers 
of independent variables and very large dispersions in variance-covariance matrices (Balcaen & 
Ooghe, 2006). The third assumption that requires factoring in the determination of the optimal 
cut-off point for the function, the costs of type I and type II errors and the probability of 
dispersion between both data groups, serves to ensure accuracy and generalizability of the 
function result (Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006). The Z-score is still popular and the simplicity of its use 
in the form of a single function with fixed factors, only requiring financial ratios input must have 
contributed to its success. Scholars like Deakin (1977), Edmister (1972), Eisenbeis (1977), Joy 
and Tollefson (1975) or Tafler (1982) have been aware of its restrictive assumptions and worked 
on them extensively and in 1980 conditional probability models shifted the paradigm of 
bankruptcy prediction analysis (Altman, 1968; Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006; Deakin, 1976, 1977; 
Edmister, 1972; Eisenbeis, 1977; Fisher, 1936; Joy & Tollefson, 1975; McLeay & Omar, 2000; 
Tafler, 1982).  
Conditional probability models appeared as alternatives to MDA for bankruptcy 
prediction analysis. The most popular is the O-score (Ohlson, 1980), a method that uses a logit 
score to predict bankruptcy. Martin (1977) was the first to use the logit model to predict bank 
failure. The second type of model is a probit analysis proposed by Zmijewski (1984). These 
models provide non-linear maximum likelihood estimations obtained from assumptions on the 
probability distribution of failure conditional on firm characteristics. Those assumptions are a 
logistic distribution for the most popular logit analysis and a cumulative normal distribution for 
probit analysis (Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006). Ohlson (1980) broke away from the tradition of using 
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matched pairs with a sample of 105 bankrupt industrial firms and 2,058 non-bankrupt industrial 
firms from 1970 to 1976. He used nine variables based on previous literature and issued a linear 
function with parameters and a single cut-off score used to classify firms with the group they are 
the closest to in terms of dichotomous failed/non-failed status. As they allow the use of 
disproportional samples, conditional probability models are less statistically demanding than 
MDA, but like MDA, type I and type II error rates are the statistics of choice for measuring the 
accuracy of their classification. Logit analysis relies on two assumptions: the dependent variable 
must be dichotomous, and the optimal cut-off probability should factor in the cost of type I and 
type II error rates. The logit score is an intuitively comfortable value between zero and one 
resembling a probability of failure but the models are highly sensitive to multicollinearity and 
outliers (Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006; Martin, 1977; Ohlson, 1980; Zmijewski, 1984). The course of 
this research indicates that the Z-score and the O-score are the most compared to techniques in 
empirical studies, but over the years since the early seventies there have been many alternative 
techniques proposed for financial distress and bankruptcy prediction (Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006; 
Martin, 1977; Ohlson, 1980; Zmijewski, 1984). 
Other Techniques Used in Bankruptcy Prediction 
Corporate failure prediction has used several techniques besides MDA and conditional 
probabilities, and among them neural networks stand out for their relative frequency in the 
literature. The neural network technique is a non-statistical approach coming from neural 
computing, an artificially intelligent system using a network of interconnected units called 
artificial neurons. The original idea driving the development of neural networks was to mimic 
the human brain’s neural architecture and to emulate its functioning; and in many other 
disciplines than finance researchers explore the application of this field (Chong & Wilson, 1995). 
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The technique consists in teaching computers to develop algorithms based on provided samples 
(Blocher, Ko & Lin, 2001; Chong & Wilson, 1995; Ravi & Ravi, 2007). Several studies 
concluded in the superiority of neural networks over statistical methods including Charalambous, 
Charitou and Neophytou (2004), Chong and Wilson (1995), Han, Kwon and Lee (1996), Hansen 
and Messier (1991), Kiang and Tam (1992), Odom and Sharda (1990), and Sharda and Wilson 
(1994). However, Boritz, Kennedy and De Miranda e Albuquerque (1995) found that rather than 
the panacea, neural networks show only discrete bubbles of superior performance compared to 
MDA and conditional probability models. Neural networks are part of iterative learning models 
as are inductive learning systems that develop rules from given samples and composite rules 
induction systems applied by Blocher et al., Altman, Frydman and Kao (1985) and Hansen and 
Messier (1991). Support vector machines, or SVM, are supervised learning algorithms used for 
outlier detection, classifications and regression analysis (Erdogan, 2013; Lai, Yen & Zhou, 
2014). Like SVM, composite rule induction system is also a supervised learning technique 
central to machine learning and relying on making inferences from a dataset (Blocher et al., 
2001). Multidimensional scaling is a visualization technique relying on ordination of related data 
displayed in a distance matrix (Chipulu, Jayasekera & Khoja, 2016; Garcia-Cestona, Mar-
Molinero & Sagarra, 2015; Mar-Molinero & Neophytou, 2004; Mar-Molinero & Serrano-Cinca, 
2001). Multiple criteria linear programming is a data mining technique evolving from linear 
discriminant analyses used for decision-making involving several criteria (Kou, Kwak & Shi, 
2012). Decision trees are a non-parametric data mining technique classifying data in an 
arborescence, which then serves as input for decision analysis (Altman et al., 1985; Bhattacharya 
et al., 2010; Chen, 2011; Hosseini & Rashidi, 2013). Isotonic separation is a data separation and 
classification method originally developed in medical research and relying on the key 
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assumption of monotonic consistency of data. Ravi and Ravi (2007) also identify soft computing 
subsuming seamless hybridization of other computing techniques (Ravi & Ravi, 2007). Non-
computing techniques include managerial decision based approach (Peat, 2007) and factor 
analysis (Caruthers, Mingo & Pinches, 1973). The gambler’s ruin model (Wilcox, 1971, 1976), 
the catastrophe theory (Fletcher, Ryan & Scapens, 1981; Fabozzi, Francis & Hastings, 1983) and 
the contingent claims models (Cram, Hillegeist, Keating & Lundstedt, 2004) also belong to this 
category. At last, the other approaches to corporate failure prediction include operational 
research, evolutionary approaches, simple-intuitive models (Ooghe, Spaenjers & Vandermoere, 
2009), and survival analysis often referred to as dynamic event history analysis in social 
sciences. All but survival analysis are binary classification techniques and none of the 
approaches mentioned above has so far successfully imposed itself as the next unequivocal 
paradigm in corporate failure analysis as have the Z-score and the O-score. But survival analysis 
presents unique and distinctive characteristics in the way it approaches corporate failure 
prediction and benefits greater credit than any of these alternative techniques  (Altman et al., 
1985; Bhattacharya et al., 2010; Blocher et al., 2001; Boritz,et al., 1995; Caruthers et al., 1973; 
Charalambous et al., 2004; Chen, 2011; Chipulu et al., 2016;  Chong & Wilson, 1995; Cram et 
al., 2004; Erdogan, 2013; Fabozzi et al., 1983; Fletcher et al., 1981; Garcia-Cestona et al., 2015; 
Han et al., 1996; Hansen & Messier, 1991; Hosseini & Rashidi, 2013; Kiang & Tam, 1992; Kou 
et al., 2012; Lai et al., 2014; Mar-Molinero & Neophytou, 2004; Mar-Molinero & Serrano-
Cinca, 2001; Odom & Sharda, 1990; Ooghe et al., 2009; Peat, 2007; Sharda & Wilson, 1994; 
Ravi & Ravi, 2007; Wilcox, 1971, 1976). 
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Survival Analysis 
Survival analysis is a statistical technique widely used in biostatistics and to a lesser 
extent in mechanical engineering and social studies (InfluentialPoints, 2016; Pereira, 2014). 
Using historical data, survival analysis generates on a time continuum the probabilities of 
survival or survivor function, and the probability of instantaneous failure along the continuum 
provided the entity has survived so far or hazard function. Survival analysis can take the form of 
multiple models but the most frequently used are the parametric proportional hazard models, the 
Cox semi-parametric PH model and the accelerated failure time models. Proportional hazards 
models rely on the stable proportionality over time of the hazard of each predictor variable 
within the sample population. They are a regression analysis of univariate or multiple covariate 
predictors such as financial ratios and market data where the covariates do not show 
multicollinearity. In parametric models, the data requires fitting a specific statistical distribution 
with the assumption that the hazard follows that distribution (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & 
Kleinbaum, 2012). Cox (1972) developed a semi-parametric approach to proportional hazards 
analysis by removing the necessity to define the probability of a baseline function. This 
simplification of removing the need for prior distributions has made of the Cox semi-parametric 
PH model the preferred survival analysis corporate failure prediction technique. When the values 
of the predictor covariates remain constant over time, such as sex or geographic location for 
example, the covariates are time-invariant. When the values of some covariates change over 
time, as can be expected for financial ratios, those covariates are time varying and the Cox PH 
model requires the inclusion of a time coefficient for these covariates to extend the original 
model (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). Lane, Looney and Wansley (1986) 
pioneered the use of the Cox PH model in corporate failure prediction by doing a survival 
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analysis on the duration between balance sheet date and official disclosure of bank failure. The 
first studies applying survival analysis for corporate failure used time-invariant covariates. They 
also systematically justified the use of the Cox PH model by comparing their results with the 
classical alternatives of MDA and conditional probability models (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein 
& Kleinbaum, 2012; Lane et al.; Laitinen & Luoma, 1991; Chen & Lee, 1993; Henebry, 1996; 
Whalen, 1991).  
Several finance research papers have addressed the superiority of survival analysis over 
the classical binary models of MDA, logit and probit (Agarwal & Bauer, 2014; Beaver et al., 
2010; Chen & Lee, 1993; Davydenko, 2013; LeClere, 2005; Pereira, 2014; Shumway, 2001; 
Whalen, 1991; Yamazaki, 2013). The early authors noted two attributes in praising the 
technique. The first is the ability to estimate how long a firm may survive as opposed to the 
binary lens used in classical models that answers only whether the firm survives. The second is 
that survival analysis does not require any assumption about the distributional properties of the 
data, which is the multivariate normality restrictive assumption underlying MDA (Chen & Lee, 
1993; Whalen, 1991). Shumway (2001) made a landmark assertion praising the superiority of 
hazard models for bankruptcy prediction in a frontally critical paper of previous methods, and 
has since become a commonly cited reference in survival analyses empirical studies. He 
specifically asserted that “static” models have a selection bias due to the use of data for the year 
prior to failure as opposed to computing from all the years available in the sample, thus he 
contended that “static models do not adjust for period at risk, but hazard models adjust for it 
automatically” (Shumway, 2001, p.102). He also noted the benefits of using time-varying 
covariates that allow to capturing changes in corporate health, a point LeClere (2005) also 
emphasized. The third benefit of hazard models Shumway (2001) listed is the compounding 
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effect of using more data than in binary models as all sample years are used and thus they are 
more accurate. Beaver et al. (2010) acknowledged the advantages of hazard analysis. Agarwal 
and Bauer (2014) specifically attested to the superiority of hazard models over the Z-score and 
contingent claims. Yamazaki (2013) recognized the statistical power of proportional hazard 
models for analyzing and estimating events risks. Pereira (2014) considered survival analysis 
more useful and accurate than alternative approaches. In addition, for Davydenko (2013) “hazard 
analysis has become the instrument of choice in empirical studies predicting default and 
bankruptcy” (Davydenko, 2013, p.25). The superiority of survival analysis for a more 
meaningful and accurate predictability of corporate failure is recognized in the literature. The 
classical binary or static models carry heavy assumptions easily violated or require additional 
mitigating transformations. Comparatively, hazard models offer increased accuracy thanks to the 
inclusion of larger data, they remove the selection bias and the multivariate normality of data 
requirement, and above all, they give the probability of surviving up to a certain time along with 
the probability of failure at that time, respectively the survivor and the hazard functions. The Cox 
proportional hazards model has imposed itself as the method of choice over parametric models in 
business-related empirical studies and its validation in the literature participates in its selection 
for this research. The financial literature shows a wide and frequent use of the now asserted 
technique of survival analysis in corporate failure prediction. Yet, its use has so far remained 
marginal in both oil and gas studies and Canadian literature (Agarwal & Bauer, 2014; Beaver et 
al., 2010; Chen & Lee, 1993; Davydenko, 2013; LeClere, 2005; Pereira, 2014; Shumway, 2001; 
Whalen, 1991; Yamazaki, 2013). 
Empirical studies document the use of survival analysis to predict financial distress for 
several industries but seldom for oil and gas and to the best of the researcher’s knowledge never 
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for Canadian Oil and Gas firms. This research has identified 67 business related empirical 
survival studies using a proportional hazard method, including 18 published in the last five years 
(appendix A). 41 of these studies used an all-industry sample data and 15 focused on banking. 
Only one was on Oil and Gas (Chen & Lee, 1993) and two by Canadians without however any 
specific focus on Canada (Chen & Lee, 1993; Davydenko, 2013). Chen and Lee (1993) were 
inspired by the oil price decline of 1981 and used three years of data for a sample of 175 firms 
including 67 financially distressed (Chen & Lee, 1993). They used a definition of financial 
distress consistent with Beaver (1966) as the first event of any of the following: a) filing for 
bankruptcy or going into receivership, b) defaulting on debt payment, and c) suspending 
preferred stock dividends. They concluded to the usefulness of the Cox PH model as compared 
to logit and found that financial structure, the ability to find reserves, size and diversification 
between oil and gas are important determinants of survival time for oil and gas companies, but 
cash flow is not. Their survival analysis used time-independent covariates and they suggested 
future research to include time-dependent financial ratios as well as consider mergers as 
alternative causes for exit (Chen & Lee, 1993). Research on business failure in Canada has relied 
on the use of MDA. Altman and Levallee (1980), Legault and Veronneau (1986) and Springate 
(1978) developed each MDA Canadian business failure prediction models. Boritz, Kennedy and 
Sun (2007) compared them to the reference Z-score and O-Score models to assess their 
applicability to the Canadian business environment and noted that “a major obstacle in Canadian 
business failure prediction research is the scarcity and poor organization of available data” (p. 
147). Davydenko (2013) used a Cox PH model with a sample of 30,744 firm-months to insist on 
the use of market data rather than book values, especially for very distressed firms and 
demonstrate that insolvency is a much stronger trigger of default than illiquidity, except for 
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constrained firms, as illiquidity can be mitigated by external refinancing (Davydenko, 2013). He 
defined insolvency as a low ratio of market asset values to debt and illiquidity as low ratio of 
cash reserves to current liabilities. He also asserted that the timing of default, found to 
concentrate on two calendar months, June and December, and more specifically in the thirty days 
preceding those bond scheduled payment semi-annual dates, is by far best determined by the 
market value of assets (Davydenko, 2013). Scholar empirical analyses have made of survival 
analysis and more specifically the Cox proportional hazards model their preferred instrument, 
away from the classical binary approaches. Yet the technique appears only twice in Canadian 
studies and only once in Oil and Gas, using time-independent covariates. Chen and Lee (1993) 
justified their analysis by the external oil price shock impacting oil and gas firms and Davydenko 
(2013) following Shumway (2001) insisted on the use of market data for very distressed firms.  
The criteria defining distressed firms are not consistent in the literature and this key construct of 
interest for this study requires a focused review of its own (Altman & Levallee, 1980; Beaver, 
1966; Chen & Lee, 1993; Boritz et al., 2007; Davydenko, 2013; Legault & Veronneau, 1986; 
Springate, 1978; Shumway, 2001). 
Financial Distress 
The financial literature is very heterogeneous in defining financial distress. This diversity 
shows in the meaning and the criteria used to measure the cut-off point used for sampling 
studies. Financial distress is distinct from insolvency for Davydenko (2013) who related it to 
illiquidity, whereas insolvency is economic distress, for Purnanandam (2008) who viewed it as 
transitory stage from solvency to insolvency, and for Outecheva (2007) who put it on a 
sequential process where they are different phases of a cycle (Davydenko, 2013; Outecheva, 
2007; Purnanandam, 2008). Both financial distress and insolvency are also distinct from default 
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which is characterized by the failure to make a payment on a specific due date and bears a legal 
liability. A firm can be in a state of insolvency at any point in time and for a long period before 
triggering the default by missing a payment. Davydenko (2013) placed most defaults in the 
month preceding the semi-annual bond payments dates of June and December, but the actual 
insolvency may have been prevalent for a much longer time before defaulting (Davydenko, 
2013). Similarly, bankruptcy is also distinct from financial distress, insolvency and default, as 
filing for bankruptcy is a legal proceeding that varies from one country to another and that may 
not only be motivated by the consequences of financial and economic distress, but also by 
strategic and restructuring purposes without necessarily entailing financial distress (Gilbert, 
Menon & Schwartz, 1990; Outecheva, 2007). The two main avenues to defining financial 
distress are values and flows. Value-based insolvency relates to assets versus debts in terms of 
net worth, and flow-based insolvency is the actual inability to pay debt when it comes due 
(Hillier et al., 2012). Several authors use multiple criteria to define financial distress, some use 
only one and many do not formally distinguish between financial distress, default, failure and 
bankruptcy. Financial distress is a default on due payment for Beaver (1966), Andrade and 
Kaplan (1998), Ross (2005), Chen and Lee (1993), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Kim, 
Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993). Hillier et al. and Whitaker (1999) related financial distress 
to illiquidity and insufficient cash flows to cover current obligations. Liquidity is also the criteria 
for McEwen and Turetsky (2001) who measured it by a change in cash flow from positive to 
negative, and for Asquisth, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) who determined a cut-off in terms of 
Ebitda falling below 80% of interest expenses. A decrease in asset value defines financial 
distress for Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Purnanandam 
(2008) who measured it as the market value of assets falling below 66% of the face value of 
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debt, and Davydenko (2013) who argued that access to refinancing discounts illiquidity as the 
main trigger of failure. Chen and Lee (1993) used an interruption in preferred dividends as a 
classification criterion for financial distress, while Hillier et al. used a more general reduction in 
dividend payment. Another criterion of Chen and Lee (1993) is the actual filing for bankruptcy, 
and so do Pereira (2014), Davydenko (2013) and Chancharat, Davy, McCrae and Tian (2007). 
Restructuring is a sign of financial distress for Andrade and Kaplan (1998), Brown et al. (1992), 
Platt and Platt (2002), Hillier et al. who include it in a more generic required corrective action to 
be taken by the firm, and Chancharat et al. Other authors used a decrease in profitability to 
define financial distress. For Altman and Hotchkiss (2006), it is the return on invested capital 
falling below the cost of capital in a significant and continuous manner. Platt and Platt (2002) 
considered several years of operating loss, as did Denis and Denis (1995) with three consecutive 
years and Gilbert et al., Whitaker (1999) and Shumway (2001) considered a drop in the firm’s 
stock market returns, in line with Opler and Titman (1994) who specified it at 30% or more of 
the median stock return. Other criteria used in the literature include lay-offs (Hillier et al., 2012; 
Platt & Platt, 2002), distressed exchange offers (Davydenko, 2013) and a decrease in sales 
growth (Opler & Titman, 1994). The list of criteria used to define financial distress thus includes 
assets value, illiquidity, default, dividend reduction, bankruptcy filing, restructuring, 
profitability, stock market value, lay-offs, sales and debt refinancing. However, financial distress 
is not a single event, rather, it is part of a sequence of subsequent stages (Outecheva, 2007; 
McEwen & Turetsky, 2001; Whitaker, 1999). Outecheva (2007) described corporate financial 
distress as a cycle starting with early impairment, which is a strategic level of danger where the 
firm is still solvent. The cycle continues with a distressed but solvent phase with operational 
impacts manifested as a deterioration of performance affecting profitability followed by failure, 
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insolvency and default where the firm is illiquid. In the next phase, the firm is insolvent: it starts 
with bankruptcy along with a death struggle between liquidation, takeover or survival, which 
takes the form of restructuring the troubled debt and eventually regaining solvency to be in the 
last stage of the cycle, recovery (Outecheva, 2007). Failure, a term mainly used in predictive 
statistical models, default, insolvency and bankruptcy appear indistinctly in the financial 
literature as synonyms to financial distress and while some authors stressed the semantic 
distinctions many others did not seem to note the diversity of meanings. The criteria used to 
define and measure the state of financial distress are very diverse but the two main approaches 
are illiquidity triggering default and insolvency measured through assets relative to debt. While 
financial distress may come as insolvency for many in the literature, some authors also stressed it 
as a preceding phase to actual insolvency. Outecheva (2007) provided an accurate synthesis of 
the difficulty in defining financial distress: 
Different approaches to the definition of the term “Financial Distress” show how 
versatile, complex, and sometimes even controversial this economic category is. The state 
of the art in the theory of financial distress is rather to interpret it as dependent on the 
purpose of research under a particular point [sic] of view: operational, legal, etc., which 
leads to using this term interchangeably with other similar financial definitions 
(Outecheva, 2007, p.18). 
The definition of financial distress is very heterogeneous but invariably firms in distress 
tend to see their stock value drop and their gearing increase, two consequential attributes of 
hedging authors have largely documented among others (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006; Anderson 
& Sundaresan, 1996; Andrade & Kaplan, 1998; Asquisth et al., 1994; Beaver, 1966; Black & 
Cox, 1976; Brown et al., 1992; Chancharat et al. 2007; Chen & Lee, 1993; Davydenko, 2013; 
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Denis & Denis, 1995; Gilbert et al., 1990; Hillier et al., 2012; Kim et al., 1993; Leland, 1994; 
Longstaff & Schwartz, 1995;  McEwen & Turetsky, 2001; Mooradian 1992; Opler & Titman, 
1994; Outecheva, 2007; Pereira, 2014; Platt & Platt, 2002; Purnanandam, 2008; Ross, 2005; 
Shumway, 2001; Whitaker, 1999). 
Hedging 
The reasons to hedge are varied and the presence and level of hedging also fluctuate 
especially in oil and gas. The literature on hedging has evolved since Miller and Modigliani 
(1958) and eventually focused on the reasons for hedging, among which financial distress. Miller 
and Modigliani (1958) provided the foundation for this literature in denying the pertinence of 
hedging, as they assumed that corporate financial policy is irrelevant. Several authors disagreed 
with this postulate and from 1960 to the early 1980s, the literature focused on how to hedge, at a 
time that was concomitant with the development and multiplication of financial derivatives 
instruments and contracts. Mayers and Smith Jr. (1982) followed by Smith Jr. and Stulz (1985) 
and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) shifted this paradigm with landmark papers on the 
reasons for hedging. Those include a reduction in the cost of financial distress, tax optimization, 
risk aversion, avoiding underinvestment and maximizing growth opportunities, correlation with 
leverage or correlation with firm value increase. Chowdhry and Schwartz (2012) referred to a 
long-standing puzzle in the risk management literature as to why firms chose not to hedge their 
exposure to the risks representing the highest negative impact on their cash flow. They asserted 
that firms should hedge the variance in cash flow using specific transaction exposures for known 
and contracted cash flow amounts, rather than hedge the cost of financial distress, that is, hedge 
the probability of bankruptcy as opposed to its impact (Chowdhry & Schwartz, 2012). Following 
DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), Breeden and Viswanathan (2016) also considered a reduction in 
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cash flow volatility as an objective in hedging because it shines light on managerial performance. 
They posited too that firms do not consider hedging all risks but only the marginal risks that 
stand the firm apart from similar firms, the risks out of managerial control, which can affect the 
superior managerial ability and performance, or simply put, firms hedge to lock in performance 
(Breeden & Viswanathan, 2016). Jin and Jorion (2006) analyzed the hedging activities of 119 oil 
and gas producers from 1998 to 2001 and concluded that hedging has no impact on market value 
in oil and gas. They explained that due to the homogeneity of the industry and the facility to 
identify and hedge commodity risk exposure, hedging does not reduce the stock price sensitivity 
to oil and gas prices, and speculated that hedging in this industry must thus lie in management’s 
will to maximize personal utility (Jin & Jorion, 2006). Lookman (2004) also concluded that the 
impact of hedging on firm valuation is marginal in an empirical study based on 364 year-firm of 
oil and gas producers. He found that for undiversified firms facing primary risk (commodity 
risk), hedging was associated with high agency costs, lower firm value and bad management, 
while for diversified firms mainly hedging secondary risks (foreign exchange and interest rate 
risks) it was the opposite, but overall the impact on firm value was marginal (Lookman, 2004). 
Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) considered income smoothing with discretionary accrual choices in 
an absence of markets to hedge the operational risk of unsuccessful drilling and found that 
managers make such decisions based on their existing hedging. They also confirmed the finding 
by Haushalter (2000) that oil and gas producers do not hedge all their exposure. Haushalter 
(2000, 2001) observed a wide variety in the hedging policies of oil and gas producers, some not 
hedging at all, some doing it only partially and others hedging 100% of their production. He 
positively correlated the level of hedging of oil and gas firms to financing costs and leverage, 
economies of scales in hedging and negatively to basis risk, which is the risk of low correlation 
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between changes in the value the oil and gas being hedged and the value of the derivatives used 
for hedging. He concluded that firms with higher leverage and thus higher financing cost tend to 
hedge more; firms facing lower basis risk also tend to hedge more; and as hedging is a costly 
process requiring specific expertise and economies of scales in transaction costs, larger firms 
tend to hedge more (Haushalter, 2000, 2001). Iqbal (2015) also found that oil and gas firms show 
a higher level of debt than non-hedge firms before entering hedging and subsequently their debt 
decreases (Iqbal, 2015). The literature shows that firms engage into hedging for more reasons 
than mitigating an exposure, and even when they do, especially for oil and gas producers, there is 
no industry uniformity in hedging policy. Hedging is demanding in expertise and transaction 
costs and bears basis risk, therefore it may not be accessible or favored by companies below a 
certain size, especially in oil and gas where it does not increase firm value through stock 
appreciation. As the benefits of hedging are already embedded in the stock price in that industry, 
the incentive to hedge must then be specific such as locking in managerial performance, covering 
only precise cash flow exposure or mitigating a high leverage that comes with higher refinancing 
cost. So not all oil and gas firms hedge, those who do may do it only partially and be large 
enough, yet those with high leverage should have an incentive to hedge and high leverage is a 
factor in leading to financial distress. The hedging literature reveals a similarity to financial 
distress analysis through hazard models: it is not a binary hedge/non-hedge simple proposal; 
rather, the factors used are heterogeneous and may fluctuate with time. Firm size is one of these 
evolving factors and a corporate failure predictive variable frequently used in empirical studies 
(Allayannis & Weston, 2001; Breeden & Viswanathan, 2016; Campello, Lin, Ma & Zou, 2011; 
Carter, Rogers & Simkins, 2006; Chowdhry & Schwartz, 2012; DeMarzo & Duffie, 1995; 
Dolde, 1995; Froot et al., 1993; Haushalter, 2000, 2001; Haushalter, Heron & Lie, 2002; Iqbal, 
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2015; Jin & Jorion, 2006; Lookman, 2004; Mayers & Smith Jr., 1982; Miller & Modigliani, 
1958; Nance, Smith Jr. & Smithson, 1993; Pincus & Rajgopal, 2002; Smith Jr. & Stulz, 1985; 
Purnanandam, 2008) 
Firm Size 
Firm size is a popular variable used in bankruptcy prediction and a review of literature 
helps shining light on its predictive power and its measurement. For Chancharat et al. (2007) 
firm size increase directly correlates to increased probability of failure. On the contrary, many 
other studies found that smaller firms have a larger exposure to financial distress (Aziz & Dar, 
2006; Fitzpatrick & Ogden, 2011; Raj & Rinastiti, 2002; Shumway, 2001). Rommer (2004) 
formulated two hypotheses to relate the effect of size to the trigger of financial distress. The first 
is that firm size follows a U-shaped statistic where small firms lack resilience to shock and are 
thus exposed at one branch, while at the other branch large firms lack flexibility and nimbleness 
to quickly monitor their employees and communicate internally. The second is like the scholar 
consensus considering that firm size inversely correlates to bankruptcy risk. Altman and 
Hotchkiss (2006) considered the major corporate failure of the early 2000s and for them “size is 
no longer a proxy for corporate health” (Hotchkiss, 2006, p. 4). While most authors agree that 
firm size has strong failure predictive power, the metric of choice for measuring it varies in the 
literature. Charalambous et al. (2004) listed 43 previous empirical studies on corporate failure in 
which 17 used asset size for pair matching (with industry and/or sales). Total assets and its 
natural logarithm are common proxies used for company size (Chancharat et al. 2007; Gentry et 
al., 1985; Peat, 2007; Raj & Rinastiti, 2002; Chong et al., 2010; Ohlson, 1980), but less 
frequently used proxies include sales and its natural log (Chen & Lee, 1993), market 
capitalization (Shumway, 2001) and headcount (Nikitin, 2003; Prantl, 2003). Dang and Li (2015) 
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who reviewed 100 empirical papers in an analysis of firm size measurement in corporate finance 
confirm these frequencies. They found that total assets, total sales and market value of equity 
along with their natural log appeared as size proxy in 85 out of 87 papers using single measures 
(the other 13 with multiple measures served for robustness check in the study). Of the 85 papers, 
49 used total assets, 20 used market capitalizations, 16 used total sales and two used the number 
of employees, or respectively their natural log. They found a strong correlation of 0.92 between 
the log of assets and the log of sales, while however, warning that the measures of firm size are 
not interchangeable (Dang & Li, 2015). Reviewing the literature on firm size thus reveals three 
conclusions. Most studies find strong financial distress predictive power to firm size. They 
conclude to a positive correlation between decreasing size and probability of failure. The natural 
log of total assets is the preferred proxy for firm size. As with hedging, firm size can also be a 
factor in mergers and acquisition (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006; Aziz & Dar, 2006; Chancharat et 
al., 2007; Charalambous et al., 2004; Chen & Lee, 1993; Chong et al., 2010; Dang & Li, 2015; 
Fitzpatrick & Ogden, 2011; Gentry et al., 1985; Nikitin, 2003; Ohlson, 1980; Peat, 2007; Prantl, 
2003; Raj & Rinastiti, 2002; Rommer, 2004; Shumway, 2001).  
Mergers and Acquisitions 
The literature on mergers and acquisitions is vast and varied but several authors have 
explored the relationship between financial distress and M&A, especially to see in M&A a 
bankruptcy avoidance strategy and correlate solvency fragility to increased takeover risk. 
Vazirani (2015) listed six temporal waves, four theories and seven motives for M&A. The waves 
listed start as early as 1893 for the first and end with the last from 2003 to 2007, a wave of M&A 
driven by leverage buyouts, private equity financing, collateralization and syndicated debt. 
Vazirani (2015) also anchored the study of M&A activity into four theories: the capital market 
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school focused on wealth creation derived from M&A, the strategic management school centered 
on diversification strategy, the organizational behavior school and the process perspective. Those 
theories shelter the following motives for M&A: inefficient management, synergy or horizontal 
mergers, diversification, agency problems, tax considerations, market expansion, and purchase of 
assets below their replacement costs (Vazirani, 2015). One or more of these motives may 
specifically relate to bankruptcy avoidance. Shrieves and Stevens (1979) analyzed that newly 
merged companies improved their solvency ratios over that of both pre-merger entities. 
Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (2003) used a sample of UK companies to find in pre-emptive 
acquisitions a defense mechanism against hostile takeover and a great influence against the 
probability of bankruptcy. Similarly, for Billingsley, Johnson and Marquette (1988) debt 
capacity and tax benefits drive the choice between merger and bankruptcy, while Stiglitz (1972) 
saw a higher risk of hostile takeover in firms with high debt-to-equity ratio, equated to high 
bankruptcy risk (Billingsley et al., 1988; Stiglitz, 1972). Erel, Jang and Weisbach (2015) studied 
a large sample of European companies to report that indeed, being acquired lifted the financial 
constraints of the target firms, especially when they are small, who no longer need to hoard cash 
for strategic capital investments, become less sensitive to cash flow fluctuation and tend to 
increase investment (Erel et al., 2015). For Pastena and Ruland (1986), among distressed firms, 
those merging are larger and have lower financial leverage than those filing for bankruptcy, as 
well high ownership concentration is a factor indicating a stronger propensity to merge than to 
default (Pastena & Ruland, 1986). Kyimaz (2006) supported the bankruptcy avoidance argument 
by observing that the divestiture announcement resulted in higher wealth gains for distressed 
firms and firms with higher leverage (Kyimaz, 2006). Peel and Wilson (1989) also found in 
acquisitions an alternative to bankruptcy and Powell and Yawson (2007) shone light on how well 
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the variables used to predict takeovers are similarly useful for bankruptcy prediction. Parnes 
(2009) analyzed the objective of enhancing credit worthiness for both the acquirer and the target 
as a motive for corporate acquisitions and distressed firms (Parnes, 2009). In Canada, Cohen, 
Gupta, Uffner and Wach (2009) focused on income funds that originated in the oil and gas sector 
in the 1980s. Those funds were tax exempt and the authors reported that they have represented a 
significant level of activity and importance in Canadian mergers and acquisitions, for tax 
optimization purposes, until a 2006 tax policy removed their flow-through entity tax advantages 
(Cohen, et al., 2009). M&A have regularly taken place intensely in economic waves throughout 
modern history and while growth and wealth optimization purposes often motivate them, several 
researchers have demonstrated that they also take place to avoid bankruptcy and tend to improve 
solvency and leverage. A reason for seeking an M&A partner can also be tax benefits and in 
Canada, many such motivated M&A took place in the oil and gas sector through income funds 
until those lost their tax shelter status in 2006. However, in an industry largely sensitive to the 
fluctuation of the price of oil and gas, survival motivated M&A along with solvency, leverage 
and creditworthiness are still arguably fueling Canadian Oil and Gas M&A activity (Billingsley 
et al., 1988; Cohen et al., 2009; Dickerson et al., 2003; Erel et al., 2015; Kyimaz, 2006; Parnes, 
2009; Pastena & Ruland, 1986; Peel & Wilson, 1989; Powell & Yawson, 2007; Shrieves & 
Steven, 1979; Stiglitz, 1972; Vazirani, 2015). 
Ever since ratios have started being used in financial analysis, they have proven as a solid 
backbone of preferred metrics still used in most of financial distress and bankruptcy prediction 
analyses alongside with additional market and firm characteristics data (Horrigan, 1968). In the 
life cycle of corporate failure prediction, the classical approaches best exemplify the growth 
stage of analytical capabilities (Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006). They have imposed themselves as a 
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reference focal point in the literature, and while alternatives are still regularly proposed, survival 
analysis is a paradigm shift representing both maturity and depth of analysis unlike any other 
technique (Agarwal & Bauer, 2014; Beaver et al., 2010; Chen & Lee, 1993; Davydenko, 2013; 
LeClere, 2005; Pereira, 2014; Shumway, 2001; Whalen, 1991; Yamazaki, 2013). Survival 
analysis permits to enrich the analysis with specific vantage points such as hedging, firm size and 
M&A. The results of any survival analysis are nonetheless a function of the criteria used to 
define financial distress. The literature is not consensual on the subject and researchers may fit it 
to their specific purposes, hence the axiological assumption stipulated above for this study 
(Outecheva, 2007). Hedging has varied motives and policies; it is costly and does not contribute 
to increasing corporate wealth in oil and gas (Haushalter, 2000, 2001; Iqbal, 2015).  Ad hoc risk 
management motivates hedging by those oil and gas firms that are large enough to effectively 
manage it and amortize its cost. The literature consensually points to an understanding that 
smaller firms are more prone to financial distress than large ones, and among other measures 
uses mostly the natural logarithm of total assets to measure firm size (Aziz & Dar, 2006; Dang & 
Li, 2015; Fitzpatrick & Ogden, 2011; Raj & Rinastiti, 2002; Shumway, 2001). Several motives 
justify M&A activity, but bankruptcy avoidance for financially distressed companies has been 
documented in the literature beyond or concurrently to expansion, growth and wealth creation, 
along with the will to improve leverage, optimize tax or improve creditworthiness similarly to 
the same impulse that originated financial distress prediction analysis almost a century ago 
(Kyimaz, 2006; Parnes, 2009; Powell & Yawson, 2007). The theoretical foundation for this 
research takes roots in a rich and varied literature that has evolved along the life cycle of 
corporate distress analysis. Yet despite the strengths of its roots and the quality of its analyses, it 
is still open to critiques considering the research problem of this study, critiques that are 
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necessary to pave the way to the selected methodology and subsequent analysis performed 
(Agarwal & Bauer, 2014; Aziz & Dar, 2006; Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006; Beaver et al., 2010; Chen 
& Lee, 1993; Dang & Li, 2015; Davydenko, 2013; Fitzpatrick & Ogden, 2011; Haushalter, 2000, 
2001; Horrigan, 1968; Iqbal, 2015; Kyimaz, 2006; LeClere, 2005; Outecheva, 2007; Parnes, 
2009; Pereira, 2014; Powell & Yawson, 2007; Raj & Rinastiti, 2002; Shumway, 2001; Whalen, 
1991; Yamazaki, 2013). 
Critique of Previous Research 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no specific precedent to studying the 
determinants of corporate failure in the Canadian oil and gas industry. This study nonetheless 
anchors in a generic body of work in financial distress predictive analysis. This theoretical 
orientation suffers weaknesses, and the consideration of these limits contributes to the selection 
of the methodology for this research. The first critique expressed below pertains to authoring and 
credit, the second explores the abusive use of classical references and its consequences, and the 
third critique ties into the covariates used in financial distress analysis. 
The literature on corporate failure is abundant and varied. While this field of research is 
matured, and has already evolved through a few distinct eras, the research performed for this 
literature review reveals an incorrect and persistent tendency by most authors to give exclusive 
credit for the origins of this branch of corporate finance research to Beaver (1966). Indeed, as 
Horrigan (1968) foresaw, the work of Beaver (1996) did become a landmark publication and it 
rightfully deserves the credit commensurate with the importance of the breach it represented. 
However, as described above, Beaver (1966) stood on the shoulders of others before him rather 
than creating ex-nihilo. Yet, there is rarely any mention of the predecessors to Beaver (1966) and 
it requires a focused research effort intent on understanding the origins of the stepping-stone 
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Beaver (1966) used to unravel the foundations he stood on. Whether the systematic and easy 
reference to Beaver (1966) seeking to plant the origins of research in corporate failure and give 
credibility to the literature review in most papers flows out of mimesis or whether it has become 
the orphan child of the requirement to limit references to the past five years, the literature in 
general perpetuates a compounding ignorance. Although not enough credit goes to his 
predecessors, Beaver (1966) himself opened his seminal article with this first sentence “At the 
turn of the century, ratio analysis was in its embryonic state.” (Beaver, 1966, p.71) and cited in 
footnotes a reference from 1908 as well as the historical research performed by Horrigan (as 
cited in Beaver, 1966) for his 1963 unpublished dissertation. The question of replicating 
preceding studies then emerges as whether so many who cited Beaver (1966) have read his 
paper? One of the key factors to the solidity and success of Beaver’s (1966) paper was the 
novelty of its stronger statistical analysis than ever proposed before in similar research contexts. 
Beaver (1966) did express in a footnote to the second introductory line of his paper his gratitude 
to H. Roberts for his help with statistical expertise, but the contribution of this expert to this 
seminal paper seems to have vanished in history. Similarly, little to no reference appears in the 
literature about the fact that Altman (1968) found his inspiration in Fisher (1936) who originally 
pioneered linear discriminant analysis. Again, only purposeful research allows reaching such 
depths and the unverifiable suspicion may arise that the publication of Fisher’s (1936) work in 
the Annals of Eugenics stewarding prejudice against racial, disabled and ethnic groups may have 
contributed to blackballing any reference to his inspirational contribution to MDA. If this 
suspicion holds true, it is worth denouncing, as the value of a scientific contribution should stand 
on its own, regardless of the personal views of their author. Academic research and publication 
steward high standards of ethics and integrity; it is also the ultimate scientific and 
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epistemological reference, one supposed to be complete and accurate. Gradually and collectively 
failing to give due credit, not in the way of improperly citing an author, but more subtly by not 
acknowledging the theoretical foundations of seminal works is a surreptitious asphyxiation of 
said foundations until they eventually fade away, and that is worthy of criticism. 
Shortsightedness in giving due credit can also morph into another collective flaw where 
corporate failure predictive analyses tend to systematically use the classical models as reference 
benchmarks (Altman, 1968; Beaver, 1966; Horrigan, 1968; Fisher, 1936). 
For benchmark analyses, predictions and new techniques, the constant references in the 
literature are the Z-score and the O-score, respectively by Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980). 
However, the classical techniques are laden with limitations and while their merit in advancing 
the field deserves a consistent and full acknowledgement, they should no longer be the 
systematic focal point used to gauge the validity of empirical studies, especially when alternative 
techniques like survival analysis are there to provide more analytical depth. Classical models 
result in binary classifications of failure or non-failure that do not provide insights into the 
relative weight, contribution and influence of the determinants, and mainly rely on data from the 
last year preceding bankruptcy. Until Ohlson (1980) used logit to introduce his conditional 
probability model, MDA models like preceding analyses used pair matching, often with small 
sample sizes including the Z-score with 33 matched pairs. Both attributes of small sample size 
and pair matching considerably limit the generalizability of these models and should caution 
against making of them the obligatory references. MDA has restrictive assumptions largely 
identified in the literature and reported by Balcaen and Ooghe (2006), requiring demanding 
transformations, and conditional probabilities models are also limited by their sensitivity to 
outliers and the risk of multicollinearity. The well-established limits and restrictions of MDA, 
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logit and probit should caution against using them to assert the validity of empirical studies on 
corporate failure and financial distress analysis. Survival analysis relies on a larger period than 
the year preceding failure, explains the impact of the covariates to survival time, and the Cox PH 
model has the proportional hazard assumption of proportionality over time and the assumption 
that there is no multicollinearity among covariates. Each multivariate study should test both 
assumptions. Yet, even with survival analysis, the results are a function of both the covariates 
and the definitions used (Altman, 1968; Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006; Ohlson, 1980).  
More than a century after the emergence of financial ratios and their use in assessing 
business performance and predicting corporate failure and bankruptcy there is still no consensus 
on the ontology of financial distress analysis. Dang and Li (2015) noted that the empirical 
literature fails to provide rationales for defining or selecting measures of firm size (Dang & Li, 
2015). They make a criticism that may also be valid for the determinants of failure. Solvency and 
liquidity are generally central to bankruptcy prediction but the ratios used vary from one study to 
another; as well, the use of market data and firm characteristics also fluctuate. Shumway (2001) 
made an impact when he championed the use of market data for survival analysis. Davydenko 
(2013) insisted on solvency over liquidity and market data over book values. Altman (1968) used 
four variables, Beneish (1999) eight, and five in another version, Ohlson (1980) nine and 
Zmijewski (1984) three, while other authors used varying combinations of ratios, market data 
and firm characteristics. Business practitioners such as the DBRS credit agency assess oil and 
gas firms’ risk through profitability and cash flow, competitive landscape, stability, regulation 
and inherent industry specific considerations, all with their specific series of ratios, and with a 
clear acknowledgement of multicollinearity: 
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Although there is an overlap in some instances (to some degree, in the long term all five 
factors tend to profitability and stability), DBRS has found that considering these five 
measures in a separate fashion is a useful way of approaching this analysis (DBRS, 2011, 
p5). 
So, whether in research papers or in business, there are potentially as many ways to 
measure financial distress as there are studies and this lack of consistent and solid framework 
limits the generalizability and replicability of several analyses. Here too, mimesis is an accepted 
and recurring habit in scholar publications when ratios selection flows out of popularity in 
previous studies, rather than through a transparent and clearly explained rationale. Like the 
variety of covariates found in the literature, the definition of what constitutes a state of financial 
distress is also unbound and fluctuates from one author to another. In this regard, a major 
criticism applies to the use of a strictly legal definition of bankruptcy, especially for studies made 
in the US, as companies may file for Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing to reorganize 
themselves or for other strategic reasons (Blakes Canadian Lawyers, 2016). The legal definition 
lens of financial distress is thus a limitation when analyzing and predicting financial distress, as 
within a sample, not all stressed companies may file for bankruptcy and not all of those who file, 
are effectively distressed economically, meaning with their going concern capability at risk. 
Davydenko (2013) distinguished two schools: one using economic distress based on the market 
value of assets going below the face value of debt to trigger insolvency, and one focused on 
current obligations with a shorter-term world view of financial distress (Davydenko, 2013). 
Many authors analyzing bankruptcy and financial distress do not even define their acception of 
the failure status. While the absence of boundaries framing predictive analyses of financial 
distress increases the freedom to explore new techniques and innovate, it can be detrimental to 
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the scientific rigor, the generalizability and the consistency of such analyses. To the best of the 
researcher knowledge, only one empirical study applied a survival analysis to study corporate 
failure in oil and gas. In that study, Chen and Lee (1993) used time-invariant covariates but they 
did recommend for further research to use time-varying covariates (Beneish, 1999; Blakes 
Canadian Lawyers, 2016; Chen & Lee, 1993; Dang & Li, 2015; Davydenko, 2013; DBRS, 2011; 
Ohlson, 1980; Shumway, 2001; Zmijewski, 1984).  
The absence of an undisputed paradigm for corporate failure analysis beckons researchers 
into omitting to appropriately acknowledging the stepping-stones that enabled the main 
paradigms of their favorite references, Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980). They ignore the well-
documented restrictions and limitations of both approaches and continue referencing them to 
seek validity for any new empirical study, often using intelligent techniques that provide a binary 
answer to the prediction of failure. The definitions used for failure and the selection of predictive 
variable fluctuate and are not always rationalized. This study falls within a post-positivist 
paradigm that defines its boundaries, subjectivity and limits. Within that framework, an 
empirical analysis seeking to understand the determinants of financial distress beyond a binary 
answer, using more than a single year preceding failure data, and factoring in the changes over 
time of the variables, requires using a Cox Proportional Hazards model with time-varying 
covariates or more precisely an extended Cox model with repeating events (Altman, 1968; Cox, 
1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012; Ohlson, 1980). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
This study requires a specific and detailed methodology description to set the paradigm 
within which the survival analysis takes place in the next chapter. This chapter provides this 
description and includes seven sections. The first section is the research design that introduces 
and elaborates on the concept of financial distress, explains the predictor variables used in the 
baseline model of this study and describes the baseline model. The second section proposes the 
research hypotheses and includes the specific technique variations from the baseline model for 
each hypothesis. The third section explains the population and sampling strategy, followed by a 
description of the research instrument in section four, including its mathematical development. 
The fifth section discusses data collection and the sixth deals with the descriptive statistics of the 
data. The last section is a summary concluding this chapter. 
Research Design 
This study is a quantitative research using the statistical technique of survival analysis on 
a sample of 540 Canadian oil and gas exploration and production firms. Although there are 
several methods in survival analysis, this study uses the semi-parametric approach of Cox 
(1972), known as the Cox extended model allowing for the use of time-dependent covariates 
with repeating events (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). The research 
instrument section below contains a detailed description of this model and its theoretical 
foundations. The overall problem guiding the research in this study is about the financial fragility 
of oil and gas producers whose profitability and sustainability is impacted by the external factor 
of oil and gas prices. The whole oil and gas industry in Canada follows boom and bust cycles 
and the survival of the firms in that sector is the central focus of this research inspired by the 
current severe bust cycle started with the mid-2014 drop in oil prices (CAPP, 2016; Jakeman & 
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Tertzakian, 2016; Macrotrends, 2016; Millington, 2016). The nature of the problem and the 
question of survival analysis focused on a specific sector within an industry in a country require 
the use of tangible data, and the methods available to analyze corporate failure are diverse and 
well established in academic literature. Among them, survival analysis is a robust statistical 
technique central to biostatistics and epidemiology (InfluentialPoints, 2016). Financial 
empiricists have applied it to research on corporate failure to gain a richer set of perspectives and 
answers than the previously available paradigms offering binary answers. They have consistently 
used the semi-parametric model proposed by Cox (1972) and this research inscribes in that 
tradition (Chen & Lee, 1993; Davydenko, 2013; LeClere, 2005; Pereira, 2014; Shumway, 2001). 
Therefore, a survival analysis of Canadian oil and gas firms demands actual data and a robust, 
academically proven and accepted statistical method, a requirement that leads to the choice of a 
quantitative methodology for this study. The design of this research includes the prerequisite 
description of the notion of financial distress and the selection of the predictors ahead of the 
actual survival analysis per se (Chen & Lee, 1993; Cox, 1972; Davydenko, 2013; Fox, 2008; 
InfluentialPoints, 2016; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012; LeClere, 2005; Pereira, 2014; Shumway, 
2001). 
Definition of Financial Distress 
The notion of financial distress suffers multiple definitions and interpretations in the 
literature and each researcher adapts it to their purpose (Outecheva, 2007). This study is not 
different in that regard and as financial distress is the key construct of interest around which the 
whole analysis evolves, it must be precisely defined and the rationale for its definition must also 
be clearly laid out. The purpose of the research is to analyze the relationship of predictor 
variables to the event of financial distress. The governing paradigm of this study is post-
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positivist and the axiological assumption is that the researcher’s world view permeates it, 
specifically regarding the definition of the central key construct notion of financial distress 
(Outecheva, 2007). 
For this research, the definition of financial distress is two consecutive quarters of 
negative operating cash flow to total assets (OCF/TA). To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, this definition is original in the literature. The rationale for the selection of this 
definition stems from the cash-intensive and asset-heavy nature of the oil and gas E&P sector 
and a deliberate distinction between bankruptcy, insolvency, illiquidity and financial distress. 
E&P firms require numerous, large, and expensive equipment in remote exploration sites with 
camps, air travel and lodging accommodations; and continuous capital expenditure for 
maintenance, upgrades and expansion projects. Their business is very tangible and cash-
intensive. They invest heavily in exploring oil reserves in areas they pay royalties to exploit, and 
they use large capital expenditures and operating expenses to extract, produce and transport the 
crude oil to the downstream refineries. The province of Alberta in Canada has the worldwide 
third largest reserves of crude oil, its oil reserves lie primarily in oil sands which unlike light 
crude found in Saudi Arabia or in the North Sea for example are more expensive to extract 
(CAPP, 2016; Natural Resources Canada, 2017). Canada’s E&P industry needs considerable 
cash to operate and that vital cash needs to be generated by its operations. In other words, E&P 
firms need to “sweat the assets” (Harrison, 2005) to survive, especially during and immediately 
following low oil prices periods and bust times fueling economic recessions (CAPP, 2016; 
Harrison, 2005; Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; Millington, 2016; Natural Resources Canada, 
2017; PSAC, 2016). 
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 The ratio of OCF/TA is an asset efficiency ratio that measures how well the assets 
generate cash. This ratio shows the quintessential capability of an E&P firm to autonomously 
and continuously operate and grow as a going concern. The threshold for a healthy OCF/TA ratio 
is not standardized and it is industry-specific. In some industries, a ratio of 10% is recommended 
by investors and analysts looking for an upward trend profit opportunity (Financial Analysis 
Hub, 2016). The context of this study is specific and far removed from an investment outlook. 
Rather, it is about survival during a recession. Therefore, for this research, the consideration of 
the dire economic environment, the possibility to access refinancing, the tangible value of the 
assets collaterals and the value of the reserves for Canadian E&P firms lead the researcher to 
consider that when seeking to survive, firms reduce their capital investments and expansion and 
thus need only a positive OCF/TA ratio. Additionally, the industry-specific propensity to rise and 
fall with boom and bust cycles, is not foreign to banks and creditors, and those stakeholders 
discern systemic externalities such as oil prices impacting the whole sector from mismanagement 
or individual underperformance. They are thus supposedly more inclined to refinance those firms 
suffering the impact of cyclical externalities even when their asset efficiency is minimal, yet not 
negative. The researcher considers that in an integrated commodity-driven economy such as 
Canada’s where oil and gas is a key resource, such flexibility from banks participates from their 
own long-term strategy and governance as they must conservatively manage their own risk by 
limiting proprietary exposure and complying with Basel III requirements (CAPP, 2016; Financial 
Analysis Hub, 2016; Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; Millington, 2016; Natural Resources Canada, 
2017; PSAC, 2016).  
The choice of using two consecutive quarters of negative OCF/TA follows the 
assumption that even before the first quarter’s financial statements are published, management 
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starts taking the measure of liquidity drying up and whether or not they already seek refinancing 
before that quarter’s publication, the disclosure of the illiquidity risk sends a strong signal to 
creditors and bankers with a potential impact on their credit worthiness, risk and cost of capital.  
Management can still leverage its strong collaterals during the second quarters and convincingly 
promote a strong strategic change including restructuring plans, reorganization, divestiture, joint 
venture, lay-offs, renegotiation, along with a firm executive commitment and new strategic plan, 
to access refinancing. Firms failing to be alarmed by a negative asset efficiency ratio and take 
consequent strategic action right away fall into financial distress if the OCF/TA ratio is negative 
for a second consecutive quarter. They are then illiquid or rapidly draining on their liquidity and 
need urgent refinancing to jump start a newly balanced alignment between their cost base, their 
assets, their profitability and their cash flow. This state of financial distress may correspond to 
what Outecheva (2007) calls the death struggle but it respects the fact that E&P firms must use 
their assets to generate the cash flow required for their survival and long-term profitability 
(Outecheva; 2007). 
This definition of financial distress differs from illiquidity stricto sensu as firms can still 
access refinancing as documented by Davydenko (2013). This definition is also distinct from 
insolvency because technical insolvency is triggered by a default on a due payment. Until the 
payment date, the firm is not officially insolvent. Davydenko (2013) analyzed that 62% of 
Canadian firms default in the 30 days before the two semi-annuals bond coupons months of June 
and December including 29% on the actual date. The semi-annual calendar for coupons creates a 
temporal bias for defaults that skews the operational inefficiency of assets at producing cash that 
this research attempts to champion. At last, the definition of financial distress in this study also 
varies from bankruptcy as bankruptcy or receivership in Canada is a legal rather than an 
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economic state that may or may not be reflective of actual illiquidity and growing risk of 
insolvency and that also may be entered for strategic reasons more so than survival economic 
ones. In any event, receivership may not offer the consistency required in capturing financial 
distress for several firms over many years. Bankruptcy may be an outcome of the death struggle 
and therefore a subsequent stage (Blakes Canadian Lawyers, 2016; Davydenko; 2013; 
Outecheva, 2007). 
This study’s definition of financial distress as two consecutive quarters of negative 
OCF/TA ratio captures a state where the firm is in liquidity trouble and faces insolvency risk but 
it can still turn the odds of failure around through drastic action. Diagnosing financial distress at 
that stage is ultimately of a greater interest to the industry professionals and all their stakeholders 
including banks. With the notion of financial distress defined, the next foundational component 
of the study is the predictor variables used in this study (Hillier et al., 2012; Outecheva, 2007). 
Predictor Variables 
Table 2 lists all the independent covariates that contribute to calculating the regression 
coefficients and hazard ratios in this study. The choice of predictors in the table reflects the 
objective of being complete, exclusive and specific. Completeness refers to the categories of 
financial ratios and proxies titled as liquidity, solvency, profitability, valuation, efficiency, 
energy and size. Exclusivity is about avoiding unnecessary redundancy in the ratios and proxies 
selected. For example, the quick ratio is a liquidity ratio predictor similar enough to the current 
ratio, ceteris paribus, to make its inclusion redundant. Specificity aims at capturing the proxies 
and ratios that are uniquely relevant to the oil and gas industry and without which the list of 
predictors would be incomplete. Those include for example the use of EBITDAX in proxies X8 
and X13, the use of probable reserves in proxy X15, and the proxies X16 to X18. 
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Table 2. Determinants of Financial Distress 
Determinants of Financial Distress 
 
 
With the dependent variable of financial distress established and the covariates listed, the 
prerequisites to designing the actual steps of the analysis are complete. Consistent with 
practitioners’ approaches to conducting survival analyses prior to exploring hypotheses and 
given the context of an industry exposed to boom and bust cycles along with the anchoring of 
this study in the century long tradition of using financial ratios to measure corporate health and 
risk, this study establishes a baseline model as a prelude to the three hypotheses central to this 
research. 
SURVIVAL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN OIL AND GAS FIRMS 106 
  
Baseline Model 
The baseline model covers the main categories of financial ratios traditional to standard 
ratio analysis, in continuity and coherence with the literature and theoretical foundations of 
corporate distress analysis. The baseline model grounds the theoretical approach that will be used 
for the hypotheses and offers a wider perspective on the original topic of Canadian oil and gas 
firm survival analysis than would the hypotheses taken exclusively. 
The survival analysis in this study follows a rigorous and established statistical method 
more than four decades old. The research instrumentation section in this chapter provides a 
description of the theoretical foundations of the Cox PH model and the extended Cox model 
(Cox, 1972; Fox; 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). The actual regression analyses of the 
baseline model, using over 15,850 firm-quarters, are performed in R, a statistical software 
specifically designed for conducting survival analyses among other capabilities. The Cox PH 
model assumes an absence of multicollinearity and builds its strength and originality on the 
proportional hazards assumption that keeps the hazard ratio constant across the firms being 
tested and over time. A common practice in survival analysis consists in testing a vector of 
covariates and run the regressions with several predictor variables in the same function (Cox, 
1972; Fox; 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). However, in this study the researcher performs a 
series of univariate extended Cox models with repeating events to prevent any risk of 
multicollinearity and confounding, and maximize the understanding of the potential correlation 
between each predictor and the dependent variable of financial distress. To reach the results this 
study seeks to analyze, this quantitative research follows a technique that includes a long 
preparatory work in Excel followed by the running of the survival analysis in R. The research 
technique for the baseline model consists in the following steps: 
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1. Collect the raw and public financial and market data for Canadian oil and gas E&P firms 
that are traded on the TSX, headquartered in Canada and having their E&P activity 
located in Canada. This data is graciously provided to the researcher by JuneWarren 
Nickle’s Energy Group (JWN), a publishing firm specializing in gathering, managing and 
leasing operational and financial data on the Canadian oil and gas industry. The 
researcher obtains the data in Excel format (see appendix B). 
2. Verify and clean-up the raw data by removing firms with incomplete data, firms with 
foreign headquarters or foreign production that may have been included in the data query 
despite the original filters in selecting the data from the JWN database. 
3. Check the accuracy of the data by visually reconciling financial statement lines on the 
balance sheet and income statement of a 5% sample of firms, between 25 and 30, with the 
reporting in PDF format that the TSX makes available on its website for the past five 
years. In case of significant discrepancy, consult back with JWN and alternatively 
consider another source as required. In case of satisfactory reconciliation, proceed with 
the rest of the analysis. 
4. Build in Excel the financial ratios listed in table 2 for each firm and each quarterly period 
in the sample (see appendix C). 
5. Use the table of OCF/TA ratio built in step 4 to identify the status of financial distress for 
each firm during the period it reported financial statements between Q1-2002 and Q1-
2016. 
6. Identify and label as “FD” any firm that experienced two or more consecutive quarters of 
negative OCF/TA, or “No FD” any firm that has not. 
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7. Identify and label as “active” all firms still reporting their financial statements in Q1-
2016, or “inactive” if they are no longer. 
8. Use the labels of steps 6 and 7 to filter data subgroups and calculate the following 
descriptive statistics for each ratio and each subgroup: number of firms N, mean, median 
and standard deviation. 
9. Layout the data for use in R. This includes presenting data in continuous columns for 
each variable, building the periods with the first one for each firm numbered as zero and 
removing all periods where the firm is inactive. The covariate data layout for R is 
prepared in Excel and then saved as a CSV file for use in R (see appendix D). 
10. Prepare a separate Excel file with the start and end date number of quarters within the 
analysis time frame for each firm (i.e. a firm starting in Q2-2005 has a start number of 10 
as this is the tenth period after Q1-2002). This file is required for the survival analysis in 
R and is also saved as a CSV file (see appendix D). 
11. In R, code and run the univariate survival analyses (see appendix E). 
12. Analyze the descriptive statistics from R, including the number of observations used in 
the regression analyses and the number of dependent variable events (see appendix F). 
13. Analyze the models’ goodness of fit and validity through the likelihood ratio test, the 
Wald test, the score (logrank) test, the concordance and the R-square values returned by 
R. 
14. Analyze whether the null hypothesis is rejected or fails to be rejected through the z-score, 
the p-value, the hazard ratio or the coefficient or regression as required, and the 
confidence intervals. 
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15. Interpret the hazard ratio or the coefficient of regression for the variables that reject the 
null hypothesis. 
16. Stratify the data around oil price major shifts during the study period to analyze the 
potential impact of such price changes on the dependent variable of financial distress. 
17. Run a univariate survival analysis with the stratification as independent variable. Interpret 
the results in the form of a cumulative hazard curve. 
18. If the stratification rejects the null hypothesis of no oil price impact on financial distress, 
rerun the survival analysis on the variables that rejected the null hypothesis in step 14. 
Interpret the results. 
The baseline model is designed to analyze the pertinence and strength of standard 
financial ratios and industry specific variables on the dependent variable of financial distress as 
defined in this study. The baseline model uses over 15,850 firm-quarter observations from 540 
firms over the periods of Q1-2002 to Q1-2016. The baseline model also serves as a reference for 
the hypotheses of this study. The next section poses the three hypotheses of this research and 
completes accordingly the specific technique for each one of them. 
Research Hypotheses 
The baseline model attempts to understand the extent to which representative and 
exclusive standard financial ratios correlate in a survival analysis to the dependent variable of 
financial distress defined as two consecutive quarters of negative OCF/TA. Thus, for each 
predictor variable, the baseline model tests a null hypothesis of no correlation and no predictive 
ability to the dependent variable of financial distress. Beyond that baseline though, the central 
research questions of this study are the following three hypotheses. 
SURVIVAL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN OIL AND GAS FIRMS 110 
  
The first question R1 is: does the presence of an active hedging policy influences 
financial distress? The hypotheses formulating question R1 are: 
- Null hypothesis H10: Hedging has no influence on preventing financial distress. 
- Alternative hypothesis H1a: Hedging does influence the prevention of financial distress. 
For research question R1, the dependent variable is financial distress and the independent 
variable is a Heaviside function identifying the presence of hedging in percentage of BOE 
hedged with “1” and the absence of hedging with “0”. The sample size for this research question 
differs from the baseline models as it includes a shorter time frame starting in Q1-2007 and 
ending in Q1-2016. The Q1-2007 starting period reflects the beginning of a compulsory 
reporting of hedging activity for Canadian oil and gas firms as required by the National 
Instrument 51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities (NI 51-101) (Ontario 
Securities Commission, 2016). The sample size for this hypothesis is 515 firms and over 11,000 
observations. The changes in technique from the baseline model are: 
1. Perform step 4 for with the percentage of BOE hedged by all firms in each quarter and 
build a Heaviside function status identifying the companies that hedged as “1” and those 
that did not as “0”. 
2. Repeat steps 6 to 14 for this data sample. 
3. Perform the interpretation in step 15 for the hedging predictor variable. 
4. Omit subsequent steps 16 to 18. 
The result analysis consists primarily in verifying the validity of the model through the 
goodness of fit test in step 13, and the following steps 14 and 15 on the rejection of the null 
hypothesis, should the model be valid. Specifically, an HR different from 1 or a large p-value of 
more than 0.05 would reject the null hypothesis H10 and an HR equal to 1 or a small p-value of 
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less than 0.05 would fail to reject H10 (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012; Ontario 
Securities Commission, 2016). 
The second research question R2 is whether firm size influences financial distress? The 
hypotheses for this question are:  
- Null hypothesis H20: Smaller size does not influence financial distress. 
- Alternative hypothesis H2a: Smaller size influences financial distress. 
The dependent variable remains financial distress and the independent variable is 
company size measured as the natural log of total assets. The sample size is the same as the 
baseline model’s and the changes in technique from the baseline model are: 
1. Perform step 4 with the natural log of total assets for each company and each period. 
2. Repeat steps 6 to 15 for company size. 
3. In step 16 stratify the data around company size to gain precision on the results. 
4. Repeat steps 17 and 18 accordingly. 
Like R1, the result analysis consists primarily in verifying the validity of the model 
through the goodness of fit test in step 13, and the following steps 14 and 15 on the rejection of 
the null hypothesis, should the model be valid. For R2 too, an HR different from 1 or a large p-
value of more than 0.05 would reject the null hypothesis H20 and an HR equal to 1 or a small p-
value of less than 0.05 would fail to reject H20 (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 
2012). 
The third research question R3 is: does being financially distressed influences being an 
M&A target? The hypotheses are:  
- Null hypothesis H30: Financial distress does not influence the propensity to be an M&A 
target. 
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- Alternative hypothesis H3a: Financial distress is a catalyst to being an M&A target. 
The dependent variable is a proxy for M&A activity in the form of a Heaviside function 
of “1” for M&A activity and “0” for the lack of M&A activity. The sample size is 166 firms and 
175 events, some firms having more than one transaction during the period of study of Q1-2002 
to Q1-2016. An event is a status of being a target in an M&A completed transaction. The 
changes in technique from the baseline model are: 
1. Like step 1, collect M&A transaction data from JWN. 
2. Filter the data to remove transactions that are private, cancelled, incomplete, about 
foreign production and duplicated. 
3. Repeat steps 6 to 14 for this data sample. 
4. Perform the interpretation in step 15 for the financial distress predictor variable. 
5. If the model is valid and the null hypothesis rejected, rerun the model with a vector of 
covariates including predictors X9 to X16. Validate model’s goodness of fit and interpret 
the correlation of the predictor variables to the status of M&A target. 
Consistent with the previous two hypotheses, the result analysis is first a check of model 
validity and second a review of the null hypothesis rejection or not. a HR different from 1 or a 
large p-value of more than 0.05 would reject the null hypothesis H30 and an HR equal to 1 or a 
small p-value of less than 0.05 would fail to reject H30 (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & 
Kleinbaum, 2012). 
These three hypotheses leverage the baseline model design which is an underlying basis 
for framing the paradigm of financial ratios as predictors of financial distress as defined in this 
study, in the context of a survival analysis of Canadian oil and gas firms. With a 14-year span, 
540 firms and over 15,850 observations for the baseline model, the statistical sample of this 
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study is large, significant and aiming at ensuring the validity and the credibility of this study. The 
next section expands on the logic governing the sampling strategy of this study. 
Population and Sampling Strategy 
The population for this study is specific and focused, consisting in public Canadian oil 
and gas exploration and production firms. The sampling strategy backs onto the specific business 
cycles characterizing this industry through oil price fluctuations. The firms included in the 
sample are all listed on the TSX, headquartered in Canada and have their production in Canada 
as well. Canada is a country with a commodity-driven economy in which the oil and gas sector 
plays a major role. The province of Alberta with its oil sands has the world’s third largest 
reserves behind Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. The Canadian oil and gas industry is mainly 
upstream, exploring, extracting, producing and shipping oil and gas for refining mainly - 97% of 
Canadian oil is exported to the USA, per Natural Resources Canada (2017) - in the USA (CAPP, 
2016; Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; Millington, 2016; Natural Resources Canada, 2017; PSAC, 
2016). The revenue stream of the capital-intensive oil and gas E&P sector in Canada is largely 
tributary to the international price of oil and gas. This dependency impacts profitability and 
submits the whole sector and the industry to boom and busts cycles when the oil price fluctuates. 
During high prices, E&P firms, the oil and gas industry, Alberta and Canada experience growth 
and enjoy a boom. On the contrary when the oil prices dip significantly and remain low, 
revenues decrease, investments are minimized, layoffs occur and an economic recession takes 
hold, materializing the bust phase of the boom and bust cycle (Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; 
Millington, 2016). A long boom cycle commenced in 2002 when oil prices started climbing up 
following a rough bust phase in 2000 and 2001 with a price as low as USD 26.02 per barrel in 
November 2001. This boom cycle lasted until June 2014 and during that period the oil price 
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peaked at USD 151.72 in June 2008, then dipped briefly at USD 46.86 in January 2009 due to 
the international financial crisis and the uncertainty it brought, and then it remained high above 
USD 80.00. In June 2014, it was at USD 105.54 and went continuously down in the next year 
and a half until it reached a floor of USD 28.50 in January 2016. Since the end of World War II 
there have been several oil price cycles: until 1974, the price of the barrel was relatively steady 
under USD 30.00; in March 1974, the first boom started with a price at USD 50.15 and lasted 
until July 1980 at USD 113.25; then a bust followed until March 1986 with a low price of USD 
22.33. From March 1986 until November 1998, the price was more volatile with large 
fluctuations including a spike at USD 70.64 in September 1990 and a dip at USD 23.07 in 
December 1993 and a record low of USD 16.44 in November 1998. The price then jolted up 
steeply in the next two years reaching USD 45.40 in August 2000. This period was followed by 
another year and half bust until November 2001 at USD 26.02. From there a long boom started 
until June 2014 with only one exception in the second half of 2008. The cycle is in a bust since 
June 2014 (Macrotrends, 2016). Graphs 1 and 2 show the graphic representations of the oil price 
cycles for the past 70 years and 20 years, respectively (CAPP, 2016; Jakeman & Tertzakian, 








SURVIVAL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN OIL AND GAS FIRMS 115 
  
Figure 1. 70-year Historical Chart of Crude Oil Prices 
 
Figure 1. Chart of the WTI crude oil prices in USD from January 1st, 1946 to October 1st, 2016, 
showing the volatility of oil prices (Macrotrends, 2016). 
Figure 2. 20-year Historical Chart of Crude Oil Prices  
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Figure 2. Chart of the WTI crude oil prices in USD from January 1st, 1998 to October 1st, 2016, 
showing the oil price growth and drops triggering the cycles of booms and busts (Macrotrends, 
2016). 
The sampling strategy for this study considers these business cycles and aims at gathering 
a large sample size while covering a period long enough to give significance to the results. The 
data available to the researcher is from January 2002 until March 2016. The start of data 
availability in 2002 coincides with the beginning of the latest and longest boom cycle and the 
end of the period includes the current bust cycle (Macrotrends, 2016). This 14-year period is the 
longest used in a similar survival analysis, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge. All firms in 
the sample are publicly traded in Canada on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) or the TSX 
Venture (TSXV) in Calgary, and therefore all firms submit quarterly financial reporting. The 
sample thus consists of an initial pull of 608 firms reduced to 540 eligible firms representing up 
to 15,854 firm-quarters for the largest number of observations on the size variable (Macrotrends, 
2016).  
Research Technique 
The methodologies employed to analyze business failure and corporate financial distress 
have matured and evolved over the past century. The first ones were financial ratios analysis 
followed by univariate and multi-discriminant analyses (MDA), conditional probability models 
and many alternative intelligent techniques such as neural networks, decision trees, support 
vector machines or multidimensional scaling (Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006; Horrigan, 1968). 
However, all these techniques perform a binary pass/fail snapshot analysis and prediction, as 
opposed to survival analysis, a statistical technique that is more dynamic, uses larger data 
including several years before the event, and provides more analytical depth as well as increased 
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predictive power in understanding the determinants of survival (Agarwal & Bauer, 2014; Beaver 
et al., 2010; Chen & Lee, 1993; Davydenko, 2013; LeClere, 2005; Pereira, 2014; Shumway, 
2001; Whalen, 1991; Yamazaki, 2013). Survival analysis is a regression analysis technique 
widely used in epidemiology, biostatistics and to a lesser extent engineering and finance 
(InfluentialPoints, 2016; Pereira, 2014). Survival analysis allows for a better understanding of 
the time-to-event and the impact of predictor variables on the survival time. The limits of MDA 
and other probabilistic models have been well documented in the literature and Davydenko 
(2013) summarized a preference for survival analysis by many empiricists in asserting that 
“hazard analysis has become the instrument of choice in empirical studies predicting default and 
bankruptcy” (Davydenko, 2013, p.25). The methods to perform a survival analysis can be 
parametric, semi-parametric or non-parametric. Parametric methods require defining a baseline 
hazard as they carry an assumption that the underlying distribution of the survival times follows 
a probability distribution such as exponential, Weibull, lognormal, log-logistic or gamma 
distributions. Semi-parametric models do not hold that assumption and do not require the use of 
a probability distribution for defining a baseline hazard, and the most popular method is the Cox 
proportional hazards model proposed by Cox (1972). They allow for only using the covariates 
without a baseline hazard defined out of a past probability distribution. Nonparametric models 
like the Kaplan-Meier graphical representation of survival curves or the life-table method are 
mainly used for univariate analyses (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). The 
survival analysis method of choice generally used in finance and social sciences is the Cox PH 
model, which can accommodate univariate or covariate analyses. The method is preferred 
because it does not require a baseline function as opposed to the more cumbersome parametric 
models and it is statistically robust, delivering results very close to the parametric models (Klein 
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& Kleinbaum, 2012). The Cox PH model requires the satisfaction of the proportional hazard 
assumption: the hazard ratio (HR) is constant over time or more specifically the hazard for one 
firm is proportional to the hazard for any other firm and the proportionality remains constant, 
independent of time. This underlying assumption means that the covariates used in the study are 
time-independent. When the value of some independent variables changes with time and makes 
the proportionality of those predictors inconstant, these predictor variables are said to be time-
dependent. The PH assumption is generally not satisfied with time-dependent covariates and the 
Cox PH model is not appropriate for a survival analysis involving time-dependent or time-
varying covariates. The appropriate semi-parametric method for time-dependent covariates is the 
extended Cox model. The extension of the Cox PH model for time-dependent covariates consists 
in either stratifying the data in homogenous time-independent blocks or adding a time coefficient 
to the Cox PH model. When the observation of the dependent variable, such as financial distress 
in this study, happens more than once, the extended model can include such repeating events and 
R, the software conducting the survival analysis in this study can run extended Cox models with 
repeating events, either focusing on univariate or covariates analyses. When the independent 
variables are ratios, changes over time in the numerator and denominator of the ratios can 
influence the output of a survival analysis using a vector of covariates (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; 
Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). In studies like this one, the researcher may therefore seek to 
minimize the risk of confounding and ensure the absence of multicollinearity by running 
univariate analyses that can more accurately expose the prediction ability and impact of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable. In this study, the researcher mainly elects to 
using such a method consisting in univariate extended Cox model with repeating events, but the 
theoretical foundations of survival analysis, the Cox PH model and the extended Cox model with 
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a time coefficient developed below include vectors of covariates for completeness and 
standardization of the mathematical models (Agarwal & Bauer, 2014; Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006; 
Beaver et al., 2010; Chen & Lee, 1993; Cox, 1972; Davydenko, 2013; Fox, 2008; Horrigan, 
1968; InfluentialPoints, 2016; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012; LeClere, 2005; Pereira, 2014; 
Shumway, 2001; Whalen, 1991; Yamazaki, 2013;). 
The general objectives of survival analysis are to estimate and interpret the probability of 
survival over time through the survivor function, the instantaneous risk of failure or death event 
at any time through the hazard function, and perform comparative analyses involving both 
functions (Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). Survival analysis is a regression analysis of several 
observations for which a series of explanatory variables or predictors are covariates that 
additively and proportionately contribute to the event. The researcher selects the covariates and 
tests whether and to what extent they contribute to the event. The cornerstone of the analysis is 
the hazard function made of two components: a baseline hazard and a vector of covariates. 
Estimating the hazard function requires defining the baseline hazard probability distribution and 
calculating the maximum likelihood function for the covariates. The Cox PH model does not 
require the baseline hazard, making it a semi-parametric model. The mathematical foundations 
that explain the tools and procedure of survival analysis in the general context of this study 
follow below (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
Let t be the time when financial distress occurs and T the corporate survival time 
following the event of financial distress. T is therefore a random variable that is non-negative 
(T≥0). At time t, the instantaneous risk of financial distress event is a density function: 
 
Instantaneous risk of financial distress:    Equation 1 
SURVIVAL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN OIL AND GAS FIRMS 120 
  
where   T is a random non-negative (T≥0) variable indicating the time to failure of a firm 
  t is a specific value for T; 
  ∆t is a time interval 
 
Given that instantaneous risk of financial distress, the probability that a firm survives 
longer than time t units is a cumulative density function measured from t to infinity called the 
survival function: 
 
Survival function: S(t) = P(T ≥ t) = 1 - f(t)     Equation 2 
 
For the firms surviving longer than time t, the probability of financial distress in the next 
instant is a conditional failure rate given as the hazard function: 
 
Hazard function:      Equation 3 
 
The hazard function focuses on the happening of the failure event and describes the 
evolution over time of the immediate rate of failure of a firm; it is therefore the conditional 
probability of failure in the next instant or per unit of time, given that the firm was not yet in 
financial distress at time t. The numerator is the probability that the random variable associated 
with a survival time T lies between t and t+∆t subject to T being greater or equal to t. And the 
hazard function h(t) is the limit of that probability over the time interval ∆t, as ∆t approaches 
zero, or the instantaneous potential per unit of time for the financial distress to occur, given that 
the firm has survived up to time t (Chen & Lee, 1993; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012; Pereira, 2014). 
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The hazard function has a baseline component and a vector of covariates component. The 
combination of both components means that the hazard is a function of the natural course of 
events as represented by the passing of time, ceteris paribus, and the specific impact of the 
covariates. In the absence of any such specific impact, the value of the covariates is reduced to 
nil and the hazard only depends on the baseline component. In parametric models, the baseline 
hazard is calculated as a probability distribution using past data that can take the form of an 
exponential, a Weibull, a lognormal, a log-logistic or a gamma distribution. The baseline hazard 
function then defined is only a function of time and is independent of the covariates. On the 
contrary, the second component of the hazard function that is the vector of covariates does not 
involve time, but only the values of the explanatory variables. The baseline hazard is 
denominated h0(t) as the baseline hazard that is a function of time, and the vector of covariates is 
a function C(βiXi) representing the values β1, β2, ...βp of p explanatory variables X1, X2,...Xp 
aggregated as the vector X=( X1, X2, ...Xp). For i firms, the hazard function expresses as:  
 
Hazard function: h(t|X) = h0(t) C(βiXi)      Equation 4 
Where  h(t|X) is a function of time t and covariates X 
h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, involving only time t  
  C(βiXi) is a function of the vector of explanatory variables, not involving time t 
  βi is the value of the vector of covariates Xi  
Xi is the vector of covariates X = (X1, X2, ...Xp) 
 
Equation (4) means that the hazard function varies by a ratio of C(βiXi) from the baseline 
hazard: for any two firms A and B, the hazard of falling into financial distress of A is relatively 
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higher or lower than that of B by the ratio of C(βAXA)/ C(βBXB), where βA and βB are the 
values of the explanatory variables XA and XB respectively. Thus, the hazard for firm A is 
proportional to that of firm B and the values of the βs affect the survival time proportionally. The 
model is a proportional hazard model as the hazard for any observation i is a fixed proportion of 
the hazard of any other observation at any point in time. 
 
 Proportionality: HR (A: B) = C(βAXA) / C(βBXB) 
      = β(A-B)  
      = β1(XA1-XB1) + β2(XA2-XB2) +…+ βp (XAp-XBp) Equation 5 
 
The function C(Xiβi) is thus a sum of relative risks of the predictors or explanatory 
variables and as this relative risk cannot be negative it can be written as the exponential of the 
linear combination of p predictors assumed to act additively on log h(t). The hazard function then 
becomes: 
 
Hazard function: h(t|X) = h0(t) e
C(βiXi)      Equation 6 
 
 
Equivalently:  h(t|X) = h0(t) exp (β1X1 + β2 X2 +... βpXp)   Equation 7 
 
 
With the exponentiation now introduced, the proportionality of hazards for two firms A 
and B can be expressed as the following hazard ratio from equation (5): 
 
Proportionality: HR(A:B) = eβA / eβB  
    = e[β(A-B)]  
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    = exp[β1(XA1-XB1) + β2(XA2-XB2) +…+ βp( XAp-XBp)]   
       Equation 8 
When the values β’s of the vector of covariates are zero, the second component of the 
function becomes e0, which is equal to 1, and the function is reduced to its baseline hazard 
component to become: 
 
Baseline Hazard   h(t) = h0(t)      Equation 9 
 
And when the baseline hazard function is not specified, the hazard function becomes a 
semi-parametric model that depends only on the vector of covariates. In the Cox PH model the 
baseline hazard function is unspecified and the hazard ratio becomes the following semi-
parametric equation: 
 
Semi-parametric Cox PH HR HR(X) = e (β1X1+ β2X2 +...βpXp)    Equation 10 
 
Then, the goal becomes the estimation of the β’s. That estimation requires maximizing 
the likelihood function (ML), which is the joint probability of the observed data. However, in the 
Cox PH model, only the probabilities of the financially distressed firms are considered, not those 
of the censored firms. Censoring is a key component of survival analysis and censored firms are 
those within the data sample that did not experience the event of financial distress by Q1-2016, 
or those for which data was not available and were therefore lost to follow-up up to Q1-2016, or 
those that were removed from the observation of financial distress event for other reasons than 
failure to financial distress, such as delisting from the TSX or being acquired or merged with 
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another firm. Including only the uncensored data in the ML function turns it into a maximization 
of the partial likelihood function L(β) expressed as: 
 
Partial Likelihood: L(β)=  =    Equation 11 
 
where    L(β) = L1 x L2 x ... Lk       Equation 12 
 
L(β) is the product of several likelihoods, one for each k financial distress time, and Lj is 
the portion of L(β) for the jth financial distress time. Maximizing the partial likelihood function 
consists in maximizing the natural logarithm of L: Log L and calculate the partial derivatives of 
Log L with respect to each predictor in the model, a process done by iteration in a step wise 
manner. 
The objective of the Cox PH analysis is to find the point estimate for the hazard ratio 
(HR), the confidence interval, test the significance of effect and test the PH assumption.  The 
point estimate HR is the value that describes the relationship between the predictor and the event 
of financial distress. HR is the exponential of the regression coefficient provided in the model 
output. The confidence interval for HR is generally a 95% confidence interval. The test for 
significance of effect is the p-value or the likelihood ratio or the Wald statistics or the score 
(logrank) test. Testing the PH assumption involves either graphical methods such as log-log 
survivor curves or predictor survivor curves, or a p-value goodness-of-fit test or the use of 
Shoenfeld residuals (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012).  
The standard Cox PH model output is a table listing for each covariate the regression 
coefficient, its standard deviation, the p-value, the hazard ratio (the exponential of the regression 
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coefficient) and the confidence interval at 95% over two columns. The Interpretation of the 
results passes through the p-value to assess the significance of the results in validating or 
infirming the null hypothesis: a small p-value of 5% or less strongly indicates to reject the null 
hypothesis; on the contrary, a large p-value above 5% fails to reject the null hypothesis whereas 
a p-value close to the 5% cut-off is marginal and can be interpreted either way. The hazard ratio 
indicates whether there is a relationship between the covariate and the event. A hazard ratio of 1 
means that there is no such relationship, as opposed to a larger number meaning a stronger 
relationship, as many times the number as the relationship for censored or unexposed data; and 
conversely a value below 1 indicates a lesser relationship to the event than unexposed data. The 
survival curves provide a graphical representation of the step function of each covariate, showing 
an ever-decreasing chance of survival as time passes starting from the event. Alternatively, the 
cumulative hazard curves show an increasing hazard rate with time, built out of applying the 
regression equation to the actual data being analyzed. Another way to appreciate the survival 
curves is the table of survival probabilities used to graph the step functions. The confidence 
interval gives a measure of precision for the point estimate HR, the wider the interval the less 
precise (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
When the value of the predictors covariates varies with time and the PH assumption is 
not satisfied, the covariates are time-dependent and each observation has then a unique covariate 
vector Xi(t) that includes a time component. The Cox PH model becomes an extended Cox 
model to include the time factor for each covariate observation. The exponential component for 
the vector of covariates now includes the original β factors as in the Cox PH model, for the time-
independent covariates represented by Xi, and a time factor ∆ for the time-dependent covariates 
represented by Xj(t). The model formula in equation (7) then becomes: 
SURVIVAL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN OIL AND GAS FIRMS 126 
  
Time-dependent hazard function:  h(t|X(t)) = h0(t)  exp[∑βiXi + ∑ΔjXj(t)] Equation 13 
where   X(t) = (X1, X2,…, Xp1, X1(t), X2(t), …, Xp2(t))    
with    X1, X2,…,Xp1 being time-independent predictor covariates 
and   X1(t), X2(t), …,Xp2(t) being time-dependent predictor covariates 
 
The proportionality of firm A’s hazards relative to firm B discussed in equations (5) and 
(8) now includes for both firms the set of time-independent covariates and the set of time-
dependent covariates. For each covariate, the factor β applies to the difference of (A-B) included 
in the generalized Xi in equation (13) as in the Cox PH model, but it also includes the extension 
with the time factor ∆ applying to the time-dependent covariates of (A(t) – B(t)) included in the 
generalized Xj(t) in equation (13). An important underlying assumption of the extended Cox 
model is that the hazard at time t depends on the value of Xj(t) at that same time. Another 
important feature of the model to understand is that the time coefficient ∆ does not vary with 
time itself; it is rather a unique time-independent factor representing the corresponding time-
dependent predictors blending in all observations for those predictors. Still maintaining the semi-
parametric characteristic of the Cox PH model and keeping the baseline hazard unspecified, the 
hazard ratio in equation (10) becomes for the extended Cox model: 
 
Time-dependent Hazard Ratio HR(t) = exp[∑βi[Ai-Bi] + ∑ Δj[Aj(t)-Bj(t)]] Equation 14 
where   Ai is the time-independent covariate i for firm A 
  Bi is the time-independent covariate i for firm B 
  Aj(t) is the time-dependent covariate j for firm A 
  Bj(t) is the time-dependent covariate j for firm B 
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Aj(t)-Bj(t) is a function of time and the coefficient ∆ is the unique overall time factor that 
applies to it. ∆ being a single number, eΔ is therefore a fixed number. In the extended Cox model, 
the maximum likelihood function ML allows the hazard to vary over time as the baseline hazard 
cancels similarly to the Cox PH model. When there are time-independent covariates, the 
extended Cox model allows testing the PH assumption for time-independent covariates by 
adding a function of time. 
 
PH assumption in extended Cox model  
h(t,X(t)) = h0(t)  exp[∑βiXi + ∑ΔiXigi(t)]    Equation 15 
where  gi(t)] is a function of time for the i
th variable and can take different forms such as 
zero (as in the Cox PH model), a value of time t, Log t or a Heaviside function 
with t=1 or t=0.  
 
The result output and interpretation is the same for the extended Cox model as described 
for the Cox PH model above (Cox, 1972; Chancharat et al, 2007; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012; 
Pereira, 2014). 
The tools used to apply this statistical research instrument are Excel and R. Excel serves 
to import the raw data query from the JWN’s Canoils database, build the financial ratios, prepare 
the data descriptive statistics, and lay out the data for R. R is a free integrated suite of software 
environment and programs for statistical computing and graphics. The software requires 
programming skills but thanks to its wide popularity, multiple methods for using it have been 
published including several peer-reviewed papers. The research technique of this study is a solid 
statistical method that has been established for over four decades allied with the computing 
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powers of Excel and the robust R environment and programming language (Cox, 1972; Fox, 
2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). Both Excel and R are necessary for computing 14 years of 
quarterly data for 62 metrics and 608 firms, which is the amount of raw data initially collected 
for this study. 
Data Collection Procedures 
This research does not use any primary data, only secondary data. This is due to the 
nature of financial information this study requires, which consists in publicly reported financial 
statements detailed information, production and energy data, and mergers and acquisition 
activity data. Canadian researchers have previously reported on the difficulty to gather financial 
corporate data for empirical studies in corporate failure (Boritz, Kennedy & Sun, 2007). 
Financial statements information for publicly traded companies is available on the TSX website 
but it covers only the past five years and comes in a PDF format. Five years of data is not enough 
for the scope of this research and the PDF format is not practical for extracting and analyzing 
data. Yet, oil and gas is an important industry in Canada and any or all data pertaining to it is 
valuable for strategic and competitive analysis purposes. The data required for the scope of this 
study exists but it is generally privately owned. JuneWarren-Nickle’s (JWN) is a publishing firm 
established over 75 years ago, that specializes in Canadian oil and gas. At the core of their 
business, JWN collects, analyzes, secures, and sustains oil and gas data to make them available 
to professional subscribers such as oil and gas corporations, credit analysts and banks, media or 
educational institutions. For this study, JWN graciously granted the researcher a free access to 
their Canoils database for the duration of one year. The researcher signed a non-disclosure 
agreement before getting access to Canoils and benefitted the required training from JWN 
experts in accessing and retrieving data from Canoils. Before running a data query the researcher 
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dressed a list of financial ratios and industry indicators that could be relevant to this research. 
Then, the researcher queried a multi-criteria selection in Canoils to retrieve the initial batch of 
data for the baseline model. The criteria were a) oil and gas companies publicly listed on the 
TSX or the TSXV; b) Exploration and Production companies; c) companies headquartered in 
Canada; d) companies with their oil and gas production in Canada; and e) quarterly and annual 
data from Q1-2002 to Q1-2016. This query returned 62 data items for 608 firms. Upon review of 
the data, the researcher removed 63 firms from the sample because their data was incomplete or 
missing, and an additional five firms because their productions were not located in Canada. The 
final sample is 540 firms and up to 15,859 firm-quarters observations for the 14 years’ time of 
data used in the scope of this study. The period of Q1-2002 to Q1-2016 covers 57 quarters and 
potentially 30,894 firm-quarters for the 540 firms in the sample, but many firms have not been 
publicly reporting quarterly data for the entire period as they started and/or stopped after Q1-
2002 and before Q1-2016. The total number of reported firm-quarters is 15,859 for the sample of 
540 firms. As a precaution and to verify data accuracy, the researcher reconciled key balance 
sheet and income statement figures for a random sample of 27 firms representing 5% of the total 
sample of 540 firms with their PDF data available on the TSX website. The reconciliation 
matched with more than 99% accuracy and the difference attributed to rounding and foreign 
exchange translation impact is deemed immaterial. Therefore, the data from Canoils is accurate 
and acceptable for this study. Table 3 shows the sample selection process and the split of data 
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Table 3. Sample selection process - Baseline Model 
Sample selection process - Baseline Model 
 
The same sample remains valid for testing the second hypothesis in this study about firm 
size impact on financial distress hazard. The baseline sample also serves as a sampling starting 
point for the first hypothesis about hedging. Canadian oil and gas firms were not required to 
report on their risk management practice with actual data on the volume and percentage of 
production hedged before Q1-2007. The regulatory and accounting standard National Instrument 
51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities (NI 51-101) introduced in 2003 
evolved to include this requirement as of Q1-2007 (Ontario Securities Commission, 2016). The 
shorter time than the baseline model starting in Q1-2002 resulted in the removal of 25 firms from 
the baseline sample. The total sample size for the first hypothesis is thus 515 firms. The third 
hypothesis requires a different sample focusing on the M&A transactions involving the same 
population of Canadian oil and gas E&P firms headquartered in Canada, listed on the TSX and 
with their production in Canada. For M&A data, the researcher makes an initial query on Canoils 
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that returns 573 oil and gas announced deals on conventional and unconventional assets for the 
period of Q1-2002 to Q1-2016. All deals are corporate transactions and with Canadian targets 
and as the same firms can be involved in more than one transaction over time, the sample 
consists in transactions rather than firms. For each transaction, the data of interest is the financial 
distress status of the target firm one quarter before the time of the transaction and the vector of 
covariates also at one quarter before the M&A transaction. The assumption of considering the 
quarter before the transaction obeys to data quality purposes: at the time of the transaction, 120 
firms did not publish any financial reports and their covariate information is missing, whereas 
one quarter before the transaction, only 26 firms did not report their financial statements. The 
time of the transaction means the quarter during which the deal is announced. In one instance, a 
target firm is involved in two transactions in the same quarter; but as the first transaction 
consisted in the acquisition of 19.8% of the shares of the target and the second transaction one 
month later is the acquisition of the remaining 80.2% of shares by the same acquirer, this 
acquisition in two steps is considered as one transaction in this study. The perspective required 
for testing this hypothesis is that of target companies and the sample available out of the original 
list of 573 transactions is 166 firms targeted with 175 transactions. Of the 573 transactions, 222 
involved public firms but 47 transactions are not eligible for inclusion in the sample due to 
cancelled status, incomplete data, foreign production, duplication in the dataset or post Q1-2016 
announcement date. After this selection, the total number of transactions is 175. As some firms 
went through more than one M&A deal throughout the period, there are more transactions than 
firms and the total number of firms eligible for the sample is 166. Table 4 provides a breakdown 
of this sampling selection process (JWN, 2016; Ontario Securities Commission, 2016; TMX, 
2016). 
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Table 4. Sample selection process - M&A target firms  
Sample selection process - M&A target firms 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
The dataset of this study is large and its use is varied as it serves for a baseline model and 
three hypotheses. This section is an analysis of the descriptive statistics of the data presented in 
relevant population groups with the number of firms N, the mean and the median values, and the 
standard deviation SD for each covariate predictor pertinent to that hypothesis or the baseline 
model. The statistics also include information on the censored firms and on comparative volume 
data for hedging and size. The population groups include all firms, financially distressed and 
non-financially distressed, and active and inactive firms. The section starts with the baseline 
model and continues with each of the three hypotheses. 
Baseline model 
For the total population of the baseline model table 5 displays a summary abstract of 
table 3 focusing on the number of censored firms in the total sample. 386 firms are censored out 
of 540 representing a proportion of 72%. 
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Table 5. Baseline model - Censored firms and active financially distressed firms  
Baseline model - Censored firms and active financially distressed firms 
 
The key statistical characteristic of the data population of 540 firms is its dispersion. All 
predictors in the baseline model show a very large standard deviation (SD) which calls for 
caution when looking at the mean of any predictor in this large data sample. Table 6 shows these 
descriptive statistics along with significant differences between the mean and the median as a 
further indication of the data dispersion and the impact of strong outliers shifting the mean away 
from the median. Remaining mindful of the large SD, the X1 proxy shows that on average firms 
fall short by about 4% of generating enough cash flow to sustain their total assets. The two 
liquidity proxies do exhibit directionally opposed means with X2 indicating a strong state of 
illiquidity relative to total assets while X3 indicates that current assets cover current liabilities 
more than seven times. The median for X3 does however point to 50% of the data population 
having current assets worth only 85% of their current liabilities and thus being illiquid. Both 
proxies are calculated differently, one using the difference between current assets and current 
liabilities while the other uses their ratio. The data are very volatile even for the same firm over 
different periods and the variations compound at different rates between both metrics, which for 
a large population of over 15,850 observations can yield significant differences of the averages 
and allow for outliers and volatility to show a current ratio mean of 7.62 times while X2 is 
negative at (0.97). Overall the solvency ratios show on average a high level of debt and the 
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profitability ratios are all negative, including their median. The SD is particularly large for X11 
and X8 pointing to significant disparities in the operating costs including exploration costs, their 
leveraged financing and the ability to be operationally profitable. The average operating cost per 
BOE is $21.27 but for this proxy also the SD is large, confirming the disparity and dispersion of 
the 15,850 observations.   
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for the baseline model - All firms  
Descriptive statistics for the baseline model - All firms 
 
As the overall data is dispersed, table 7 provides a split perspective of the descriptive 
statistics by the population of distressed and non-distressed firms. There are about three times as 
many financially distressed firms as non-financially distressed firms and except for X8, all 
predictors are considerably less dispersed for non-distressed firms. For these firms, the liquidity 
ratios are directionally aligned with respectively -0.14 for X2 and 0.98 for X3 and show on 
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average a state of very moderate illiquidity. The solvency ratios are also healthier and show a 
relatively moderate indebtedness compared to financially distressed firms. The mean for X8 is 
negative at -26.67 and may reflect large self-funded exploration costs the non-distressed firms 
incurred, but the large SD for this proxy tempers this reading. At about $11.00 of operating cost 
per BOE, these firms are on average more efficient. The more concentrated data with mean and 
median closer, and the direction and values of the predictors for non-financially distressed firms 
indicate a validation of the definition and the metric selected for the state of financial distress in 
this study. 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics for the baseline model - FD and NFD firms 
Descriptive statistics for the baseline model – FD and NFD firms 
 
Tables 8 and 9 further split the financially distressed and non-financially distressed firms 
respectively into active and inactive firms to get a more precise sense of the descriptive statistics. 
Financially distressed and active firms show a more negative X1 predictor and a significantly 
higher X7 proxy than inactive firms, although with a large SD for X7. Those active firms also 
exhibit a positive mean for X11 but the dispersion is very large around this statistic. X17 is also 
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higher for active firms with, again, a large SD. For non-financially distressed firms in table 9, the 
data is, consistently with table 7, less dispersed and the only notable difference between active 
and inactive firms appears in X8 where inactive firms have a negative mean of -68.72 with a 
very large SD. The profitability ratios are on average very close between both groups of active 
and inactive firms, albeit being negative for the latter. The operating costs per BOE are very 
close between both categories and overall, the distinction between financially distressed and non-
financially distressed firms seem to be impervious to the active or inactive status of the firms. 
Thus, the main split of relative importance is between financially distressed and non-financially 
distressed firms as opposed to active and inactive firms.  
Table 8. Descriptive statistics for the baseline model – FD firms: active and inactive  
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Table 9. Descriptive statistics for the baseline model – NFD firms: active and inactive  
Descriptive statistics for the baseline model – NFD firms: active and inactive 
 
Indeed, by removing the distress status and splitting the firms only into active and 
inactive in table 10, it appears that both groups present similar statistics except for X7, X8 and 
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Table 10. Descriptive statistics for the baseline model – Active and inactive firms 
Descriptive statistics for the baseline model – Active and inactive firms 
 
Hypothesis 1 - Hedging 
The sample of population on which the first research question is tested is a subgroup of 
515 firms within the sample of the baseline model. As such, the descriptive statistics of the 
baseline model are equally valid for hypothesis 1 even though the hedging statistics starts in Q1-
2007, five years later than the baseline model. Table 11 shows an additional marginal statistic 
relevant to this hypothesis with the percentage of production hedged by group and sub-groups. 
The distribution of data for hedging percentage is very dispersed as indicated by the large 
standard deviations. The large dispersion is especially apparent for firms that are still active and 
financially distressed. With the caution imposed by large SD on interpreting mean data, these 
averages reveal that financially distressed and inactive firms hedged less than 10% of their 
production while non-financially distressed firms hedged over 27% of their production with a 
median and SD close to the mean. 
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Table 11. Descriptive statistics hypothesis 1 – Percentage of production hedged 
Descriptive statistics hypothesis 1 – Percentage of production hedged 
 
Hypothesis 2 - Size 
The marginal descriptive statistic of interest for hypothesis two is the size of the sample 
companies, which are the same as those in the baseline model. Table 12 lists the mean, median 
and SD by groups and subgroups for this sample, in dollars and in the natural logarithm proxy 
used for the survival analysis testing in this study. The size of non-financially distressed firms is 
very dispersed, as is that of active firms: there are thus firms of all sizes these descriptive 
statistics show to not be financially distressed. Financially distressed firms have a more 
concentrated distribution and show an average of a much smaller size with about $162M in total 
assets than non-financially distressed firms with a mean of $1.247B. While the Log proxy serves 
for the survival analysis, the actual dollar value is a metric that provides a more intuitive reading 
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Table 12. Descriptive statistics hypothesis 2 – Total assets size  
Descriptive statistics hypothesis 2 – Total assets size 
 
Hypothesis 3 – M&A 
With a smaller sample than the baseline model, the population of firms used for 
hypothesis 3 shows less dispersion for the financial distress and profitability proxies. On the 
contrary, the valuation proxies are very dispersed, especially X14 which includes leverage. Table 
13 shows that on average for the population of firms that were a target in an M&A transaction, 
they were moderately distressed and unprofitable.  
Table 13. Descriptive statistics hypothesis 3 M&A – All firms 
 Descriptive statistics hypothesis 3 M&A – All firms 
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A closer look at the split between those that were financially distressed and those that 
were not, shows in table 14 that the large dispersion in X11 still apparent for all firms is due to 
the financially distressed firms with a SD of 542.82 in stark contrast to the SD of 1.60 for non-
financially distressed firms. The same comparison also applies to X14. However, the opposite 
trend exists for X1 where the financially distressed data are more concentrated. Between both 
groups, the most significant comparative differences are in the valuation predictor descriptive 
statistics with X12 being negative at -41.70 for non-financially distressed firms and positive at 
99.28 for financially distressed firms where the means and median are also volatile for X13, X14 
and X15.  
Table 14. Descriptive statistics hypothesis 3 M&A – FD and NFD firms  
Descriptive statistics hypothesis 3 M&A – FD and NFD firms 
 
Within the financially distressed group of firms, active firms, with a small size of 11, 
appear in table 15 to be driving the data dispersion of the financially distressed group of firms. 
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Table 15. Descriptive statistics hypothesis 3 M&A – FD firms: active and inactive  
Descriptive statistics hypothesis 3 M&A – FD firms: active and inactive 
 
Only two firms are non-financially distressed and active as showing in table 16. This 
sample size is too small for descriptive statistics reading and the inactive firms statistics provide 
all the substance of the non-financially distressed firms in table 14.  
Table 16. Descriptive statistics hypothesis 3 M&A – NFD firms: active and inactive  
Descriptive statistics hypothesis 3 M&A – NFD firms: active and inactive 
 
Of the total sample of 166 firms in table 17, 13 only are active and 153 are inactive. This 
last subgroup therefore drives the statistics for both the financially distressed and non-financially 
distressed subgroups and for all the firms. Active firms show a positive average operating profit 
margin with a large SD and very high X12, also with a large SD, compared to inactive firms. 
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Table 17. Descriptive statistics hypothesis 3 M&A – Active and inactive firms  
Descriptive statistics hypothesis 3 M&A – Active and inactive firms 
 
The descriptive statistics in this study are different from the actual survival analysis in the 
next chapter, but they are important to understand the data. There are three times as many 
financially distressed firms as non-distressed and overall the data is highly dispersed, especially 
for financially distressed firms. The distinction between active an inactive status is not very 
relevant, but it provides a deeper level of reading when looking at groups of distressed and non-
distressed firms, such as for example for non-financially distressed and active firms that hedge 
more and are larger in size than any other category. The valuation metrics for the 166 firms in 
the third hypothesis sample are highly dispersed; notably, X14 – EV/DACF – is very volatile for 
distressed and inactive firms. Overall the data shows a large dispersion and the descriptive 
statistics above are not sufficient to analyze any correlation, regression or causal relationships 
between the predictors and financial distress, which calls for a more robust method such as a 
survival analysis. 
Summary 
The focal point of this research is the definition of financial distress as two consecutive 
quarters of the ratio of operating cash flows to total assets. This definition is unique to this study 
and intends to capture the ability of public E&P firms in a capital intensive and asset-heavy 
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industry with long lead times to generate from their operations enough cash to build resilience, 
reinvest in productive assets, be profitable and secure their going concern prospective. The study 
is an extended Cox model with repeating events for which a baseline model serves to analyze the 
extent to which predictor ratios in financial distress, liquidity, solvency and profitability 
contribute to creating a state of financial distress (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 
2012). Building on the baseline model, three hypotheses are tested, respectively to understand 
whether hedging contributes to reduce the hazard of financial distress; whether larger size also 
contributes to a reduction in financial distress hazard; and whether financial distress is an 
aggravating factor in being a target of an M&A transaction. The baseline model uses a 
population of 540 public Canadian E&P firms with production and headquarters in Canada, with 
quarterly reporting covering the period of Q1-2002 to Q1-2016 or over 15,850 firm-quarters. For 
the first hypothesis on hedging the period is Q1-2007 to Q1-2016 as firms were not compelled to 
report their hedging status before Q1-2007, and the sample is a subset of the baseline sample, of 
515 firms. The second hypothesis uses the same sample as the baseline model and the third 
hypothesis has a smaller sample of 166 firms. A descriptive statistical analysis reveals that the 
data is highly dispersed and the split between financially distressed and non-financially 
distressed firms is more relevant than the distinction between active and inactive firms. 400 firms 
are financially distressed representing 74% of the baseline sample of 540 firms and the 140 non-
financially distressed show significantly less dispersed predictors. Similarly, the descriptive 
statistics reveal that non-financially distressed firms hedge a larger percentage of their 
production and have a larger size. The valuation ratios for the third hypothesis are also highly 
dispersed and the non-financially distressed firms have better profitability ratios. The overall 
significant dispersion of the data limits the accuracy of the descriptive statistics and stresses the 
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need for a stronger analytical method to run the regressions with the proportionality that only a 
Cox PH model enables, and to capture the time impact on the predictors by extending the model, 
while also including the repetition of the event of financial distress. Following the presentation 
of the research design, the sample data and their descriptive analyses discussed above, the next 
chapter precisely addresses this requirement of a more robust method and uses the extended Cox 
model with repeating events to analyze the baseline model and the three hypotheses of this study 
(Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; JWN, 2016; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
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Chapter 4: Analysis and Presentation of Results 
The survival analysis consisting in a Cox extended model with repeating events designed 
for this study is performed in the free statistical software R (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & 
Kleinbaum, 2012). This chapter reports on the results of the analysis and includes three sections. 
The first is a presentation of the descriptive statistics returned by R. The second and longer 
sections details the results and includes four subsections, one for the baseline model and one for 
each of the three hypotheses this study tests. The last section is a summary of the results (Cox, 
1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
Descriptive Statistics from R 
The statistics summarized in table 18 are issued by the R software upon running the 
survival analysis models. The baseline model is carried out of a total sample of 15,836 quarter-
firms. A certain number of observations are deleted “due to missingness” as showing in the 
second column for each univariate analysis. The percentage of events is the number of events 
divided by N, the number of observation used for the analysis. The comparatively small N for 
X18 and X19 result from the fact that the observations for these predictors are annual rather than 
quarterly. For the baseline model, the event of financial distress represents an average of about 
20% of N. There is virtually no observation deleted for the hypotheses and the percentage of 
financial distress events are 33.1% and 21.3% respectively for the first two hypotheses of 
hedging and size, and only 4.7% for the event of M&A in the population of distressed firms for 
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Table 18. Descriptive Statistics from R  
Descriptive Statistics from R 
 
The value of N for all predictors in table 18 is large enough to carry out the survival 
analysis and expect to test the goodness of fit and the validity of the model. Similarly, the 
number of events appear sufficiently significant to test the null hypotheses of the baseline model 
and the three hypotheses. The detail of the results below formally answers those intuitive 
observations for the baseline model and the hypotheses. 
Details of Analysis and Results 
The results of the Cox extended model with repeating events (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; 
Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012), as returned by R, are listed for the baseline model first, followed by 
each of the three hypotheses this study is testing. The baseline model results include the 
statistical validity or goodness of fit, the survival analysis testing the null hypothesis and a 
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stratification using the price of oil to get a glimpse at any strong correlation between that 
externality and financial distress and whether it accentuates or not the predictors results initially 
returned without the stratification of oil pricing. The results for each hypothesis also explore the 
model validity first and upon validation, the actual survival analysis results (Cox, 1972; Fox, 
2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
Survival Analysis of the Baseline Model 
Table 19 provides a summary of the validity of the baseline model. R returns five 
different tests for the goodness of fit of the regression analysis. Concordance measures the 
probability that a randomly selected firm that experienced financial distress has a higher risk 
score than a firm that did not experience financial distress. This index can take a value between 
0.5 and one with 0.5 meaning that the probability is not better predicted than pure chance and 
one showing perfect predictability; above 0.7 the model is good and above 0.8 the model is 
strong. The R-square shows the data concentration or dispersion around the fitted regression line 
with a value between 0 and 100%. The higher the value the higher the goodness of fit and the 
more precise the prediction from the model. The likelihood ratio test, the Wald test and the score 
(logrank) test measure the goodness of fit of nested models. Their values can range from zero to 
infinity, the higher, the better the fit of the model and the lower the p-value which represents the 
probability that the result is due to chance. When all three tests agree, the goodness of fit is 
strong and the results of the analysis are reliable; when they do not, statisticians favor the 
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Table 19. Baseline Model Statistical Validity 
Baseline Model Statistical Validity 
 
While the concordance and the R-square present average to low values, except for the C-
index for X1, the three other tests are all high above zero and agree, with small p-values (as a 
small exception X19 Wald test disagrees with the other two tests). Therefore, the baseline model 
returns a solid goodness of fit for all predictors and its survival analysis results are trustworthy. 
With the model validity established, the focus can now advance to the actual results of the 
baseline model survival analysis summarized in table 20. To increase the accuracy of the 
regression, the researcher elects to run for each predictor a univariate survival analysis regression 
and test the following null hypothesis: the predictor variable does not contribute to predicting 
financial distress. The alternative hypothesis is that the predictor variable does help predicting 
financial distress. A p-value of more than 0.05 or a confidence interval value of one fail to reject 
the null hypothesis. Under the null hypothesis, the pattern of the data tested is random and takes 
the form of a normal curve. A large or low z-score contribute to rejecting the null hypothesis as 
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the pattern is in the tail of the curve. The baseline model tests fourteen variables. For nine of 
these variables, the null hypothesis is rejected, indicating a valid correlation between the 
predictor and the state of financial distress. For the other four variables, the null hypothesis fails 
to be rejected. Table 20 lists all variables and their respective results. 
Table 20. Baseline Model Survival Analysis 
Baseline Model Survival Analysis 
 
As the outcome of the analysis is not binary but rather continuous for the variable tested, 
the regression coefficient is the intercept of interest for interpreting the survival analysis results, 
rather than the hazard ratio, included in table 19 for information purpose only. This interpretation 
is the following for X1: the estimate of the change in the log of the hazard in financial distress is 
-3.47% per unit of change of OCF/TA. This interpretation applies only to the variables for which 
the null hypothesis is rejected and deserve attention under the perspective of the directional 
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effect on financial distress presented in table 2. Thus, the rate given by the regression coefficient 
is the estimate of the decrease in the log of the hazard in financial distress per unit of change in         
X1 (-3.47%), X2 (-0.035%), X4 (-0.068%), X5 (-0.006%) and X11 (-0.006%). A unit increase in 
any of these ratios reduces the log of the hazard in financial distress by their respective 
percentage of regression coefficient. Alternatively, for X6 (0.033%) and X17 (0.007%) the 
positive rates indicate, as directionally expected, a decrease in the log of the hazard in financial 
distress per unit of change in these predictors. Counterintuitively, for X3 (-0.006%) an increase 
in current ratio tends to also increase the hazard of financial distress, and for X8 (-0.003%) an 
increase in debt relative to Ebitdax decreases, rather than increases, the risk of financial distress, 
albeit as with these variables, in very modest proportions. 
The price of oil is a strong externality that impacts the oil and gas industry, as explained 
above in chapter three. While this economic observation is not central to this study, the 
researcher takes the opportunity of having available data and survival analysis processing 
capability to test the baseline model variables that rejected the null hypothesis considering an oil 
price change. This part of the analysis requires a stratification that starts by running a histogram 
of company starts by quarter, further aggregated by year as showed in figure 3 (company starts 








SURVIVAL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN OIL AND GAS FIRMS 152 
  
Figure 3. Histogram of Company Starts by Year   
 
Figure 3. Histogram showing the number of Canadian oil and gas firms starting to be publicly 
traded on the TSX by year. The first year of 2002 corresponds to the first year of the sample size 
in this study and includes all companies that were already trading on the TSX as of Q1-2002. 
Adapated from data provided by JuneWarren Nickle’s (2016) (JWN, 2016; TMX, 2016). 
The histogram in table 3 shows 13 periods for each year between 2002 and 2015. To 
stratify this histogram relative to the price of oil, the researcher refers to the historical chart of 
crude oil prices in figure 2. This chart shows two major price inflection points during the period 
of interest in this study: Q3-2008 and Q3-2014, each marking a severe inflection in the chart and 
the price of oil.  
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Figure 2. 20-year Historical Chart of Crude Oil Prices 
 
Figure 2. Chart of the WTI crude oil prices in USD from January 1st, 1998 to October 1st, 2016, 
showing the oil price growth and drops triggering the cycles of booms and busts (Macrotrends 
2016). 
With these two dates, the researcher further consolidates the histogram into three strata, 
each representing the company starts for the periods of Q1-2002 to Q2-2008, Q3-2008 to Q2-
2014, and Q3-2014 to Q4-2015. The resulting histogram in figure 4 shows a very small stratum 
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Figure 4. Histogram of Stratified Company Starts by Period 
 
Figure 4. Histogram of oil and gas firms becoming publicly traded on the TSX, aggregated into 
three strata from the histogram in figure 3. 
With only two strata representing company starts before and after the steep price 
correction of the end Q2-2008, a univariate survival analysis using only this stratification as a 
predictor shows in figure 5 a higher cumulative hazard of distress for companies that started after 
Q3-2008 in stratum two (blue) compared to the companies in stratum one (red) that started 
between Q1-2002 and Q2-2008. The distinct and higher sloped blue stratum compared to the red 
stratum indicates a higher risk of financial distress hazard for the firms that started post Q2-2008, 
and the colored halo around the curve indicates a larger confidence interval and more volatility 
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for that same blue stratum two compared to the red stratum one. The table of number of firms at 
risk below the graph shows the number of firms entering the sample, therefore starting to be 
publicly traded, each year, that are at risk of experiencing financial distress. For stratum two for 
example, 142 firms became active in the sample in the second half of 2008 and eight in the last 
year preceding Q1-2016.  
Figure 5. Period Cumulative Hazard  
 
Figure 5. Cumulative hazard curves showing the increased risk of financial distress for firms that 
started (became public) since Q2-2008, in blue, compared to firms that started between Q1-2002 
(including those that were already active and public by then) and Q1-2008. 
The researcher then runs the survival analysis using the stratified model for the baseline 
predictor variables that did reject the null hypothesis to understand if the change in oil price 
contributes to further changing the baseline model results summarized in table 20. For this test, 
the null hypothesis is: the change in oil price in June 2008 does not affect the correlations found 
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in the baseline model valid predictors. The alternative hypothesis is that the June 2008 variation 
in oil price changes the correlations found in the baseline model valid predictors. 
The results summarized in table 21 show that except for X1, there is no evidence of 
change due to the oil price drop. For X1, the regression coefficient increases from -0.0347 to -
1.5464, representing a 44.5 times increase and thus a significant decrease in risking financial 
distress per unit increase of OCF/TA following the decrease in oil price. 
Table 21. Baseline Model Stratified Survival Analysis  
Baseline Model Stratified Survival Analysis 
 
Table 22 and figure 6 are example outputs of the R survival analysis and cumulative 
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Table 22. Sample output of R Survival Analysis 
Sample output of R Survival Analysis 
 
Figure 6. Sample Cumulative Hazard Curve – Stratified OCF/TA 
 
Figure 6. Sample representation of the cumulative hazard showing an increased risk of financial 
distress for stratum two firms over stratum one firms, using OCF/TA as a predictor. 
The baseline model is not the focus of this study, unlike the three hypotheses tested 
below, but it provides a general context for the survival analysis of the Canadian oil and gas 
firms using a new definition of financial distress. The univariate models, ran on sample of 
quarter-firms ranging from 2,641 to 15,805 are valid and present a strong goodness of fit making 
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their results reliable. Those results show the existence of a predictive correlation between nine 
variables and financial distress, however the values of the regression coefficients are very small. 
A stratification around the time of the June 2008 drastic oil price drop shows that the firms that 
started after that period are more exposed to financial distress than those that existed before. 
Additionally, the stratification fails to reveal any change in the original survival analysis due to 
the change in oil price, except for the only variable that is inherently tied to the definition of 
financial distress used in this study. This contextual baseline model analysis provides a 
background for the three hypotheses that make the focus of this research. 
Hypothesis 1 – Hedging 
The survival analysis for the hedging hypothesis uses a sample of 11,005 quarter-firms 
and shows very decisive results in rejecting the null hypothesis. The goodness of fit is strong and 
observable through the very low z-score confirmed with an extremely low p-value. Additionally, 
the likelihood ratio test is high and in agreement with the Wald test and the score (logrank) test 
(all exhibiting low p-values too). The confidence interval of 0.0436 and 0.0669 is far removed 
from one and narrow, indicating a high level of precision with very little volatility for the 
predictive accuracy of the correlation of hedging to hazard of financial distress. Table 23 shows 
the results of the survival analysis. As explained in chapter 3, when the point estimate or hazard 
ratio is one, there is no relationship between the predictor and the event, a number larger than 
one indicates as many times the hazard for the sample of non-censored firms compared to the 
total sample and a number lower than one conversely means as fewer chances of hazard. As 
opposed to the baseline model, where the output is not binary, the hedging hypothesis uses a 
Heaviside function identifying the presence of hedging in percentage of BOE hedged with “1” 
and the absence of hedging with “0”. Therefore, the right correlation to read is the point estimate 
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given by the hazard ratio. HR is 0.0540, a value that is 18.5130 times lower than one. This means 
that the null hypothesis is rejected and that the firms that hedged had more than 18.5 times less 
chances to be exposed to the hazard of financial distress.  
Table 23. Hypothesis 1 Hedging - Survival Analysis Results  
Hypothesis 1 Hedging - Survival Analysis Results  
 
Figure 7 represents the cumulative hazard curves of both populations of firms. The 
hedging firms have a rather flat and consistently low curve in blue, indicating their low level of 
exposure to financial distress. The non-hedging firms’ red curve show on the contrary an 
increasing and higher cumulative hazard with limited volatility in the form of a narrow 
confidence interval throughout. Thus, for hypothesis one, the survival analysis shows a strong 
correlation between the hedging activity and the event of financial distress: hedging firms are 









SURVIVAL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN OIL AND GAS FIRMS 160 
  
Figure 7. Hypothesis 1 Hedging - Cumulative Hazard Curve  
 
Figure 7. Cumulative hazard curves showing a higher risk of financial distress for firms that had 
no hedging policy, in red, compared to firms that had an active hedging policy, in blue. 
Table 24 shows that for 2,794 firms that hedged, only 86 experienced financial distress, 
that is 3.07%; and for 8,211 non-hedging firms, 3,561 did experience financial distress, a 
proportion of 43.37%. These statistics provide a different perspective that further confirms the 
results of HR and the cumulative hazard curve in table 23 and figure 7. 
Table 24. Hypothesis 1 Hedging - Survival Analysis Descriptive Statistics from R  
Hypothesis 1 Hedging - Survival Analysis Descriptive Statistics from R 
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Hypothesis 2 – Size 
The second hypothesis is tested on a large sample of 15,849 quarter-firms with only five 
observations deleted from the total sample due to missingness. The interpretation of the survival 
analysis results starts with the validity of the model, then the testing of the null hypothesis and a 
stratification by size to further understand the results. 
Table 25 shows the return of the analysis performed in R. The z-score of -26.6573 is very 
low and the p-value is extremely small. The confidence interval around the hazard ratio of 
0.8469 is very narrow at 0.8367 and 0.8573, and the likelihood ratio test is positive at 926.4, in 
agreement with the Wald test and the score (logrank) test (all of which have very small p-values 
too). Therefore, the model is valid and its strong goodness of fit makes its results reliable. The 
correlation coefficient is negative at -0.1661 and the hazard ratio is below 1 at 0.8469, indicating 
that the null hypothesis is rejected. For each unit of change in size, the estimate of change in the 
log of the hazard in financial distress is -16.61%. In other words, using the point estimate HR, 
each increment in size reduces the hazard of financial distress by 1.1807. 
Table 25. Hypothesis 2 Size - Survival Analysis Results  
Hypothesis 2 Size - Survival Analysis Results  
 
Having already tested the hypothesis and confirmed that the null hypothesis of no 
correlation between size and financial distress is rejected, the researcher performs a stratification 
of the sample by initially dividing the size by five to obtain five groups. Figure 8 shows the 
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sequence of histograms leading to the final three strata. The second histogram shows that both 
extremes of very small and very large companies are very small in numbers and can thus be 
merged with the closest strata, delivering a final stratification of three strata visible in the third 
histogram in figure 8. 
Figure 8. Hypothesis 2 Size – Stratification Histograms  
 
Figure 8. Three histograms representing the stratification of firm sizes from 19 categories to five 
strata and ultimately to three strata. 
The stratification objective is not to test the null hypothesis, which is already confirmed 
as rejected. Rather, it is to gain further perspective on the impact of size in the hazard of financial 
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Figure 9. Hypothesis 2 Size – Stratified Cumulative Hazard Curve  
 
Figure 9. Cumulative hazard curves for all three strata tested in hypothesis two. 
The three curves confirm the survival analysis by showing for stratum one in red, the 
strata of the smallest firms, a higher and slightly steeper cumulative hazard along with a larger 
confidence interval and volatility. Alternatively, the blue curve for the larger firms of stratum 
three is flatter and narrower, showing a lesser exposure to financial distress thanks to their larger 
size. And the larger sample of stratum two representing the middle of the histogram, is the green 
curve sandwiched between the other two strata, with a lower hazard than stratum one red curve 





SURVIVAL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN OIL AND GAS FIRMS 164 
  
Table 26. Hypothesis 2 Size - Survival Analysis Descriptive Statistics from R 
Hypothesis 2 Size - Survival Analysis Descriptive Statistics from R 
 
Table 26 reveals that for each stratum, the percentage of events to records is respectively 
32.78% for stratum one, 23.38% for stratum two, and 8.74% for stratum three. These statistics 
further confirm the rejection of the null hypothesis and the existence of the inverse correlation 
between size increase and financial distress hazard. 
Hypothesis 3 – M&A 
The third hypothesis of this study explores the existence of a correlation between the state 
of financial distress and the event of being a target of an M&A activity. The sample size is 3,698 
financially distressed quarter-firms for 175 M&A events involving 166 target firms. As with the 
previous two hypotheses, the analysis starts with the goodness of fit before accepting the results 
of the null hypothesis rejection or not. Table 27 shows the survival analysis results from R.  
Table 27. Hypothesis 3 M&A - Survival Analysis Results  
Hypothesis 3 M&A - Survival Analysis Results  
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The concordance is 0.676, a value above 0.5 the threshold for a model being not better at 
predicting the outcome than chance, and just shy of 0.7, the minimum limit for a good model. 
This metric indicates a model that is at best acceptable but not good. The likelihood ratio is 37.9 
on two degrees of freedom with a very small p-value (i.e. the LR value is trustworthy), and it 
agrees with the Wald test and the score (logrank) test. All these tests have positive but relatively 
low values, confirming the acceptability but weakness of the model. The R-square is very low at 
0.01 and shows that the model’s data is not close to the fitted regression line and does not 
provide any meaningful distinction between the explained variation and the total variation. The 
R-square of 0.01 also reveals that the model would not be good at providing any precise 
prediction. Figure 10 shows how the cumulative hazard curves for the stratum representing the 
sample population that did not experience the event of being an M&A target has an indistinct 
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Figure 10. Hypothesis 3 M&A – Cumulative Hazard Curve  
 
Figure 10. Cumulative hazard curves for hypothesis 3 showing the absence of a causal 
relationship between financial distress and the event of being an M&A target. 
The graph also shows that the confidence intervals are large, especially the blue one for 
the M&A target firms. This graph provides a visual representation of the R-square results. 
Overall, with a positive and low LR confirmed by the Wald test and the score (logrank) test and 
a concordance superior to 0.5, the model is valid; but the low results of these tests and the very 
low R-square caution that the model is very weak. The model for hypothesis three is valid but 
very weak; it is however valid enough to proceed to the next step of the analysis and check the 
null hypothesis. The p-value of 0.2750 is largely superior to the threshold of 0.05 and indicates 
that the probability that the pattern of the M&A activity relative to the state of financial distress 
being created by some random process is too high to reject the null hypothesis. The model for 
hypothesis three is very weak yet valid, but the null hypothesis fails to be rejected and this 
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survival analysis does not show a causal relationship between financial distress and the event of 
being an M&A target. 
Despite the lack of null hypothesis rejection for the model of the univariate analysis, the 
researcher also runs a model using a vector of covariates including valuation metrics. Table 28 
shows the results of this analysis. 
Table 28. Hypothesis 3 M&A Vector of Covariates - Survival Analysis Results  
Hypothesis 3 M&A Vector of Covariates - Survival Analysis Results  
 
R ran this model for 547 observations of financial distress only, with 23 events of being 
an M&A target, and censored 3,151 observations. The concordance shows a good model and the 
LR is positive, the model is valid. Regarding the null hypothesis that the covariates have no 
predictive value for the event of being an M&A target, the results in table 28 confirm those of 
table 27 with one exception. The p-value is too high for all covariates but one to reject the null 
hypothesis. That exception is the X13_EV/Ebitdax covariate with a p-value of 0.0019 and a 
narrow confidence interval that is also different from one. The interpretation of this result is that 
for each unit of change in the ratio of EV/Ebitdax, the estimate of change in the log of the hazard 
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in being an M&A target is 1.0032. The overall result for hypothesis 3 remains nonetheless that 
the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
Summary of Results 
This study focuses on three hypotheses for which table 29 provides a summary of results.  
Table 29. Summary of results 
Summary of results 
 
Albeit a baseline model serves as a foundation to explore for the first time the existence 
of strength of the correlation between standard financial ratios and the hazard of financial 
distress as defined in terms of two consecutive quarters of negative OCF/TA efficiency ratio, 
table 29 does not include this baseline model. Suffice to say about the baseline model that the 
results of the univariate Cox extended model survival analyses (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & 
Kleinbaum, 2012) do show a correlation between nine financial ratios (out of 15) and the event 
of financial distress hazard, but this correlation remains very small. The stratification visible in 
figure 6 shows that the oil price shock of June 2008 is a distinct shift in the exposure to financial 
distress between firms that started their activity after date (higher hazard) and those that had 
started before (lower hazard). However, this shift does not alter the initial results of the baseline 
model and thus fail to amplify the already low correlations for the nine valid predictor variables. 
The study results in table 29 show that the models are valid for all three hypotheses and 
allow to check the null hypothesis. For hypotheses one and two, the null hypotheses are rejected, 
and for the hypothesis three it is not. The results for hypothesis one show that a hedging firm is 
18.5 times less likely to experience the hazard of financial distress than a non-hedging firm. The 
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results for hypothesis two indicate that the estimate of the change in the log of the hazard in 
financial distress is -16.61% per unit of increase in size, therefore, the larger the firm the less 
likely it is to experience financial distress. The results for hypothesis three are that financial 
distress is not a reliable predictor variable of the event of being an M&A target. With the results 
of the study now available, disclosed and interpreted statistically, this research reaches the point 
to review the entire study, discuss the results and offer recommendations, in the last chapter of 
conclusions and recommendations (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
This research concludes with this chapter, following an opening with an overview chapter 
before a literature review to provide an exhaustive background to this study, and a methodology 
chapter leading to the presentation and analysis of the results. This ultimate part starts with a 
summary of the key points in this research, follows with a discussion of the results, then a 
section on the conclusion and practical recommendations and closes with recommendations for 
future research. 
Summary of the Results 
The content in this study, building up to this concluding chapter, is vast and varied. This 
section proposes a refresher summary of the key components of this study, including the problem 
statement, the significance of the study, the literature review findings, the methodology and the 
results. 
Summary of the problem statement 
An economic context with severe impact on the Canadian oil and gas sector sets the 
background of this study. The problem this context sheds light on and that drives this research is 
the dire financial distress Canadian oil and gas firms experience during bust cycles. The 
Canadian economy is commodity driven, and among other commodities such as grain, coal, 
phosphate or gold and diamond to name a few, oil and gas play a significant role sustaining 
almost a million jobs, driving the province of Alberta and representing over CAD 81B in annual 
investment (CAPP, 2016; Millington, 2016; PSAC, 2016). The oil and gas industry in Canada 
follows boom and bust cycles and is sensitive to the volatility of the price of oil on the 
international markets, conventionally reported in USD for the WTI index. Since the mid-1970’s 
there have been a series of cycles and the period of interest in this study from Q1-2002 to Q1-
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2016 includes an oil price growth that peaked at USD 151.72 in June 2008, fell sharply right 
after in the context of the 2008 and 2009 financial recession, resumed with a growing but volatile 
growth and fell again in June 2014, starting one of the most severe bust cycles this industry has 
experienced, epitomized with a January 2016 oil price floor of USD 28.50 (Macrotrends, 2016). 
Canada is a net exporter of oil and per Millington (2016), every annualized dollar increase in the 
price of oil barrel represents a CAD 1.7B GDP increase for the period of 2015-2021. In Calgary, 
the Canadian oil and gas capital located in Alberta where the oil sands producing 97% of 
Canadian oil are located, employers in all sectors have implemented massive lay-offs, hiring and 
investment freezes, and many companies have been struggling to survive (CAPP, 2016; PSAC, 
2016). This bust cycle started in the second half of 2014 and in early 2017, it is still not 
recovering as an economic leading indicator consisting in the city’s downtown offices occupancy 
rate shows that 30% of the available office space is empty (Avison Young, 2007; Macrotrends, 
2016). In the two years from September 2014 to August 2016, 20 Canadian oil and gas firms 
have filed for bankruptcy and several others have and still are experiencing financial distress 
(Haynes & Boone, 2016; Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, 2016). These two 
notions are distinct and this study’s introduction of a new financial distress definition contributes 
to its significance (Avison Young, 2007; CAPP, 2016; Haynes & Boone, 2016; Macrotrends, 
2016; Millington, 2016; Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, 2016; PSAC, 
2016). 
Summary of the significance of the study 
The significance of this study is multifold. The scope, originality, method, and practical 
use to the business world contribute all to the importance of this research. The scope of this study 
pertains to the importance of the oil and gas industry in Canada that materially permeates the 
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value chains of several other sectors including transportation, construction, banking, hospitality 
and retail among others with $142B of 2015 nominal GDP (7.7% of Canadian GDP) and 
709,548 direct and indirect jobs (3.9% of national employment) (Natural Resources Canada, 
2017). The scope also relates to the size of the sample: 540 firms with public quarterly financial 
data during a 14-year period and representing a sample size of more than 15,850 observations. 
This study is original in its focus on Canadian oil and gas, its use of an extended Cox model with 
repeating events (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012), its use of a new and clearly 
rationalized definition of financial distress that leverages the existing literature, and the 
hypotheses of hedging, size and M&A it explores. Testing hedging as a minimizing factor of 
Canadian oil and gas firms’ financial distress hazard is a novelty in the existing literature; testing 
size in the same context is a confirmation of the literature consensus for an original scope (Aziz 
& Dar, 2006; Fitzpatrick & Ogden, 2011; Raj & Rinastiti, 2002; Shumway, 2001); and testing 
the impact of financial distress on the status of being a target in Canadian oil and gas M&A 
activity is also an original attempt that may contribute to the design of future research for more 
decisive results. The method of an extended Cox model with repeating events is a survival 
analysis technique that gives this study a depth and breadth alternative binary bankruptcy 
predictive analyses cannot match, especially with such a large sample and for the dynamic 
perspective of understanding the time to the event (Chen & Lee, 1993; Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; 
Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). To practitioners, along with scholars, this study provides a new 
helpful perspective through the definition of financial distress when making diagnoses, 
appreciating profitability and going concern capability during bust cycles, and ultimately making 
strategic decisions. This study contributes to oil and gas managers’ understanding of the 
importance of their assets’ efficiency and capacity to autonomously generate cash, secure 
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solvency, long term profitability and growth through sustained capital investment. Similarly, this 
study also contributes to managers’ understanding of the importance of hedging and size for 
preventing financial distress. The significance of this study also stems from being framed within 
a clearly stated post-positivist paradigm, in the tradition of several quantitative studies that are 
part of the literature review of this research (Aziz & Dar, 2006; Chen & Lee, 1993; Cox, 1972; 
Fitzpatrick & Ogden, 2011; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012; Natural Resources Canada, 
2017; Raj & Rinastiti, 2002; Shumway, 2001;). 
Summary of the literature review 
The literature review of this study starts by providing a contextual and historical 
framework of the evolution of the use of financial ratios as the main predictive tool in corporate 
failure. This introduction serves to better understand the two main paradigms of multi-
discriminant analysis (MDA) and conditional probabilities models that remain literature 
benchmarks and that preceded the variety of alternative methods mainly using intelligent 
techniques. In the rich field of corporate failure predictive approaches, survival analysis stands 
apart in its ability to assess the hazard. The literature review also includes the notion of financial 
distress and the current state of research on the three topics of the hypotheses, hedging, size and 
M&A.  
The use of financial ratios started at the turn of the past century and evolved in the 1920’s 
with the first empirical studies geared towards credit worthiness (Horrigan, 1968). More studies, 
larger and more focused followed, up to the early sixties, but it was Beaver (1966) who set off 
the main paradigm shift in bankruptcy prediction, rapidly followed by Altman (1968) with the 
MDA developed Z-score. Ohlson (1980) and Zmijewski (1984) shifted the MDA paradigm 
towards the logit and probit conditional probabilities models. MDA carried restrictive 
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assumptions requiring demanding transformations, and while logit an probit were less 
demanding but very sensitive to multicollinearity and outliers, both methods are intuitively 
comfortable and popular among neophytes (Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006). The advent of increased 
computing power and data processing capabilities enabled alternative techniques to enter the 
field of bankruptcy and corporate failure prediction. Those include neural networks, support 
vector machines or decision trees among others. Until Ohlson (1980), empirical studies used pair 
matching and all but survival analysis, rely on a pass/fail binary response (Altman, 1968; 
Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006; Beaver, 1966; Horrigan, 1968; Ohlson, 1980; Zmijewski, 1984).  
Cox (1972) proposed a semi-parametric approach to survival analysis that social sciences 
and finance researchers adapted from biostatistics and epidemiology to gain superiority in 
bankruptcy and corporate failure prediction over the binary results providing techniques (Cox, 
1972; InfluentialPoints, 2016; Pereira, 2014). That superiority stems from the use of larger data, 
longer time-frame, the proportional hazards assumption, the assumption of no multicollinearity, 
the hazard ratio and the survival rate showing survival or hazard probabilities over time. Of the 
67 business-related survival analyses using a proportional hazards method this research has 
found, only two are Canadian: Chen and Lee (1993) did the only published Cox PH survival 
analysis on a sample of 175 firms including 67 financially distressed; and more recently 
Davydenko (2013) focused on credit analysis with a large sample of 30,744 firm-months. Chen 
and Lee (1993) used time-independent covariates and suggested future research to include time-
dependent financial ratios as well as consider M&A as alternative causes for exit. Among other 
findings, they reported that cash flow is not an important determinant of survival time for oil and 
gas companies. They used a definition of financial distress aligned with Beaver’s (1966) and 
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based on bankruptcy, default, or suspension of preferred dividends (Beaver, 1966; Chen & Lee, 
1993; Cox, 1972; Davydenko, 2013; InfluentialPoints, 2016; Pereira, 2014).  
The literature is very heterogeneous in defining financial distress and the criteria include 
asset value decrease, illiquidity, insolvency and default, dividend reduction, bankruptcy filing, 
restructuring, drop in profitability, stock market value, lay-offs, sales decrease and debt 
refinancing. Outecheva (2007) described financial distress as a cycle starting with early 
impairment when the firm is still solvent followed by a deterioration of performance affecting 
profitability, the firm still being solvent; then insolvency and default where the firm is illiquid. In 
a subsequent phase, the firm is firmly insolvent and faces a death struggle characterized by an 
exit choice of liquidation, takeover or survival. Survival happens through a restructuring of the 
troubled debt leading back to solvency which starts the last stage of the cycle, recovery. Hillier et 
al. (2012) included in the state of financial distress the need for management to take decisive 
strategic action to correct the downhill course or save the company. Despite a very large number 
of studies on financial distress over several decades, there is still no consensus on a standard 
definition; rather, Outecheva (2007) concluded that “the state of the art in the theory of financial 
distress is…to interpret it as dependent on the purpose of research under a particular point [sic] 
of view” (Outecheva, 2007, p.18). (Hillier et al., 2012; Outecheva, 2007). 
The hedging literature initially focused on how to hedge, from the 1960’s until the early 
1980’s before shifting to the reasons for hedging which include a reduction in the cost of 
financial distress among other motives. For Chowdry and Schwartz (2012), firms should hedge 
the probability of bankruptcy through specific transaction exposure rather than its impact. 
Breeden and Viswanathan (2016) found that firms hedge to lock in performance. With a focus on 
oil and gas, Jin and Jorion (2006) analyzed that hedging does not increase market value. 
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Lookman (2004) had also reached the same conclusion, adding that for undiversified firms 
facing primary (commodity) risk, hedging was associated with high agency costs, lower firm 
value and bad management. Haushalter (2000, 2001) reported that oil and gas producers do not 
hedge all their exposure and that firms with high leverage and thus higher financing cost, tend to 
hedge more; firms with lower basis risk also tend to hedge more; and as hedging is a costly 
process requiring specific expertise and economies of scales in transaction costs, larger firms 
tend to hedge more (Breeden & Viswanathan, 2016; Chowdry & Schwartz, 2012; Haushalter, 
2000, 2001; Jin & Jorion, 2006; Lookman, 2004). 
Firm size is a frequent topic in the corporate failure literature and there is a scholar 
consensus that firm size has strong failure predictive power and that firm size inversely 
correlates to bankruptcy risk (Aziz & Dar, 2006; Fitzpatrick & Ogden, 2011; Raj & Rinastiti, 
2002; Shumway, 2001). For Rommer (2004), firm size follows a U-shaped statistic where small 
firms lack resilience to shock and are thus exposed at one branch, while at the other branch large 
firms lack flexibility and nimbleness to quickly monitor their employees and communicate 
internally. In a review of 100 empirical papers Dang and Li (2015) found that the most frequent 
measure of firm size is the natural logarithm of assets. Thus, a review of firm size literature 
decisively shows that firm size is a good predictor of financial distress, the risk decreases with 
size and the measure for size is Log assets (Aziz & Dar, 2006; Dang & Li, 2015; Fitzpatrick & 
Ogden, 2011; Raj & Rinastiti, 2002; Rommer, 2004; Shumway, 2001). 
Several authors considering the relationship between financial distress and M&A saw in 
M&A a bankruptcy avoidance strategy and correlated solvency fragility to increased takeover 
risk (Jin & Jorion, 2006; Kyimaz, 2006; Lookman, 2004; Powell & Yawson, 2007). Dickerson et 
al. (2003) found in pre-emptive acquisitions a defense mechanism against hostile take-over and a 
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great influence against the probability of bankruptcy. Before them, Stiglitz (1972) had seen a 
higher risk of hostile take-over in firms with high debt-to-equity ratio, which he equated to high 
bankruptcy risk. For Erel et al. (2015), being acquired lifts the financial constraint of the target 
firm. Powell and Yawson (2007) found that the variables used to predict takeovers are similarly 
useful for bankruptcy prediction. In Canada, Cohen et al. (2009) identified a surge in oil and gas 
M&A activity for tax optimization purposes following a 2006 fiscal policy change (Cohen et al., 
2009; Dickerson et al., 2003; Erel et al., 2015; Jin & Jorion, 2006; Kyimaz, 2006; Lookman, 
2004; Powell & Yawson, 2007; Stiglitz, 1972). 
Summary of the methodology 
The key construct of interest of this study is the notion of financial distress defined as two 
consecutive quarters of negative operating cash flow to total assets ratio. Exploration and 
production (E&P) of oil and gas, especially in Canada where oil sands are more expensive to 
exploit than light crude fields elsewhere in the world, is a capital intensive, asset heavy and long 
lead time industry (CAPP, 2016). This definition of financial distress leverages the notion of 
death struggle by Outecheva (2007) and the necessity of strategic action put forth by Hillier et al. 
(2012) while putting the emphasis on asset efficiency. The efficient use of the productive assets 
should generate the cash flow necessary to sustain profitability and reinvest in the assets to grant 
growth. The first quarter of negative OCF/TA is an alert about the going concern of the firm 
which should trigger strategic corrective action; a second consecutive period puts the firm in 
financial distress, a state where it still can take corrective action and a state that can become 
chronic with repetitive events for several quarters (CAPP, 2016; Hillier et al., 2012; Outecheva, 
2007). 
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This study builds a baseline model and tests three hypotheses. The baseline model 
includes a vector of covariates with select ratios for liquidity, solvency, profitability and 
industry-specific variables. Setting up a baseline model is a common practice in survival 
analysis, as is the use of vectors of covariates when there are multiple independent variables 
(Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). In this study, however, the actual testing of the baseline 
model consists in a series of univariate analyses on each predictor variable. This approach yields 
higher precision and eliminates the potential risk of multicollinearity or confounding a vector 
may carry. Each of these analyses tests the null hypothesis that the independent predictor 
variable has no effect on the hazard of financial distress. The baseline model uses the public 
financial quarterly reporting from Q1-2002 to Q1-2016 for a sample of 540 of Canadian oil and 
gas E&P firms traded on the TSX, with headquarters and production in Canada. This represents a 
sample size of 15,836 firm-quarters observations. JuneWarren Nickle’s (JWN) a Canadian oil 
and gas publishing firm graciously offered the data to the researcher, and the researcher 
reconciled for accuracy a sample of the data with PDF financial statements available on the TSX 
website (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; JWN, 2016; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012).  
The technique of the study includes two phases: a data preparation in Excel and the actual 
survival analysis in R. The raw data in Excel format serves to build the financial ratios and the 
dependent variable of financial distress for each firm and each period, present the data, calculate 
descriptive statistics and prepare the data layout for R. The same data and Excel preparation 
serves, with required adjustments, for the three hypotheses of this study. The first hypothesis 
tests whether having a hedging activity, determined from the existence of percentage of BOE 
hedged, and measured through a Heaviside function of “1” for the presence of hedging and “0” if 
the firm did not hedge in that period, helps reduce the hazard of financial distress. The null 
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hypothesis is that hedging has no impact on financial distress. The sample size is 515 firms over 
the period of Q1-2007 to Q1-2016 representing 11,005 firm-quarter observations. The second 
hypothesis is that size measured in Log assets impacts financial distress and the null hypothesis 
is that size has no effect on financial distress. The same sample as the baseline model serves to 
test this hypothesis and the total number of observations is 15,849 firm-quarters. For the third 
hypothesis, the dependent variable is not the financial distress but the status of being a target in 
an M&A activity, measured through a Heaviside function. Financial distress is the independent 
variable and the null hypothesis is that being financially distressed has no effect on being an 
M&A target. The data for this activity includes 166 firms, 175 M&A events and 3,698 financial 
distress observations. The second phase of the technique is the survival analysis in R, a statistical 
software specifically designed to carry out survival analyses among other capabilities (Cox, 
1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012).  
The survival analysis in this study is an extended Cox model with repeating events. This 
is a semi-parametric model, thus one that does not require a baseline hazard from a previous 
probabilistic distribution but instead uses only the exponentiation of the changes in the covariates 
to perform a regression analysis between the independent and the dependent variables. The Cox 
PH model uses the assumption that the hazard ratio remains constant among the population for 
each predictor variable. When that proportional hazard assumption is violated, that means that 
the value of the predictor changes with time, which is the case for the financial ratios and other 
variables this study uses. A time coefficient, directly calculated by R, serves then to reinstate the 
PH assumption and such a model is an extended Cox model. The model output includes the z-
score, the p-value, the regression coefficient, the hazard ratio and the confidence intervals at 95% 
along with goodness of fit statistics and cumulative hazard curves. The design of this study 
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includes stratifications on the baseline model to test the potential impact of oil price shocks, and 
on the size hypothesis to gain further precision on the results. The study consists in collecting 
and preparing the data, running the analysis in R, interpret the model validity and interpret the 
survival analysis results. A hazard ratio of 1 means that the null hypothesis fails to be rejected 
and a HR of more than one means that the hazard is as many times higher for exposed firms than 
censored firms, and vice versa for HR of less than one. The HR interpretation must follow the 
directional impact of the predictor on the dependent variable (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & 
Kleinbaum, 2012). 
This study includes descriptive statistics that reveal that the data is highly dispersed and 
the distinction between financially distressed and non-financially distressed is more relevant than 
that of active and inactive firms. 74% of the 540 firms in the baseline model or 400 are 
financially distressed and the remaining 140 non-financially distressed firms show much less 
distressed predictors. For the populations of the hedging and size hypotheses, non-financially 
distressed firms hedge a larger percentage of their production and have a larger size. The 
valuation ratios for the third hypothesis are also highly dispersed and the non-financially 
dispersed firms have better profitability ratios. 
Summary of findings 
This study generates three key findings for the hypotheses it tests, and two additional 
ancillary findings for the baseline model and the impact of oil price shock on the hazard of 
financial distress: 
• The first hypothesis shows the most significant finding of this study. The model presents 
a solid goodness of fit and is valid. The null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative 
SURVIVAL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN OIL AND GAS FIRMS 181 
  
hypothesis is accepted, meaning that a hedging firm is 18.5 times less likely to experience 
financial distress than a non-hedging firm. 
• For the second hypothesis, too, the model passes the goodness of fit test and is valid.  The 
null hypothesis is rejected and the valid alternative hypothesis means that the estimate of 
the change in the log of the hazard in financial distress is -16.61% per unit of increase in 
size. With each unit size increase, a firm is 1.18 times less likely to experience financial 
distress. 
• The model for the third hypothesis on the impact of financial distress on being an M&A 
target is weak but valid, but the null hypothesis is not rejected. The p-value is 0.2750 
which means that the chance of the regression analysis pattern being a random process is 
27.5%. This percentage is significantly higher than the 5% threshold below which the 
null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, financial distress is not a valid predictor of the event 
and hazard of being an M&A target. 
In addition to the key results of the hypotheses, this research also sheds light on the 
following two findings. 
• The baseline model is valid and the null hypothesis is rejected for nine predictors out of 
14. However, the correlation between those variables and the dependent variable of 
financial distress is very small. For eight predictors, the estimate of the change in the log 
of the hazard in financial distress is less than 0.1% per unit of change in the predictor. 
• A stratification around the oil price shock of June 2008 shows that the variable predictor 
of oil price change has an impact on financial distress: the companies that started after 
Q2-2008 have a higher cumulative hazard of financial distress than those that started 
before. However, upon applying that stratification to the nine valid predictors of the 
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baseline model, it appears that the change in oil price fails to have any impact on the 
initial results of the baseline model. 
The whole study, as developed in the previous chapters and summarized above, unrolls to 
identify the interest for this study, situating the theoretical foundation, designing a methodology 
and presenting the results of the survival analysis. This construction leads to the essential 
objective of critically discussing the results, in compliance with the rhetorical assumption of a 
disinterested scientist that contributes to the post-positivist paradigm governing this research. 
Discussion of the Results 
This section covers four parts, one for each of the hypotheses on hedging, firm size and 
M&A, and the last one for the ancillary results from the baseline model and the oil price shock. 
Discussion of the Findings on Hedging and Financial Distress 
The most significant result of this study is the importance of hedging on reducing the 
hazard of structural financial distress. Against a literature background that focuses on the reasons 
for hedging without specifically including survival and resilience, this result invites the addition 
of a new reason to the existing portfolio. Finance practitioners and firm managers consider that 
“cash is king” and apparently, so do hedging scholars, as Chowdhry and Schwartz (2012) 
referred to firms not hedging their exposure to the risks representing the highest negative impact 
on their cash flow as a long-standing puzzle in the risk management literature. They argued that 
firms should hedge the probability of bankruptcy as opposed to its impact. The result of this 
study supports their conclusion while offering a deeper perspective on two levels: the first is the 
focus on the self-sustained ability to generate cash, not just the existence of the cash; and the 
second is the continuity in hedging rather than a transaction-based hedging practice. Cash inflow 
can have indiscriminate catalysts building its strength, such as the externality of a strong oil 
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price, the sales of assets, other exceptional events, or the successful outcome of a refinancing 
strategy leveraging existing or future collaterals, or taking advantage of favorable economic 
conditions such as lower interest rates. Cash outflow may be variably severe, ceteris paribus, 
depending on management practice, efficiency or poor treasury and financial strategy including 
over gearing. Cash is king, indeed, but risk managing a projected cash flow that nets such 
positives and negatives and which prospective analysis requires assumptions that may prove 
somewhat accurate, does not cover the same depth of hedging effectiveness as the result of this 
study implies. The definition of financial distress this study uses puts the emphasis of corporate 
resilience on the firm’s ability to generate the cash it needs to survive, grow and thrive on the 
efficiency of its assets. This is different from the variety of factors listed above that can 
indiscriminately generate the cash flow that the existing literature focuses on, including the 
conclusions of Chowdhry and Schwartz (2012). They also argued for specific transaction 
hedging, while the result of this study using over 11,000 firm-quarters to indicate that hedging 
firms are 18.5 times less likely to face the hazard of financial distress, tends to support the 
effectiveness of a continuous and embedded hedging strategy for oil and gas firms. Survival 
analysis enables the use of very large data samples and this study is taking full advantage of it, 
but a large population often comes as dispersed data, as the descriptive statistics in this study 
revealed for this sample. The corollary of this dispersion may be a different or wider focus than 
the underlying literature reference studies, especially when those did not use the same method. 
This study does not explore the pertinence of diversification or bad management as Lookman 
(2004) studied, and does not focus either on the proportion of production hedged as did 
Haushalter (2000, 2001). The Heaviside function this study uses only pertains to the existence of 
hedging, not its proportions, continuity, strategy or importance within a firm’s risk management 
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practice. Yet, the results are decisively strong. Similarly, this study does not specifically focus on 
the effectiveness of hedging marginal risk that allows management to lock in performance as 
considered by DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) and Breeden and Viswanathan (2016). However, the 
result of this study shows that hedging contributes to building structural strength, which reflects 
sound management, and which my contribute to infirming the conclusions of Jin and Jorion 
(2006) and Lookman (2004) that minimize the impact of hedging on firm’s stock and valuation, 
for good management and sophisticated risk management must inevitably build a premium on 
the stock of the hedging companies that are 18.5 times less exposed to the anemia and shock of 
financial distress. That sophistication appears in the cost, the expertise and even the larger size 
that hedging requires as Haushalter (2000, 2001) has posited (Breeden & Viswanathan, 2016; 
Chowdhry & Schwartz, 2012; DeMarzo & Duffie, 1995; Haushalter, 2000, 2001; Jin & Jorion, 
2006; Lookman, 2004).  
Discussion of the Findings on Firm Size and Financial Distress 
The results of this study confirm the three conclusions of the literature review on firm 
size impact on financial distress, respectively on relevance, correlation and metric. With a very 
significant sample size of 15,849 quarter-firms, the model in this study has a strong goodness of 
fit as the very low p-value, the low z-score, the narrow confidence interval and the positive 
likelihood ratio confirmed by the Wald test and the score (logrank) test) indicate. This confirms 
the strong predictive power of firm size on financial distress as most the numerous studies in the 
often tested variable of firm size in corporate finance and financial distress has found. These 
studies, including Aziz and Dar (2006), Fitzpatrick and Ogden (2011), Raj and Rinastiti (2002), 
Rommer (2004), and Shumway (2001), have also concluded to a positive correlation between 
decreasing size firm and probability of failure. The result of this research confirms this scholar 
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consensus in finding that for each unit of change in size, the estimate of change in the log of the 
hazard in financial distress is -16.61%. Thus, as the literature has established, this study confirms 
that with size increase, firms decrease their hazard of financial distress. In a meta-analysis of 100 
empirical papers, Dang and Li (2015) found an overwhelming preference for the metric of Log 
assets for measuring size in corporate finance. This study remains consistent with this consensus 
and uses the same metric of Log assets. However, among the confirmations of the previous 
literature findings, this study dissents with the hypothesis by Rommer (2004) that firm size 
follows a U-shaped statistic in positively correlating to resilience against financial distress. 
Rommer (2004) hypothesized that small firms lack resilience to shock and are exposed at one 
branch of the U, while at the other branch, large firms lack flexibility and nimbleness to quickly 
monitor their employees and communicate internally. This study includes a stratification which 
results confirm the initial finding that the larger a firm, the less cumulative hazard it exhibits for 
financial distress; this result does not support the U-shape hypothesis Rommer (2004) 
formulated. While the variable of size has been tested in numerous studies and may not be as 
original as the hedging variable discussed above, the contribution of this study in this mature 
field lies in the novelty of the population of Canadian oil and gas E&P firms, including the 
sample size, and the originality of the definition of financial distress aiming to capture the 
structural weakness of firms this study introduces. With a statistically solid method of a Cox 
extended model with repeating events, a large sample size, a new population and a new 
definition of financial distress, this study adds a modest stone to the already high wall of studies 
on firm size impact on corporate health (Aziz & Dar, 2006; Cox, 1972; Dang & Li, 2015; 
Fitzpatrick & Ogden, 2011; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012; Raj & Rinastiti, 2002; 
Rommer, 2004; Shumway, 2001). 
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Discussion of the Findings on Financial Distress and M&A 
Several authors have explored the relationship between financial distress and M&A, 
especially to see in M&A a bankruptcy avoidance strategy and correlate solvency fragility to 
increased takeover risk. Those include Dickerson et al. (2003), Erel et al. (2015), Pastena and 
Ruland (1986), Kyimaz (2006), and Peel and Wilson (1989). This study attempts to explore the 
causal relationship between being structurally financially distressed and being a target in an 
M&A transaction. The sample size of 175 M&A events for 166 firms and 3,698 distressed firm-
quarters is statistically significant and the method of a Cox extended model with repeating events 
is also statistically solid (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). The model is weak 
but valid and it results in failing to reject the null hypothesis. Structural financial distress in 
terms of two consecutive quarters of negative OCF/TA asset efficiency ratio is not a valid 
predictor of the hazard for a firm to be a target in an M&A transaction. A model using a vector 
of profitability and valuation covariates returns the same results except for one predictor, 
EV/Ebitdax, which shows a relatively weak correlation indicating that a distressed firm has only 
a 0.32% hazard increase for every decrease in its EV/Ebitdax ratio. Powell and Yawson (2007) 
analyzed that the variables used to predict takeovers are similarly useful for bankruptcy 
prediction. The results of this study do not reconcile with their finding, and begs the question of 
the fit of the definition of financial distress that captures a deep structural weakness, for shining 
light on a potential M&A target. This question covers the alternative or concomitant potential 
design limitations or flows that led the testing of this hypothesis. Several externalities such as 
synergies, opportunistic consolidations, portfolio management, managerial vision and action 
among others may be factors of trigger and completion of an M&A transaction. Those are 
external to the concept of financial distress in this study, one that depicts a firm as vulnerable. 
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While the status of financial distress may not be the prime trigger that attract a predator firm, like 
a wounded prey would, it should still impact the valuation of the target firm and reflect in a valid 
model showing positive correlations between financial distress and being an M&A target. This 
intuitively expected causality does not show in the testing of this third hypothesis despite using a 
vector of valuation covariates. The epistemology of this research is epic, dual and objective, and 
the researcher acknowledges, with no vested interest and an agnostic lens, the result of this 
hypothesis (Cox, 1972; Dickerson et al., 2003; Erel et al., 2015; Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 
2012; Pastena & Ruland, 1986; Powell and Yawson, 2007; Kyimaz, 2006; Peel & Wilson, 1989).  
Discussion of the Findings on Financial Ratios, Oil Price Shock and Financial Distress 
The baseline model result, preliminary to the central hypotheses of this research, shows 
that the univariate extended Cox models with repeating events are valid and nine financial ratios 
predictor variables do correlate to the status of financial distress, albeit with low values. The 
literature review in this study explores the background of the use of financial ratios for predicting 
financial distress, including the main paradigms and models that have governed this field of 
research. Against that mature and varied literature backdrop, this study introduces a new 
structural definition of financial distress, but the standard financial ratios of liquidity, solvency 
and profitability only moderately predict the anemic state of this financial distress. Refinancing, 
debt restructuring, or other managerial action that does not reflect the firm’s inner ability to 
generate going concern, reinvestment, profitability and growth cash flow from its operating 
assets may contribute to the counterintuitive small regression coefficients. Alternatively, and 
despite the precaution of running univariate analyses, the use of ratios in a survival analysis 
compounds the confounding effect of the numerator and the denominator changes over time. 
This baseline analysis is not central to this study; it situates the context of financial distress and 
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provides an increased perspective for introducing the hypotheses of this study. A more 
sophisticated survival analysis that would warrant a whole study would be of value to more 
precisely analyze the results of the baseline model, including the oil price impact that the 
stratification highlighted. The data in this study is very dispersed but statistically significant, 
covering 14 years and amounting to over 15,850 firm-quarter observations (JWN, 2016). The 
extreme dispersion of the data is another factor that may call for specific stratifications or for an 
even more precise sample that includes size as a selection criterion. The results of the baseline 
model show both a useful confirmation of the correlation between financial ratios and the 
structural strength of the firm and a contrast with past studies that used other methods and found 
stronger correlations. They also hint at the potential limits of using ratios in a survival analysis. 
Ultimately, this baseline model opens a new alternative for further consideration, provided, 
unlike in this study, it be central to that effort (Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; JWN, 2016; Klein & 
Kleinbaum, 2012). 
The problem statement that opens this study refers to the impact of oil price fluctuations 
on the boom and bust cycles the Canadian oil and gas industry goes through. The stratification 
around one price shock shows indeed a clear distinction between the hazard of financial distress 
for firms that had been active prior to that price shock and the hazard of financial distress for 
firms that started only after that price drop. Although this observation is not the focus of this 
study, it contributes to showing that the structural weakness the key construct of interest of 
financial distress establishes in this study, does correlate to the externality of oil price 
fluctuations. The context of this specific oil price shock is a larger global financial recession, 
rather than purely endogenous to oil and gas. This context may have had an impact on the higher 
financial distress hazard of the firms that started past that date, due to other factors such as access 
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to debt, general economic contraction, managerial vision and momentum in times of generalized 
economic duress which can alter confidence levels and strategic decisions, or else. Thus, this 
finding does not prove the correlation but solidly points to its existence, and it would require a 
more specifically designed study to further establish it. However, this directional finding is 
important to relate the overall study to the context of the original problem statement and assert 
that the resilience, long term survival, profitability and growth ought to be considered through a 
deeply rooted financial distress metric as this study does, and evolve from the binary paradigms 
of bankruptcy prediction, in continuation of the work of Outecheva (2007) as well as Turetsky 
and McEwen (2001) and Whitaker (1999) (Outecheva, 2007; Turetsky & McEwen, 2001; 
Whitaker, 1999).  
The variety of topics this survival analysis covers provides the opportunity to discuss the 
results and findings on the foundational baseline model and all three hypotheses of this study. 
This discussion is disinterested, objective and non-complacent, to the best of the researcher’s 
capability and leads to the conclusion of this study, along with practical recommendations. 
Conclusion and Practical Recommendations 
The Canadian economy is tributary to its commodities, among which oil and gas 
exploration and production plays a key role (CAPP, 2016; Millington, 2016; Natural Resources 
Canada, 2016). The E&P sector is sensitive to boom and bust cycles and during the latter, oil and 
gas firms go through dire economic challenges (CAPP, 2016; Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; 
Millington, 2016; PSAC, 2016). This study uses an established statistical method that contrasts 
with alternative approaches within a field of research that has theoretically and empirically 
matured throughout a century and landmarked a few paradigms along the way (Balcaen & 
Ooghe, 2006; Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Horrigan, 1968; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). The theory and 
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practical application of financial distress predictive analysis is still evolving and not yet 
consolidated under one unequivocally accepted technique. So is the definition of financial 
distress, and this research introduces a new one that captures the deficient capability of asset 
heavy, capital intensive and long lead time firms in the oil and gas industry to generate from their 
assets’ efficiency the economic strength to remain a going concern, reinvest intelligently, be 
profitable and grow. The Canadian oil and gas industry is very diverse in firm and asset size, 
leverage, and overall management sophistication. This diversity shows in the extreme dispersion 
of the data in this study; the sample size is statistically significant, covering up to 14 years of 
financial reporting for 540 firms and giving over 15,850 observations of firm-quarters. Within a 
post-positivist research paradigm, this quantitative study thus uses large data, reviews 
extensively the existing literature and applies a solid statistical technique. The empirical findings 
of this research result in two practical recommendations for Canadian oil and gas managers and 
stakeholders (Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006; CAPP, 2016; Cox, 1972; Fox, 2008; Horrigan, 1968; 
Jakeman & Tertzakian, 2016; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012; Millington, 2016; Outecheva, 2007; 
PSAC, 2016;). 
The first recommendation is to hedge. In an industry that is so exposed to the external 
fluctuations of oil price, this study shows that hedging is a valid risk management strategy to 
prevent structural financial distress. Not hedging for stock price appreciation, or valuing 
exceptional managerial performance, but for embedding resilience at the core of the business in a 
structured, systematic, permanent and sophisticated way that honors the vision, expertise, cost 
and long term unwavering stability it may require. Smaller companies may consider expanding 
their own capabilities to create or increase their hedging strategy, consider pooling their needs to 
respond to the sophistication good hedging requires, or externalize the function to expert 
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advisory and consulting firms. Larger firms that already hedge may gain from the perspective of 
this research the will to be more systemic with a longer-term view when managing their hedging 
strategy. This includes hedging for core resilience, through cash flows naturally but not just for 
transactional cash flows, and resisting the temptation to hedge speculatively. The higher the 
proportion of its production a firm hedge, the better its financial ratios and the lower its 
cumulative hazard of financial distress. The same goes for size. 
The second recommendation is to seek size. This study confirms the results of several 
empirical studies that larger firms are less exposed to financial distress than smaller ones (Aziz 
& Dar, 2006; Fitzpatrick & Ogden, 2011; Raj & Rinastiti, 2002; Shumway, 2001). The 
Petroleum Services Association of Canada estimates at more than 1,000 the number of upstream 
oil and gas companies in Canada, doing exploration and production (PSAC, 2016). This includes 
252 public companies listed on the TSX and the TSXV with 10 seniors (producing more than 
100,000 BOE per day), 41 intermediates (10,000 to 100,000 BOE/d), 48 juniors (1,000 to 10,000 
BOE/d) and 153 emerging juniors (0 to 1,000 BOE/d) (TMX, 2016). The industry is far from 
being mature and consolidated, and the smaller the firm, the less its management systems 
including long term strategy, risk management, financial management and operations are 
sophisticated, leaving them more exposed to the adverse winds of oil price fluctuation or any 
event that can test their resilience. All these smaller firms, especially the two-third of E&P firms 
in the industry that are private along with the emerging juniors and the juniors would be well-
advised to seize consolidation opportunities and increase size to minimize the hazard of 
structural financial distress (Aziz & Dar, 2006; Fitzpatrick & Ogden, 2011; PSAC, 2016; Raj & 
Rinastiti, 2002; Shumway, 2001; TMX, 2016). 
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As the definition of financial distress in this study touches the core strength of oil and gas 
firms, they should proactively include the consideration of building inner resilience, minimize 
the risk of vegetating in a limbo anemic financially distressed state, in their decision to merge, 
consolidate and go beyond joint ventures concerns. The scope of this study is larger than the two 
practical recommendations above, and while the data is large, the technique solid and the 
hypotheses diverse and supplemented with a baseline model, this study reveals several avenues 
for future research. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
This research covers many topics and opens the following opportunities for empirical 
future research. 
• Hedging: following the strong benefit of hedging in minimizing the hazard of financial 
distress this study reports, future research may focus on risk management strategies 
including the proportions hedged or the continuity of the hedging and their impact on 
corporate resilience in the Canadian oil and gas industry; financial derivatives Canadian 
oil and gas firms use; and the motivation and factors guiding the hedging strategies in 
Canadian oil and gas, including risk appetite and corporate governance influence or 
managerial change following a merger, take-over or change in executive leadership. 
• M&A: the validity of the null hypothesis in this study points to the opportunity of further 
exploring the causal factors to M&A activity in the Canadian oil and gas industry, to 
complement the tax optimization objective Cohen et al. (2009) reported on following a 
policy change, considering the broader literature background of bankruptcy avoidance 
and solvency fragility (Cohen et al.; 2009). 
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• Baseline model: the results of this study indicate to the need to explore the impact of 
ratios’ numerator and denominator changes in affecting the correlation between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable in an extended Cox model, and 
performing a similar analysis to the baseline model in this study accordingly (Cox, 1972; 
Fox, 2008; Klein & Kleinbaum, 2012). 
• Oil price fluctuation and financial distress: the stratification around one price shock in 
this study points toward a strong correlation between oil price and financial distress, 
however a more focused study may use more than one stratification around one shock, 
and use other dependent variables than financial distress, such as financial ratios. 
• Financial distress: future research may consider how fitting the definition of financial 
distress this study introduces for capital intensive and heavy asset industries may be to 
different industries with different characteristics. 
• Industry: the population for this study is limited to the E&P sector, but a similar study 
could include or focus on the dependent industries of EPCM (engineering, procurement 
and construction management), oil and gas services, transportation (i.e. rail and road), or 
hospitality and tourism among others; future research may also seek to understand to 
what extent oil price induced economic recessions, such as the one Alberta is 
experiencing since mid-2014, influences the diversification of the oil and gas industry in 
renewable energies. 
• Oil prices: as a leading and very influential externality to the financial health of oil and 
gas firms, oil prices offer several areas of focus for future research. The first is the impact 
of new technology on oil prices. The second is the influence of futures on oil prices. And 
the third uses the assumption of oil prices staying low for an extended period (as of Q2-
SURVIVAL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN OIL AND GAS FIRMS 194 
  
2017, prices have been relatively low for almost three years) to ask what strategies should 
oil firms apply to secure their long-term survival and strengthen their resilience? 
(Macrotrends, 2016). 
The Canadian oil and gas industry is important, varied, exposed and still growing. While 
empirical data may require efforts to gather, this industry offers a much larger potential for 
diverse and impactful academic research than currently exists. This study humbly opens a small 
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Appendix B 
Abstract of Raw Data 
Table 31. Table B – Abstract of Raw Data 
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Abstract of Raw Data 
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Appendix C 
Abstracts of Excel Data Preparation 
Table 32. Table C1 – Data Preparation – WC/TA 
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Data Preparation – WC/TA 
 
Table 33. Table C2 – Data Preparation – Debt/Ebitdax 
Table C2  
Data Preparation – Debt/Ebitdax 
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Appendix D 
Abstracts of Data Layout for R 
Table 34. Table D1 – Data Layout for R – Hypothesis 3, CSV File 
Table D1  
Data Layout for R – Hypothesis 3, CSV File. 
 
Table 35. Table D2 – Data Layout for R – Hypothesis 1, Start End CSV File 
Table D2  
Data Layout for R – Hypothesis 1, Start End CSV file. 
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Hypothesis 2 - Size 
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